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Unexpected usage of user data has made headlines as both governments and commercial
entities have encountered privacy-related issues. Like other social networking sites,
LinkedIn provides users to restrict access to their information or allow for public
viewing; information available in the public view was used unexpectedly (i.e., profiling).
A non-profit entity called ICWATCH used tools to gather information on government
mass surveillance programs by scraping publicly accessible user data from LinkedIn.
Previous research has shown that privacy concerns influence behavior intention in
contrived scenarios. What remains unclear is whether LinkedIn users, whose data was
scraped by ICWATCH (an actual situation), would have similar privacy concerns and
subsequently express the intent to take privacy-preserving action.
This study proposed to answer three research questions in the context of an actual
privacy-centric situation, using an explanatory sequential mixed methods design. First,
what is the user's disposition towards privacy? Second, to what extent does this influence
users' privacy concerns regarding the inclusion of their LinkedIn profile information
within ICWATCH? Third, to what extent do these concerns influence their stated
intention to modify their LinkedIn profile/settings to minimize/eliminate this inclusion?
The two-phase approach performed quantitative analysis on collected survey data,
followed by analysis on follow-up interview data to provide context.
The resulting analyses found significant support for each hypothesis and divergence of
underlying factors between degrees of the hypotheses and variable representations. Those
participants who were not inclined to privacy and were not concerned with the situation,
as expected, did not intend to modify their LinkedIn profile. However, they did express
underlying factors such as control and privacy risk belief, unlike their counterparts. Those
participants who were more inclined and more concerned about the situation did express
an intent to modify their profile and revealed underlying factors such as regulations and
usage. The findings support the extension of the existing literature onto actual privacycentric situations. The results also highlight challenges with population demographics in
actual situations and suggestions for construct prioritization when investigating future
situations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background
The availability of personal information on the Internet has broad implications as it
relates to individual privacy. Dinev et al. (2008) note survey results where participants
reveal that "Privacy is among the highest of individual rights," falling between freedom
of speech and freedom of religion (p. 215). Warren and Brandeis (1890) defined privacy
as the right to be left alone, which has been foundational for privacy research (Christin et
al., 2011; Conger et al., 2013; Dinev et al., 2013; Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 2014;
Pavlou, 2011; Smith et al., 2011; Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011).
Building on this, Pavlou provides a consumer definition of privacy as the right not to be
disturbed, and more specifically, not to have personal information used for purposes other
than those for which the data was initially submitted. Concerns related to information
privacy are increasingly prevalent due to the volume of information collected,
transmitted, and stored by organizations (with and without consent), whose intentions are
not always evident (Rusk, 2014; Schwaig et al., 2013). Pavlou notes that "Specifically,
the tension between the proper use of personal information and information privacy has
been touted as one of the most serious ethical debates of the information age" (p. 977).
As Li et al. (2011) noted, privacy is a broad issue that poses particular problems for
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commercial entities. For example, data-dependent organizations such as Google,
Facebook, and Amazon are particularly vulnerable to privacy-related concerns. Each has
recently encountered privacy matters ranging from Facebook and Google's use of
targeted raced-based advertising (Maheshwari & Isaac, 2016) or keywords (Miller,
2013), respectively, and Amazon's use of dynamic pricing purportedly based on customer
data (Martinez, 2016). Miltgen and Smith (2015) note that, "Ironically, it appears that
consumer concerns associated with surveillance, reported extensively during 2013 and
2014, are being directed more at commercial than government data interchanges" (p.
741).
Current research is replete with studies and polls highlighting opinions regarding
various privacy concerns (PCON). Miltgen and Smith (2015) conducted polls indicating
70% of respondents expressing concerns regarding online tracking and profiling.
Wakefield (2013) noted multiple surveys where 70-90% of respondents expressed
concerns about privacy (i.e., increasing part of modern life, secondary use, access, and
willingness to disclose). Bansal and Zahedi (2014) cite surveys where 93% of
respondents were concerned about privacy in online transactions and other polls where
two-thirds of United States citizens were concerned about the threat hackers and
criminals posed to privacy. Recent studies have also noted privacy concerns related to
online social networks (OSN). Jiang et al. (2013) reported that 33% of respondents were
concerned about personal privacy loss in online social interactions. The user privacy
concerns associated with social networking's situational aspects are explored in this
research, explicitly that of user data being scraped from LinkedIn and posted to a thirdparty site (i.e., ICWATCH).
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This research's relevant aspect is that user information shared with social media
services is not limited to just that service. For instance, governments conduct or propose
to conduct social media profiling for a variety of purposes, including vetting foreign
nationals, vetting individuals for approval of security clearances (U.S. Office of the
Director of National Intelligence [ODNI], 2016), criminal activity (Joy, 2016), and
fraudulent welfare recipients (Farrell, 2016). Commercial entities also use consumer data
from social media. A U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2014) report indicated that
commercial entities use social media data to enhance activities such as marketing (direct,
online, and analytics), risk mitigation (identify verification and fraud detection), and
people search, often without consumer knowledge. Subsequently, private entities, such as
ICWATCH, also use social media information for profiling. Specifically:
ICWATCH is a project to collect and analyze resumes of people working in the
intelligence community. People working for intelligence contractors, the military,
and intelligence agencies frequently mention secret codewords and surveillance
programs in public resumes. These resumes are useful for uncovering new
surveillance programs, learning more about known codewords, identifying which
companies help with which surveillance programs, examining trends in the
intelligence community, and more. (ICWATCH Surveillance, 2015)
The researcher designed this study to investigate the level of an individual's disposition to
value privacy (DTVP), how this influences situation-specific Internet privacy concerns
(SIPC) related to the information being scraped and posted by a third-party from
LinkedIn, and ultimately, how this disposition influences the user's behavioral intention
(BITN) to modify their LinkedIn account settings.
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Problem Statement
The effect of privacy concerns in actual OSN usage (or continued usage) is poorly
understood. While the literature has clearly shown that users’ privacy concerns will
influence their intended behavior in contrived scenarios, some indicate that users often
behave in ways not necessarily reflected in their stated privacy concerns and attitudes. Xu
and Gupta (2009) note an ongoing disagreement relating to the predictive reliability of
intention. Pavlou (2011) cites additional privacy complexities, including the lack of a
unified concept of information privacy, as well as how, "The role of context shapes the
meaning and conceptualization of information privacy" (p. 980). There is no support for
whether the linkage between privacy concerns and behavior intention is congruent with
actual privacy situations.
If an individual's behavior related to privacy concerns can be unpredictable, it is
essential to understand why. Contributing factors encompass various constructs and
theories used in the literature and privacy's contextual and paradoxical aspects. Privacy
studies contain a variety of constructs, including computer anxiety (Osatuyi, 2015),
disposition (Li, 2014), perceived anonymity (Jiang et al., 2013), privacy concerns (Jiang
et al., 2013; Li & Unger, 2012; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Miltgen & Smith, 2015; Schwaig et
al., 2013; Xu et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013), self-esteem (Schwaig et al., 2013), trust
(Zhou, 2015), and website reputation (Li, 2014). Privacy studies have also employed
numerous theories, including the big five personality model (Osatuyi, 2015), cognitive
consistency theory (Wakefield, 2013), control agency perspective (Xu et al., 2012),
innovation diffusion theory (Luo et al., 2013), justice theory (Zhou, 2011), privacy
paradox (Wakefield, 2013; Xu, Luo, et al., 2011), prospect theory (Bansal & Zahedi,
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2014), social contract (Li et al., 2011), technology acceptance model (TAM) (Mao &
Zhang, 2013), theory of planned behavior (Benson et al., 2015), theory of reasoned action
(TRA) (Bansal et al., 2016; Bensen et al., 2015), and utility theory (Bansal & Zahedi,
2014). However, there is little representation across these constructs and theories in an
existing/actual situation; it is not clear if these are applicable in actuality.
Many studies have also explored the contextual and situational aspects of privacy and
its paradoxical nature. Throughout the literature, specific websites establish the context
(i.e., financial, health, social media, travel) (Bansal et al., 2016; Bansal et al. 2010; Li et
al., 2011; Li, 2014; Wakefield et al., 2011; Xu, Divev et al., 2011), type of website (i.e.,
chat, health, social media) (Bansal et al., 2010; Benson et al., 2015; Osatuyi, 2015),
and/or type of service (i.e., location-aware marketing; location-based services, mobile
commerce, mobile office) (Luo et al., 2013; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Xu et al., 2012; Xu,
Luo et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2013). Manipulating elements through experimentation
allows for assessing situational aspects (Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li et al., 2011).
Wakefield (2013) notes that "Marketing researchers have coined the term, 'privacy
paradox,' to describe the consumer who is reluctant to provide personal information yet
succumbs to organizational requests for personal data" (p. 159). Multiple studies have
explored this phenomenon in a variety of settings, including e-commerce (Wakefield,
2013; Xu, Luo et al., 2011), financial (Xu, Dinev et al., 2011), healthcare (Xu, Dinev et
al., 2011), news services (Li & Unger, 2012), and social networking (Xu, Dinev et al.,
2011). However, as noted earlier, these approaches are not actual situations; all are
missing the influence of reality.
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The privacy problem continues to grow, "As the reliance on web-based systems for
delivery of services increases, privacy concern related to disclosing various types of
personal information online gains prominence" (Bansal et al., 2010, p. 146). Most
recently, Facebook was sued for the improper access to the data of 87 million users by
Cambridge Analytica (Balsamo & Liedtke, 2018), while Google was also fined $57
million due to improper disclosure of data collection across services (for personalized
advertising) (Satariano, 2019). Hong and Thong (2013) note that, "The increase in
digitalized personal information and advances in Internet technologies pose new
challenges to consumers' information privacy" (p. 13). As noted by Dinev (2014), another
contributing factor is the paradoxical behavior of people stating their concerns about
privacy as they continue to share their personal information, which may be illustrated by
Facebook's rise in daily active users over 2018 (Isaac, 2019). Complicating this further is
a lack of clarity of the problem. As Bansal and Zahedi (2014) note, companies hesitate to
disclose/share breach data due to potential business loss.
Goals
There were three goals for this research study. First, the research results will
contribute to the literature by providing empirical justification for a relationship between
privacy concerns and behavior intention in an actual privacy-centric situation. Second,
the research will justify the appropriateness of the constructs regarding usage in an actual
situation. Third, the research will also justify scales’ suitability for assessing privacy
concerns with an actual situation.
As defined in multiple reference studies, behavior intention is either an intention to
disclose (Bansal et al., 2016; Cichy et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 2013; Li et al., 2011; Miltgen
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& Peyrat-Guillard, 2014; Xu, 2010) or intention to use/continue using (Bansal et al.,
2010; Ku et al., 2013; Li & Unger, 2012; Li, 2014; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Osatuyi, 2015;
Schwaig et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2013; Zhou, 2015, 2011). Numerous researchers have
assessed privacy behaviors through experiment (Bansal et al., 2016; Li & Unger, 2012; Li
et al., 2011) or observed behavior (Chakrabotry et al., 2013; Chen & Sharma, 2012; Jiang
et al., 2013; Miltgen & Payrat-Guillard, 2014; Zhang et al., 2013). Nevertheless, a gap
remains between intentions and actual vs. contrived scenarios. This gap merits further
investigation, as Xu and Gupta (2009) note concerns in the predictive ability of stated
intentions, drawing from the weak relationship between subjective (self-reported) and
objective (actual) system usage that Straub et al. (1995) observed.
This research further extends the dimensions utilized by Xu et al. (2012), which
denoted that, “Privacy concerns are context-specific, based in the specifics of by whom,
why, when, and what type of personal information is being collected, distributed, and
used” (p. 3) and can vary over time for the same person (Conger et al., 2013). Their
research extended other research by Li et al. (2011), which posited that the effect of
general privacy concerns might be less critical than situation-specific ones. The study
contributed new insights into the situational elements of privacy concern by
demonstrating its impact on behavior intentions related to a current privacy-centric social
media situation.
While the hypotheses predict (a) a user's disposition towards privacy would influence
their privacy concern regarding having their information scraped by ICWATCH and (b)
would declare their intention to take steps to modify their profile to stop sharing the
information, there were a variety of other possible outcomes, as noted in Table A1. As
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part of the research design, participants were divided into outcome groups so that
interview responses could provide context into the varying degrees of support for each
variable. However, only the two groups aligned with the full hypothesis support were
well represented (OG-A and OG-H).
This research strengthened the usage of general privacy concern constructs for future
research streams. The usage of general privacy concern constructs is well represented
throughout the reference studies, but not in an actual, current privacy-centric situation.
Multiple studies have used general privacy concern constructs to examine: contrived
scenarios (Choi & Land, 2016; Kayhan & Davis, 2016), experience with the Internet
(Dinev & Hart, 2006; Son & Kim, 2008), experience with a specific site (Min & Kim,
2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011), and perceptions of a specific site (Li,
2014; Li et al., 2011). Where the constructs were lacking usage was in an actual (noncontrived) situation.
The research also encouraged increased use of scales for DTVP (aka general privacy
concerns) and situational privacy concerns. Kayhan and Davis (2016) used existing scales
for DTVP to study its influence on Internet privacy concerns via contrived scenarios.
Others used similar techniques for examining experiences with a specific site (Xu, Dinev
et al., 2011) and perceptions of a specific site (Li, 2014). Researchers also used the
existing scales to evaluate situational privacy concerns and their influence on behavior
via experience with the Internet (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Son & Kim, 2008) and experience
with specific sites/services (Min & Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017). Again, where the
scales lacked usage was in a current and actual (non-contrived) situation.
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Questions and Hypotheses
Studies by Kayhan and Davis (2016) and Li (2014) served as a basis for constructing
the research framework for this study. As part of their research models, both studies
evaluated the relationship between DTVP and contextual privacy concerns. Kayhan and
Davis assessed the influence of DTVP on situational privacy concerns using contrived
scenarios. Li evaluated the relationship between DTVP and site-specific privacy
concerns. Li also investigated the relationship between site-specific privacy concerns and
behavioral intention (i.e., privacy-preserving behavior). The research focused on
evaluating three questions, supporting the simplified framework shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Research Model

Note. As each of these control variables was categorical, each category was modeled as dummy
(binary) variables; age used five dummy variables, and sex used two. Four dummy variables (3039, 20-29, <20, and female) had insufficient analysis samples.

1. What is the user’s disposition towards privacy (DTVP)?
2. What is the user’s level of privacy concern regarding their information being
scraped from LinkedIn and posted to ICWATCH (SIPC)?
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3. To what extent do their concerns influence their intention to continue sharing
information openly on LinkedIn (BITN)?

Disposition to Value Privacy (DTVP)
DTVP was also studied as a global information privacy concern (GIPC), and general
privacy concern is a person's general attitude towards privacy. Researchers have
variously defined DTVP as the desire/need for privacy (Li, 2014), tendency to worry
about information privacy (Li et al., 2017; Li et al., 2011), tendency to preserve or
restrain disclosure of private/personal information (Xu, Dinev et al., 2011), or the
inherent worries about the opportunistic behaviors of providers (Kayhan & Davis, 2016).
DTVP is not specific to any website or company (Li et al., 2017; Li et al., 2011) or
specific contexts (Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). DTVP can differ among individuals (Li et al.,
2011) and can influence situation-specific (Kayhan & Davis, 2016) and website-specific
privacy concerns (Li, 2014).

Situation-Specific Internet Privacy Concern (SIPC)
Unlike DTVP, situation-specific Internet privacy concerns, also studied as Internet
privacy concerns, are more specific than dispositional (Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). Xu, Dinev
et al. define internet privacy concerns as an individual's anxiety resulting from privacy
loss via information disclosure to a website. Others’ definitions focus on information
flow via a website (Min & Kim, 2015), website or peer misuse of information (Ozdemir
et al., 2017), effects of opportunistic behaviors related to submitted information (Dinev &
Hart, 2006), or online companies’ practices and use of information (Son & Kim, 2008).
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Research has demonstrated that DTVP positively affects internet privacy concerns
(Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li, 2014; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). Researchers have used a
variety of methodologies to establish this effect, including visiting a website followed by
a survey (Li, 2014), a survey conditional on previous interaction with a type of website
(Xu, Dinev et al., 2011), and a survey with contrived experiment scenarios (Kayhan &
Davis, 2016). Kayhan and Davis also found that DTVP positively impacted situational
privacy concerns in an experimental context manipulating privacy situations (e.g.,
presenting a privacy violation due to inadequate security measures). Considering the
contiguous support for the positive relationship between DTVP and Internet privacy
concerns, it should remain valid in an actual privacy-centric situation. Therefore, the first
hypothesis is:
Hypothesis One (H1). Disposition to Value Privacy (DTVP) has a positive effect on
situation-specific Internet privacy concerns (SIPC).

Behavioral Intention
Schwaig et al. (2013) note that privacy concerns influence a user's attitude towards a
speciﬁc information practice and/or intention to use a system. Li (2012) suggests, “That
an individual's intention to disclose information is based on the comparison of expected
beneﬁts and perceived risks in a given context” (p. 1). The relationship between privacy
concern and behavior intention has been studied extensively in the literature. Specific
examples of intentions influenced by Internet privacy concerns include willingness to
provide personal information to transact on the Internet (Dinev & Hart, 2006), engage in
privacy-protective responses (i.e., complain, refuse to participate, or falsify data) (Son &
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Kim, 2008), and continuous intention to use social network services (SNS) (Min & Kim,
2015).
Numerous studies demonstrate that privacy concerns negatively affect intention to
disclose/provide personal information (Bansal et al., 2010; Dinev & Hart, 2006; Dinev et
al., 2008; Li et al., 2017; Li et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2018; Min & Kim, 2015; Ozdemir
et al., 2017) and use or continued use of a site or service (Ku et al., 2013; Li, 2014; Mao
& Zhang, 2013; Schwaig et al., 2013; Xu, 2010). Research has also demonstrated that
Internet privacy concern negatively affects behavior intention, established through the
survey methodology (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Min & Kim, 2015; Son & Kim, 2008). Again,
considering the contiguous support for the negative relationship between Internet privacy
concerns and behavior intention, it should continue to remain valid in an existing
situation. Therefore, the second hypothesis is:
Hypothesis Two (H2). Situation-specific Internet privacy concerns (SIPC) have a
negative effect on the intention to continue sharing information publicly on LinkedIn
(BITN).

Control Variables
This study used age and sex as the two control variables. Age was used in 91% of the
reference studies and placed into the five most categories in the reference studies. Sex
(also studied as gender) was used in 81% of the reference studies and evaluated as a
binary variable.
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Relevance
The relevance of this research rests on three factors. First, the research trends toward a
more focused context (i.e., broad to specific). Second, the research focus is a problem
that continues to grow as a growing body of users contribute data used in unforeseen
ways. Finally, the literature shows that while privacy concerns influence intended
behavior, it can also be influenced by other factors (e.g., benefits), neither of which can
be sufficiently reliable without analysis of actuality analysis. The observed research trend
in the context of privacy concern supports the relevance of this research. A review of the
construct-aligned studies shows a clear trend from broad to specific in terms of online
context, as described in Table 1. For example, one can see a trend starting with privacy
concerns regarding the Internet (broad) to concerns interacting with Facebook (specific).
Table 1
Privacy Concern Research Focus
Focus

Broad
↓
Specific

Years

Context

References

2006-2008

Internet, Online
Companies

Dinev & Hart, 2006; Dinev et al.,
2008; Son & Kim, 2008

2010-2014

Website
Categories

Bansal et al., 2010; Li, 2014; Li et
al., 2011; Li & Unger, 2012; Xu,
Dinev et al., 2011

2014-2017

Social Media,
Facebook

Choi & Land, 2016; Ku et al.,
2013; Li et al., 2017; Min & Kim,
2015; Osatuyi, 2015; Ozdemir et
al., 2017

According to LinkedIn’s website (press.linkedin.com/about-linkedin), the service has
more than 722 million users. According to the ICWATCH website
(transparencytoolkit.org/project/icwatch), the system has scraped over 100,000 resumes
from LinkedIn (and other sources). Suppose ICWATCH continues to add resumes at a
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similar rate. In that case, this could add several thousand more resumes each year, not
including the possibility of continuous monitoring/updating of resumes already scraped,
potentially exposing the data of hundreds of thousands of individuals. Külcü and
Henkoğlu (2014) note,
The main reason for the need to be conscious about the use of social networking
sites and attaching importance to privacy is the misuse of personal information by
social networking sites or the misuse of the viewable content by other users. (p.
761)
While research indicates that privacy concerns influence behavior, other research
suggests that this behavior is subject to change by the perceived benefit resulting from
sharing information, denoted as the privacy paradox (Xu, Luo et al., 2011). Constructs
such as the privacy calculus (Li et al., 2011) or privacy tradeoff (Jiang et al., 2013) can
assess this paradox. User privacy concerns can also be influenced by situational (Kayhan
& Davis, 2016; Li, 2014) and contextual (Bansal et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2012) factors.
Another factor contributing to the problem is what information social media users choose
to share. Cichy et al. (2014) note that privacy may be viewed as a commodity, and users
may be willing to disclose personal data for reciprocal benefits. However, Osatuyi (2015)
notes, "Unlike on social media platforms, customers on e-commerce sites are not required
to disclose their personal information to complete transactions" (p. 11). What users
choose to share may also change over time, as Bansal et al. (2010) note:
Prior experiences shape individuals' attitudes and form their dispositions with
respect to a given context or circumstance. For example, painful memories from
an incident of privacy invasion (such as online disclosure of social security
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information that had led to identity theft) could shape individuals' beliefs about
their vulnerability in the online environment. (p. 146)
However, Li et al. (2011) note, "With progressive Web site interaction, the effect of
general privacy concern will be gradually mediated or overridden by specific emotional
and cognitive reactions to the Web site" (p. 442). This observed contradiction
necessitates the need to evaluate privacy concerns in an actual privacy-centric situation.
Significance
This study is unique because it evaluated what participants declare they will do (well
covered in literature) in the context of an actual privacy-centric situation (little coverage
in literature). Relevant literature indicates that the influence of privacy concerns on
behavior is generally evaluated in two ways: a participant’s statements regarding their
actions (Jiang et al., 2013; Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 2014) and what the participant has
stated they will do (intention) (Bansal et al., 2010, 2016; Dinev et al., 2008; Ku et al.,
2013; Li et al., 2011; Li & Unger, 2012; Li, 2014; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Osatuyi, 2015;
Schwaig et al., 2013; Xu, 2010; Xu & Gupta, 2009). It is also worth noting that other
privacy-related studies have evaluated behavior (concerning general privacy) based on
how users had previously acted (dataset reviews). The assumption for this lack of
research based on real situations is due more to the difficulty in finding real-world
situations than a lack of interest or oversight by the research community. Possible results
from the research also contribute to the literature, regardless of support for the proposed
hypotheses. As stated earlier, most of the outcomes will either strengthen or weaken the
observed relationships between general and situation-specific privacy concerns and/or the
relationship between situational privacy concerns and behavioral intention.

16
Barriers
Many factors contribute to the challenges of exploring privacy concerns and behavior.
Opportunities to study real privacy-centric situations are problematic; service providers
likely deem such research undesirable as it could provide an unfavorable view of their
service. Given the limited opportunities for assessing real privacy-related situations,
many studies substitute contrived scenarios and previous behaviors instead. Researchers
employ a variety of methods to assess behavioral intention, including fabricating websites
for assessment (Li et al., 2011), scenarios (Cichy et al., 2014; Li & Unger, 2012),
assessing general privacy beliefs (Miltgen & Peyrat-Gillard, 2014; Schwaig et al., 2013),
review existing websites (Bansal et al., 2016), and assessing services (e.g., chat, LBS, mcommerce, and social media) (Jiang et al., 2013; Ku et al., 2013; Li, 2014; Mao & Zhang,
2013; Osatuyi, 2015; Zhou, 2011). However, each of these has only yielded a prediction
of the individual's actual behavior in a contrived scenario. Underlying this, as noted by
Schwaig et al. (2013), many assume that users behave rationally.
During 2018, LinkedIn changed its website access and set up an authorization wall,
making it challenging to correlate which users listed on ICWATCH were still publicly
sharing their profile via LinkedIn. Complicating this further, LinkedIn public profile
setting modifications may also take weeks to propagate through search engines. These
barriers made an evaluation of actual behavior, in the context of this study problematic;
authorized users always have full profile access. Future modifications to the underlying
services were a concern throughout the study.
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Issues
Several issues were associated with the research study. First, the literature has
demonstrated that multiple variables can influence privacy concerns and behavior or
moderate their relationship. Next, the potential for an interaction effect existed based on
the methodology selected. Lastly, there were also potential issues with the selection of a
convenience population.
Many studies have examined the direct link between privacy concerns and behavioral
intention (Bansal et al., 2016; Ku et al., 2013; Li & Unger, 2012; Li et al., 2011; Li, 2014;
Mao & Zhang, 2013; Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 2014; Osatuyi, 2015; Schwaig et al.,
2013; Zhang et al., 2013). Still, other studies suggest numerous additional variables
influence each factor independently and/or moderate the relationship between the two.
Other variables influencing behavior include attitude (Chen, 2013a; Chen & Sharma,
2015; Schwaig et al., 2013), computer anxiety (Osatuyi, 2015; Schwaig et al., 2013),
control (Benson et al., 2015), enjoyment (Chen, 2013b), perceived benefits (Li, 2014),
perceived rewards (Miltgen & Smith, 2015), privacy protection beliefs (Li et al., 2011),
privacy risk (Chen, 2013b; Li et al., 2011; Luo et al., 2013; Zhou, 2011, 2015), selfesteem (Schwaig et al., 2013), technology acceptance factors (Mao & Zhang, 2013;
Zhou, 2015), trust (Bansal et al., 2016; Chen & Sharma, 2012; Treiblmaier & Chong,
2011; Wakefield, 2013; Zhou, 2011, 2015), and use (Benson et al., 2015). Other variables
influencing privacy concerns include: hyper-personal framework aspects (Jiang et al.,
2013), information sensitivity (Kayhan & Davis, 2016), perceived control (Xu et al.,
2012), personality traits (Osatuyi, 2015), previous online privacy invasion (Bansal et al.,
2016), regulatory protection (Miltgen & Smith, 2015), trust (Miltgen & Smith, 2015),
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website familiarity (Li, 2014), and website reputation (Li, 2014). Variables moderating
the relationship between privacy concern and behavior include geographic region (Ku et
al., 2013), industry domain (Li & Unger, 2012), experience (Li & Unger, 2012),
perceived quality of personalization (Li & Unger, 2012), perceived rewards (Miltgen &
Smith, 2015), and trust (Cichy et al., 2014). Another factor contributing to the complexity
of the issue is the contextual nature of privacy. Li et al. (2011) note:
In comparison, general privacy concern was found to be a far less important factor
influencing privacy beliefs and behaviors. The results not only provide important
insights into resolving some of the equivocation found in the literature regarding
privacy behavior, but also better explain inconsistencies in consumers' privacy
behavior found in practice. (p. 435)
Studies have also noted situational and contextual factors that may override general
privacy concerns (Li et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2010) via numerous contextual factors
influencing privacy concerns, including information contingency, privacy interventions,
and requesting organizations (Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 2014).
Considering this, some interaction effects may have skewed the research results or
potentially disqualified participants prematurely. The author assumed that most
participants were unaware of the situation. Making them aware of it in the survey
introduction could have prompted premature (regarding this study) privacy-preserving
behavior. Users may have chosen not to participate based on this action or disqualified
themselves despite the wording of the disqualifying question on the questionnaire.
This study’s proposed convenience population was comprised of individuals
associated with the intelligence community per the ICWATCH website and are 1st- or
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2nd-degree LinkedIn connections to the author. The population may be a source of
potential sample bias, considering the LinkedIn relationship with the author and the
LinkedIn limitations on the total number of results in any given search. However, these
users were part of the larger population (all LinkedIn users included within ICWATCH).
The use of a convenience population does not necessarily limit the results’
generalizability, as Li et al. (2010) noted. Several of the reference studies have utilized
convenience populations, especially among student populations (Bansal et al., 2010,
2016; Jiang et al., 2013; Li et al., 2011; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Osatuyi, 2015; Xu, 2010;
Zhang et al., 2013).
Assumptions
The research made several assumptions. First, users were not aware of this situation;
however, it is conceivable that they were. As noted earlier, the literature has observed a
privacy paradox (Wakefield, 2013; Xu, Luo et al., 2011), where the perceived benefit of
the service overrides the user's privacy concerns. It is reasonable to assume that users
may make their LinkedIn profiles available to be discovered and that a situation such as
this was conceivable.
Second, that it was appropriate to continue evaluating privacy concerns as a
unidimensional construct. Literature addressing privacy concerns’ influence on intended
behavior as a unidimensional construct is plentiful. However, privacy concerns
influencing intended behavior is also well represented as a multidimensional construct.
The researcher assumed that a unidimensional approach to evaluate “real situation”
privacy concerns was appropriate in that it provided a foundation for future
multidimensional evaluation.

20
The proposed focus qualified as a privacy-centric situation. Modeling the elements of
the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica situation described earlier, it would appear that this
situation involves (a) users voluntarily providing information to one company, while (b) a
second company was using that data without consent. While this situation may be similar
in those elements, other elements such as the discretionary LinkedIn profile visibility
settings and the unassociated third-party relationship between LinkedIn and ICWATCH
may invalidate this assumption.
Limitations
There were two identified limitations associated with the research, the reliance on
external services, and the social media privacy environment. This study relied on external
services (LinkedIn and ICWATCH), specifically their availability and behavior. As
discussed earlier, LinkedIn changed its website access forcing a modification to the
methodology. The security update only illustrates that any alterations to either service
would have dramatically affected this research. Second, any newsworthy privacy event
could have influenced people’s perceptions of privacy regarding this situation. As noted
earlier regarding Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, a similar privacy situation with
Microsoft or LinkedIn (for example) could temporarily contribute to anomalous results.
While participants may not have expressed any concern regarding LinkedIn and
ICWATCH situation, they may have conflated a more recent event with this situation,
thereby skewing the results.
Delimitations
The author created specific options limiting decisions to constrain this study’s scope,
including the number of privacy-preserving behaviors, the number of control variables,
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population exclusions, and time horizons. First, the only privacy-preserving behavior
within this study’s scope was modifying "Your profile's public visibility" of the user's
LinkedIn profile. It is reasonable to assume that a savvy user would understand that their
profile data could be modified to remove intelligence community participation indicators
(i.e., codewords or other terms) as an alternative privacy-preserving behavior. However,
given the breadth of potential indicators for ICWATCH to monitor, it would be
imprudent to imply that this is appropriate protection for the participant. The author also
controlled only two variables (age and sex) for inclusion due to their representation in the
reference studies and implemented an arbitrary 80% cutoff to limit the scope. While there
were several other relevant control variables such as experience (31% of reference),
usage (46% of reference), and education (31% of reference), they had notably less
representation in the literature.
As noted earlier, this study used 1st- and 2nd-degree connections as part of the target
population, which permitted the inclusion of the "Introduction" feature (i.e., via first
connections). Expanding the population to include 3rd-degree connections would have
limited the study to only using the "Connect" function within LinkedIn. Upon completing
the quantitative analysis, the author chose willing participants selected from groups
aligned with the outcomes described in Table 1. The researcher conducted follow-up
interviews on participants in groups meeting a 5% sample representation threshold to
provide context to the survey results.
Finally, the LinkedIn website states, "After you change or disable your profile public
[sic], it may take several weeks for it to be added to or removed from search engine
results" (www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/83/linkedin-public-profile-
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visibility?lang=en). To allow for this possibility, the questionnaire included a suitability
question asking if the respondent had modified "Your profile's public visibility" within
the last 30 days, via LinkedIn "Settings and Privacy" options for any reason other than
due to your profile information being on ICWATCH? The author allowed 30 days to pass
to permit search engines to update and to place the time in context (approx. one month)
for ease of user perception. However, there is no guarantee that users who modified their
profile 30 days earlier would still not be visible via search engines.
Definition of Terms
Table 2 provides a list of terms and their associated definitions found throughout the
research proposal.
Table 2
Definition of Terms
Term

Definition

References

1st-degree connection

Within the LinkedIn
network, 1st-degree
connections have accepted
an invitation to connect to
another member.

LinkedIn, 2019

2nd-degree connection

Within the LinkedIn
network, 2nd-degree
connections are other
members connected to a
user's 1st-degree
connection(s) (i.e., no
direct connection).

LinkedIn, 2019

3rd-degree connection

Within the LinkedIn
network, 3rd-degree
connections are other 1st
degree connections with a
user's 2nd-degree
connection.

LinkedIn, 2019

(continued)
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Term

Definition

References

behavior intention

The intention of a
LinkedIn user to continue
to share their LinkedIn
profile publicly.

Li, 2014; Li et al., 2011;
Osatuyi, 2015; Schwaig et
al., 2013; Zhou, 2011

disposition to value
privacy

A person's general attitude
towards privacy.

Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li,
2014; Li et al., 2011; Li et
al., 2017; Xu, Dinev et al.,
2011

ICWATCH

A project, hosted by
ICWATCH Surveillance,
WikiLeaks that collects
2015
and analyzes resumes from
various social networks to
identify people working in
the intelligence community
and make them searchable
through a software solution
called LookingGlass.

privacy concern

An individual's concerns
resulting from the loss of
privacy from information
disclosure to a website,
flow of information with a
website, or misuse of
information by a website
or peers, effects of
opportunistic behaviors
related to submitted
information, and practices
and use of information by
online companies.

Dinev & Hart, 2006; Min
& Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et
al., 2017; Son & Kim,
2008; Xu, Dinev et al.,
2011

privacy paradox

The contradiction arising
from a user’s stated
privacy concern and their
actual behavior.

Li & Unger, 2012;
Wakefield, 2013; Xu, Luo
et al., 2011

List of Acronyms
Table 3 provides a list of acronyms found throughout the research proposal.
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Table 3
List of Acronyms
Acronym

Term

AVE

average variance extracted

BEHV

Behavior

BITN

behavior intention

BNFT

Benefit

CFIP

concern for information privacy

CMB

common method bias

CNTL

Control

COLL

Collection

CR

composite reliability

DTVP

disposition to value privacy

e-commerce

electronic commerce

ERRS

Errors

FTC

Federal Trade Commission

GIPC

global information privacy concern

GPCN

general privacy concern

ICWATCH

intelligence community watch

INVN

Invasion

IS

information system

IUIPC

Internet user’s information privacy concern

m-commerce

mobile commerce

MPEG

moving picture experts group

OG-

outcome group

ODNI

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OSN

online social network

P1

phase one
(continued)
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Acronym

Term

P2

phase two

PCON

privacy concern

PLS

partial least squares

PLSc

consistent PLS algorithm

PNTR

personality traits

PRBF

privacy risk beliefs

REGL

Regulation

SEM

structural equation modeling

SIGINT

signals intelligence

SIPC

situation-specific Internet privacy concern

SPCN

specific privacy concerns

TAM

technology acceptance model

TPB

theory of planned behavior

TRA

theory of reasoned action

USGE

Usage

Summary
This chapter provided background regarding the ongoing problem of privacy as it
relates to social media. Current research lacks visibility into real privacy-centric
situations. This study's goals were identified as contributing to the existing literature,
appropriateness of constructs, and the use of scales to assess “real-world” privacy-centric
scenarios. The author presented two research hypotheses to evaluate the influence of
DTVP on situational privacy concerns and, subsequently, situational privacy concerns on
privacy-preserving behaviors. Much of the study's significance is its unique approach to
evaluating an actual privacy-centric situation, not presently represented in the literature.
The author outlined barriers associated with exploring real privacy situations and possible
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variable quantity and interaction effects. The author also introduced assumptions
regarding the research proposal (i.e., cognition, dimensionality, applicability). Finally,
limitations such as the reliance on external services and delimitations such as imposed
restrictions on population and time were enumerated.
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Chapter 2
Review of Literature
Constructs and Theories
This study evaluates the influence of DTVP (aka general privacy concern) on
situational privacy concerns and situational privacy on behavioral intention (e.g., privacypreserving). The literature on these relationships offers a variety of frameworks and
theories. However, researchers have generally only evaluated these relationships in a
notional or contrived context. This study proposes to explore the relationships in the
context of an actual privacy-centric situation.

Privacy Concern
Of the variety of constructs used within information systems (IS) research (e.g.,
experience, risk, security, sensitivity, usage, and trust), privacy concern has been one of
the most widely used (Li et al., 2010; Xu & Gupta, 2009), with the most inconsistent
results (Li et al., 2010). Privacy concern generically can be defined as reflecting a user's
concern (or worry) about personal information regarding its collection, storage, and use
(Xu & Gupta, 2009; Zhou, 2015). Collection concerns include factors such as
methodology, time, and disclosure. Concerns regarding the storage of personal
information include factors such as amount, accuracy, and access protections. Usage
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concerns include factors such as inappropriate/undisclosed applications (e.g.,
discrimination and marketing) and sharing (Hui et al., 2007; Kobsa, 2007).
Researchers have widely studied privacy concerns in a general context. Li et al. (2011)
noted,
A large body of research has focused on consumers' general privacy concern,
which is deﬁned as an individual's general tendency to worry about information
privacy. General privacy concern is not speciﬁc to a particular context (e.g., a
speciﬁc Web site or online company) and differs from person to person. (p. 434)
Xu et al. (2012) also support this view regarding a detailed study of general privacy
concerns.
Researchers have also examined privacy concerns as both a unidimensional and
multidimensional construct. From a unidimensional approach, privacy concerns have
generated numerous studies related to its influence on a variety of constructs, including
behavior intention (Dinev et al., 2008; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2017; Li et al., 2011), control
(Xu, Dinev et al., 2011), privacy risk belief (Li et al., 2011; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011),
specific privacy concern (Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li, 2014), and trust (Bansal et al.,
2010). Information sensitivity also influences general privacy concerns (Bansal et al.,
2010) and privacy experience (Li, 2014). Smith et al. (1996) note that “it is common for
information privacy to be approached as though it were a unidimensional construct” (p.
169) and studied as a general privacy concern or DTVP (Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li,
2014; Li et al., 2017; Li et al., 2011; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011).
Smith et al. (1996) developed a scale to measure multidimensional privacy concerns,
which has been used and adapted in recent research (Mao & Zhang, 2013; Osatuyi, 2015;
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Smith et al., 1996; Stewart & Segars, 2002; Xu, 2010; Xu & Gupta, 2009; Xu et al.,
2012; Zhang et al., 2013; Zhou, 2011) and is often referred to as concerns for information
privacy (CFIP). CFIP encompasses four dimensions: collection (the amount of data
accumulated/stored), errors (deliberate or accidental inaccuracies), unauthorized
secondary use (internal and external, collected for one purpose but used for another), and
improper access (availability to unauthorized people). Malhotra et al. (2004) later
extended this to the Internet users' information privacy concerns (IUIPC), which
encompasses three factors: collection, control, and awareness of privacy factors. Jiang et
al. (2013) have incorporated the IUIPC construct into current research.
Though generally not a primary focus, researchers have examined privacy concerns in
contextual and situational conditions. While many studies have approached evaluating
privacy in a general context, each study typically contained a specific contextual element,
including location-based services (Zhou, 2015), online (Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard,
2014), regulations (Miltgen & Smith, 2015), social media (Jiang et al., 2013; Ku et al.,
2013; Osatuyi, 2015), and websites-general (Bansal et al., 2016; Kayhan & Davis, 2016).
Multiple constructs have been studied regarding their influence from, upon, and
moderating privacy concern within a contextual condition, including age (Zhang et al.,
2013) behavior (Bansal et al., 2010; Dinev et al., 2008; Li, 2014; Xu, 2010), control (Xu,
2010; Xu et al., 2012), device (Xu, 2010), education (Zhang et al., 2013), experience
(Zhang et al., 2013), familiarity (Li, 2014), gender (Zhang et al., 2013), income (Zhang et
al., 2013), invasion (Bansal et al., 2010; Dinev et al., 2008), regulation (Xu, 2010),
reputation (Li, 2014), risk (Zhou, 2011), sensitivity (Bansal et al., 2010), surveillance
(Dinev et al., 2008), and trust (Bansal et al., 2010; Zhou, 2011). Several constructs have
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also been studied regarding their influence from, upon, and moderating privacy concerns
within a situational condition, including behavior (Li et al., 2011), protection (Li et al.,
2011), responsibility (Kayhan & Davis, 2016), risk (Li et al., 2011), and sensitivity
(Kayhan & Davis, 2016).

Behavior/Intention to Disclose
Mackenzie and Spreng (1992) utilized a scale for measuring purchase intention, which
had an implied definition of the likelihood to purchase an advertised product as
influenced by attitude. Later, Jarvenpaa et al. (1999) and Jarvenpaa et al. (2000)
expanded the construct into a willingness to buy. More recent studies have evolved the
definition further, as Li et al. (2011) also utilized behavior intention (as modeled in this
research) and described this as "The effect of salient privacy beliefs on intention to
release personal information" (p. 438). Zhou (2011) used a similar construct, termed
usage intention, which, "Reflect the usage, personal information disclosure and
recommendation [of a service provider to others]" (p. 217). Other studies have used this
construct as the intention to create online accounts (Osatuyi, 2015), use a site for inquiry
(Li, 2014), create online accounts (Osatuyi, 2015), and use a site for information request
(e.g., auction, financial, or travel) (Li, 2014). Schwaig et al. (2013) note that privacy
concerns influence a user's attitude towards a speciﬁc information practice and/or
intention to use a system. Li (2012) suggests, "That an individual's intention to disclose
information is based on the comparison of expected beneﬁts and perceived risks in a
given context" (p. 1).
The literature reflects 42 factors that have been studied related to privacy regarding
their influence on intention. However, only 10 were used in more than one study,
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including attitude (Mackenzie & Spreng, 1992; Schwaig et al., 2013), experience (Bansal
et al., 2010, 2016), innovativeness (Xu & Gupta, 2009; Xu, Luo et al., 2011), privacy
concern (Bansal et al., 2010, 2016; Dinev et al., 2008; Ku et al., 2013; Li et al., 2011; Li
& Unger, 2012; Li, 2014; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Osatuyi, 2015; Schwaig et al., 2013; Xu,
2010;, Xu & Gupta, 2009), protection (Li et al., 2010, 2011; Li & Unger, 2012), risk (Li
et al., 2010, 2011; Luo et al., 2013; Treiblmaier & Chong, 2011; Zhou, 2011, 2015), trust
(Bansal et al., 2010, 2016; Treiblmaier & Chong, 2011; Wakefield, 2013; Zhou, 2011,
2015), usage (Li & Unger, 2012; Mao & Zhang, 2013), usefulness (Li et al., 2010; Luo et
al., 2013; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Zhou, 2015), and value (Mao & Zhang, 2013; Xu, Luo et
al., 2011).

Theories Associated with Privacy Concern
Li (2012) provided an integrated framework for privacy concern research theories and
categorized them based on origin, consequences, trade-offs, and influential factors
(institutional and individual). Table A2 provides an overview of this framework and a
breakout of the theories used across the construct-aligned studies
The scales-aligned studies represented coverage across four categories, including
consequence factors (Dinev & Hart, 2006), trade-off factors (Li, 2014; Li et al., 2011;
Min & Kim, 2015), and institutional influential factors (Xu, Dinev et al., 2011).
Expanding outward, the construct-aligned studies represented coverage across four
categories, including origin factors (Li et al., 2010; Xu, 2010), consequence factors
(Bansal et al., 2016; Dinev & Hart, 2006), trade-off factors (Bansal et al., 2010; Bansal et
al., 2016; Dinev et al., 2008; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2011; Min & Kim, 2015), and individual
influential factors (Choi & Land, 2016; Zhang et al., 2018). Finally, the construct-aligned
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studies with a contextual and situational focus covered three categories, including origin
factors (Xu, 2010), trade-off factors (Bansal et al., 2010; Dinev et al., 2008; Li et al.,
2011), and individual influential factors (Li, 2014).
Inclusions
The two constructs included in this research are unidimensional privacy concerns and
behavior as intention. Multiple studies have identified a conflict in an individual's privacy
concerns and subsequent behaviors (Joinson et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011; Zhou, 2011).
Cichy et al. (2014) note that "Privacy concerns emerged as the most frequently
mentioned factor affecting respondents' personal driving data disclosure intentions" (p.
6). Privacy concerns were also studied to observe their influence on "… Various
behavior-related variables, e.g., willingness to disclose personal information, intention to
transact, and information disclosure behavior" (Xu & Gupta, 2009, p. 140). Privacy
concerns also constitute one of the most likely behavior-related variables to cause stress.
As a general construct, privacy concern is well represented in the literature. Consistently,
across several studies, DTVP demonstrated its influence on privacy concerns (Kayhan &
Davis, 2016; Li, 2014; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). Internet privacy concern (as a general
construct) influencing behavior intention is also well supported in the literature (Dinev &
Hart, 2006; Li et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017; Min & Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Son
& Kim, 2008).
As stated earlier, privacy concerns influence a user's attitude towards a speciﬁc
information practice and/or intention to use a system (Schwaig et al., 2013). Li et al.'s
(2011) work support this, noting, "Since the online consumer acts on beliefs and
dispositions rather than solely on known costs and beneﬁts, these beliefs factor into the
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privacy-related cost-beneﬁt analysis" (p. 42). Several research lines also found trust
influences a user's privacy concern and behavior (Joinson et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011; Xu
et al., 2012; Zhou 2011, 2015). Additionally, Zhou (2015) notes that privacy concerns
significantly affect privacy risk (uncertainty). Concurrently, for various reasons, users
often behave in ways that do not reflect their privacy concerns and attitudes. For instance,
users may sacrifice privacy for benefits they value (e.g., economic rationale). In other
words, "Regardless of a user's expressed privacy concerns, they are willing to reveal the
most intimate details of their personal preferences if deemed appropriate" (Spiekermann
& Cranor, 2009, p. 71). A user's behavior is also not static. Their attitudes may change
over time (Conger et al., 2013), influenced by the immediate benefits resulting from the
disclosure over long-term privacy maintenance (Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009).
Exclusions
Multiple variants of privacy concern and behavior constructs, other related variables,
and all of the theories related to privacy concern from the reference studies are excluded
from this research. As noted earlier, two constructs for multidimensional privacy concern
(CFIP and IUIPC) are also excluded. While both the influence of CFIP and IUIPC on
behaviors are represented abundantly throughout the literature (Choi & Land, 2016; Mao
& Zhang, 2013; Ostauyi, 2015; Xu, 2010; Xu & Gupta, 2009) with consistent results,
neither has been studied in an existing privacy-centric situation. It was prudent to
establish the validity of general privacy concerns before exploring multidimensional
aspects.
The literature shows that privacy research behavior has also been modeled as prior
action (via observation or dataset review) and prior stated action (conduct). Li et al.
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(2015) used data collected from social networking sites to evaluate actual prior action
against factors such as demographics, experience, network size, and productivity. The
literature also notes 11 factors influencing conduct, including affiliation (Chen &
Sharma, 2012), age (Chakraborty et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2013), attitude (Chen, 2013a),
enjoyment (Chen, 2013b), gender (Chakraborty et al., 2013), privacy concern (Jiang et
al., 2013; Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 2014), reciprocity (Chen & Sharma, 2012), reward
(Jiang et al., 2013), risk (Chen, 2013b), trust (Chen & Sharma, 2012), and usage (Chen &
Sharma, 2012). However, the researcher excluded both prior action and conduct as
neither reflected intention in an actual privacy-centric situation, past vs. present
application.
Privacy concern has been widely studied for its influence in a variety of constructs,
including anonymity of others (Jiang et al., 2013), anonymity of self (Jiang et al., 2013),
behavior (Bansal et al., 2016; Cichy et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 2013; Li et al., 2011; Li &
Unger, 2012; Li, 2014; Osatuyi, 2015), computer anxiety (Osatuyi, 2015), disposition (Li,
2014), perceived intrusiveness (Jiang et al., 2013), perceived rewards (Miltgen & Smith,
2015), perceived usefulness (Zhou, 2015), personality traits (Bansal et al., 2016),
personalization quality (Li & Unger, 2012), privacy protection belief (Li et al., 2011),
privacy risk belief (Li et al., 2011; Zhou, 2015), psychological ownership (Cichy et al.,
2014), trade-off discount (Bansal & Zahedi, 2014), trust (Cichy et al., 2014; Zhou, 2015),
and website reputation (Li, 2014). Privacy concern has been regularly examined
regarding its impact on other constructs, including behavior/adoption intention (Mao &
Zhang, 2013; Osatuyi, 2015; Schwaig et al., 2013), computer alienation (Schwaig et al.,
2013), computer anxiety (Osatuyi, 2015; Schwaig et al., 2013), control variables (i.e.,
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age, education, experience, and income level) (Zhang et al., 2013), overall privacy
concern (Mao & Zhang, 2013), perceived risk (Zhou, 2011), personality traits (Osatuyi,
2015), self-esteem (Schwaig et al., 2013), and trust (Zhou, 2011). Given that this study's
focus was to validate the influence of general privacy concerns in an actual privacycentric situation, all of these were excluded.
Extensive research shows that behavior influences and moderates other factors, such
as privacy concerns (Li & Unger, 2012), protection (Li & Unger, 2012), and quality (Li
& Unger, 2012). Researchers found moderating influence of behavior ranging from
innovativeness (Xu & Gupta, 2009), motivation (Mackenzie & Spreng, 1992), privacy
concern (Cichy et al., 2014; Ku et al., 2013; Osatuyi, 2015), quality (Li & Unger, 2012),
and region (Ku et al., 2013) to relevance (Li et al., 2010), risk (Gerlach et al., 2015),
sensitivity (Bansal et al., 2016), and value (Li & Unger, 2012). Again, as the research
focus for this paper was to validate the influence of general privacy concerns on behavior
intention in a real privacy-centric situation, all of these were excluded from examination.
Finally, all theories related to privacy concerns were excluded from this research. The
research focused on establishing the influence validity of general privacy concerns on
behavioral intention in an actual privacy-centric situation. The study did not seek to
validate why it merely sought to provide context. Each of the theories required other
constructs (e.g., beliefs and attitudes). As with all other privacy-related constructs, the
study excluded all associated theories from the study.
Strengths
The literature's strength is the consistent results from the utilized scales, constructs,
and methodologies. The scales-aligned studies found consistent results using the same
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measurement items for both DTVP and privacy concerns. Three studies found that DTVP
positively affects privacy concerns, using the same items for DTVP (Kayhan & Davis,
2016; Li, 2014; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). Three additional studies found that privacy
concern negatively affects behavior intention, using the same items for privacy concern
(Dinev & Hart, 2006; Min & Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017).
The scales-aligned studies have also found consistent results using the same
unidimensional approach for both DTVP and privacy concerns. Kayhan and Davis
(2016), Li (2014), and Xu, Dinev et al. (2011) each found that unidimensional privacy
concern constructs positively affected privacy concerns. Five studies found that
unidimensional privacy concerns negatively affected behavior intention (Bansal et al.,
2010; Dinev et al., 2008; Li et al., 2011; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2017. Finally, 10 of the
reference studies found consistent results investigating the influence of privacy concern
(both uni and multidimensional) using a survey methodology, demonstrating that privacy
concerns’ negative effect on behavior intention (Dinev et al., 2008; Dinev & Hart, 2006;
Ku et al., 2013; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Min & Kim, 2015; Osatuyi, 2015; Ozdemir et al.,
2017; Son & Kim, 2008; Xu & Gupta, 2009; Zhang et al., 2018).
Weakness/Gaps
Identified weaknesses amongst the reference studies included minimal investigation
into situational influences associated with privacy concerns and behavior and research
focused on actual situations. As previously discussed, researchers have noted that
situational and contextual factors can influence privacy concerns (Kayhan & Davis, 2016;
Li et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2010). However, limited studies have focused on the contextual
and situational elements of privacy concern, with only four of the reference studies
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having a contextual focus (Bansal et al., 2010; Dinev et al., 2008; Li, 2014; Xu, 2010)
and only two having a situational focus (Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li et al., 2011).
The literature is also limited in investigations using existing privacy-centric situations.
Ten of the reference studies investigated privacy concern's influence on behavior
intention based on a user's experience, including experience with the Internet (Dinev et
al., 2008; Dinev & Hart, 2006; Son & Kim, 2008), experience with the type of
site/service (Ku et al., 2013; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Osatuyi, 2015; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011;
Zhang et al., 2018), and experience with specific site/service (Min & Kim, 2015;
Ozdemir et al., 2017). Three studies evaluated a user's perceptions of a specific site, both
real and contrived (Bansal et al., 2010; Bansal et al., 2016; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2011; Xu,
2010; Xu & Gupta, 2009). Four studies have utilized privacy scenarios (Choi & Land,
2016; Gu et al., 2017; Li & Unger, 2012; Kayhan & Davis, 2016). Finally, four studies
evaluated privacy concern and/or privacy behavior from a historical approach, either
demonstrated action (via observation or dataset review) (Chakraborty et al., 2013; Li et
al., 2015) or stated action (conduct) (Jiang et al., 2013; Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 2014).
Similar Study Methods
While 31 of the reference studies contained at least one hypothesis related to privacy
concerns, only 21 had similar construct assessments and/or utilized the same scales.
Those were studies examining the relationship of dispositional privacy concerns and
site/situation-specific privacy concerns (3), those that studied the relationship between
privacy concerns and behavior intention (19), and those utilizing the same scales (9).
Table 4 provides a breakout of these studies.
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Table 4
Reference Studies Alignment Matrix
Area of
Alignment

Reference Studies

Overlap Utilizing
Same Scales

Studying
PCON →
PCON

Total = 3
Total = 3
Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li, Kayhan & Davis, 2016;
2014; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011 Li, 2014; Xu, Dinev et
al., 2011

Studying
PCON →
intention

Total = 19
Bansal et al., 2010;
Bansal et al., 2016; Choi &
Land, 2016; Dinev et al.,
2008; Dinev & Hart, 2006;
Gu et al., 2017; Ku et al.,
2013; Li, 2014; Li et al.,
2011; Li et al., 2017; Li &
Unger, 2012; Mao & Zhang,
2013; Min & Kim, 2015;
Osatuyi, 2015; Ozdemir et
al., 2017; Son & Kim, 2008;
Xu, 2010; Xu & Gupta,
2009; Zhang et al., 2018

Utilizing
same scales

Total = 9
Dinev & Hart, 2006;
Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li,
2014; Li et al., 2011; Li et
al., 2017; Min & Kim, 2015;
Ozdemir et al., 2017; Son &
Kim, 2008; Xu, Dinev et al.,
2011

Overlap PCON
→ Intention
Total = 1
Li, 2014

Total = 7
Dinev & Hart, 2006; Li,
2014; Li et al., 2011; Li
et al., 2017; Min &
Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et
al., 2017; Son & Kim,
2008

The two research methods most utilized in the construct-aligned studies were
experiment and survey. No study using the experimental approach fell into more than one
area of alignment from Table 6. However, only one study fell into all three of the
alignment areas for employing surveys (Li, 2014), and two fell into more than one
alignment area (Li, 2014; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011).

39
Seven of the aligned reference studies from Table 6 employed an experimental
methodology. Of the three studies investigating the influence of dispositional privacy
concerns and site/situation-specific privacy concerns, one study utilized an experimental
methodology (Kayhan & Davis, 2016). Of the 19 studies investigating the influence of
privacy concerns on intention, six studies utilized an experimental methodology (Bansal
et al., 2016; Choi & Land, 2016; Gu et al., 2017; Li et al., 2011; Li & Unger, 2012; Xu,
2010). Of the nine studies utilizing the same scales, two studies utilized an experimental
methodology (Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li et al., 2011).
Thirteen of the aligned reference studies employed a survey methodology. Of the three
studies investigating the influence of dispositional privacy concerns and site/situationspecific privacy concerns, two studies utilized a survey methodology (Kayhan & Davis,
2016; Li, 2014). Of the 19 studies investigating the influence of privacy concern on
intention, 12 studies utilized a survey methodology (Bansal et al., 2010; Dinev et al.,
2008; Dinev & Hart, 2006; Ku et al., 2013; Li, 2014; Mao & Zhang, 2014; Min & Kim,
2015; Osatuyi, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Son & Kim, 2008; Xu & Gupta, 2009; Zhang
et al., 2018). Of the nine studies utilizing the same scales, six utilized a survey
methodology (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Li, 2014; Min & Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017;
Son & Kim, 2008; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011).
Survey methodology emerged as the most appropriate methodology for this research.
Surveying was common across all of the aligned studies and the most commonly used
across all reference studies (22 out of 31). Chapter 3 referenced studies that demonstrated
standard reliability (composite reliability [CR], average variance extracted [AVE]),
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validity (CR, AVE, square root of AVE), and bias (common method bias [CMB],
Harman's single-factor). All constructs under review exhibited consistency of results.
Similar Study Measurements
Numerous studies assessed the same constructs in a manner similar to the proposed
study. Several studies examined the influence of DTVP on privacy concerns, utilizing the
same scales. Kayhan and Davis (2016) found that dispositional privacy concerns to be
positively related to situational privacy concerns. Similarly, Li (2014) found a disposition
to privacy as having a positive impact on site-specific privacy concerns. Xu, Dinev et al.
(2011) found that DTVP positively affected privacy concerns.
Multiple studies also examined the influence of DTVP on behavioral intention,
utilizing the same scales. Li et al. (2017) found that general privacy concern negatively
affects behavioral intention (i.e., disclosing personal information). Li et al. (2011) found
that general privacy concern negatively affects behavioral intention (i.e., disclose
personal information).
Several studies examined the influence of privacy concerns on behavioral intention,
utilizing the same scales. Dinev and Hart (2006) found that a higher user Internet Privacy
Concern is related to a lower behavioral intention (i.e., provide personal information).
Min and Kim (2015) found that perceived privacy concern negatively affects behavioral
intention (i.e., giving personal information). Ozdemir et al. (2017) found that the higher a
user's privacy concerns, the less likely they are to disclose information. Son and Kim
(2008) found that information privacy concerns positively affect public and private action
(e.g., complaining, word-of-mouth).
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Summary
The chapter provided a discussion of the constructs and theories associated with
research in privacy concerns and behaviors. The author provided detailed discussions
regarding the inclusion of privacy concerns (unidimensional) and behavioral intentions in
the study. Also included were the rationales for excluding other constructs
(multidimensional privacy concern, other types of behavior, and other privacy-related
variables), as well as relevant theories associated with privacy concerns. The strengths
associated with existing studies were discussed, highlighting their consistency of results.
The weaknesses and gaps associated with existing research noted a lack of coverage of
situational influences on privacy concerns and real privacy-centric situations. The author
outlined common methodologies utilized in the literature and standard methods to
evaluate reliability, validity, and bias. Finally, the chapter concluded with a review of
similar measurements used in the literature.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
This study proposed to validate the influence of privacy concerns on behavior
intention in an actual privacy-centric situation. Creswell and Plano Clark (2018) provided
a template style introduction for mixed method approaches, modeled for research design.
An explanatory sequential mixed methods design with interview follow-up was
employed. The sequence involved collecting quantitative data first and then
contextualizing the quantitative results with qualitative data. The methodology sought to
assess if general and situational privacy concerns influenced behavior in an actual
situation and provide context for the findings. The first quantitative phase of the study
involved collecting questionnaire data from situation-affected LinkedIn users via the
Internet to assess whether DTVP influenced situational privacy concerns and influenced
behavior intention. The second, qualitative phase, served as a follow-up to the
quantitative phase to group the various potential outcomes (derived from variable
combinations) and ascertain any context to assist in understanding the outcomes. The
explanatory follow-up goal was to provide context to hypothesis support, grounded in
variable support degree combinations.
Phase 1 (P1): Quantitative Methodology
This section provides an overview of the quantitative methodology phase of the
research. Employing survey methodology began with questionnaire development and its
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associated constructs, measurement items, and specific validity and reliability
measurements. The section continues with a population description and data collection.
The section concludes with a discussion of the use of PLS in the analysis.
Twenty-nine of the 31 reference studies with at least one hypothesis related to privacy
concerns used survey methodology. All 21 of the scales-aligned studies identified in
Table 4 utilized a survey methodology. The author sent the questionnaire to his 1stdegree connections using the LinkedIn Message function and to each of his 2nd-degree
connections using the Connect (with a note) function. Appendix B contains a copy of the
instrument.

P1: Instrument Development
Using items adapted from validated scales in existing literature, as described in Tables
A3, A4, and A5, the researcher operationalized the variables with questions re-worded to
fit the research context. The three constructs were measured with a seven-point scale
ranging from 1 to 7, anchored with "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree." A single
item measured each of the demographic factors (control variables), age and sex. Finally,
given participants' ability to modify their LinkedIn profile before contact, the author
added a binary scale question as a participant disqualifier.
The researcher used three items adapted originally from Malhotra et al. (2004) and
subsequently used in a variety of studies (Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li, 2014; Li et al.,
2014; Li et al., 2017; Li et al., 2011; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011) to measure Disposition to
Value Privacy (DTVP). Table A3 reports the results.
As illustrated in Table A4, the author used four items adapted originally from Dinev
and Hart (2006) and subsequently re-employed in numerous other studies (Choi & Land,
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2016; Min & Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Son & Kim, 2008; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011)
to measure Situation-Specific Internet Privacy Concerns.
The author measured behavioral intention using three items adapted from Molhatra et
al. (2004) that were subsequently used to measure behavioral intention in a variety of
additional studies on which the research framework was directly based (Li et al., 2011;
Min & Kim, 2015) or to evaluate the impact of privacy concerns on intention (Bansal et
al., 2010, 2016; Zhang et al., 2018). See Table A5.

P1: Sample and Data Collection
A preliminary methodology to determine the viability of the convenience population
yielded positive results. The first step was to search all of the author's LinkedIn
connections using the search term "SIGINT" (signals intelligence, a generic term used for
demonstration by ICWATCH developers) (re:publica, 2015), which resulted in 3,392 1stand 2nd-degree connections; however, only 1,316 were readily accessed (due to serverside search limitations of 1000 non-unique results at a time). The second step was to
reduce this list to individuals who were both (a) a LinkedIn connection and (b) listed on
ICWATCH, which resulted in a reduction to 496 connections (~37%). It was assumed
that this reduction would remain consistent across all the author's 1st- and 2nd-degree
connections and was anticipated to yield a sample population for this study of ~1,275
individuals. However, this was merely an initial support metric and was not intended to
account for additions resulting from new LinkedIn connections.
Two additional enhancements overcame the server-side search limitations mentioned
earlier, search filters (e.g., industry, location, etc.) and premium membership. The search
process was repeated through multiple iterations to identify a final population of 1,310
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individuals both on LinkedIn and ICWATCH. Based on a separate study by Claybaugh
and Haseman (2015), which resulted in a 19% response rate, 260 participants were
expected to participate. This was considered viable as a total number of participants from
a cross-section of reference studies had the following characteristics: largest = 889,
smallest = 100, median = 285, mode = ~341.
The survey was administered to the 1,310 individuals thru LinkedIn directly. Due to a
LinkedIn message size restriction, a 300-character message was created to invite each
participant. The message read, “'Please participate in my Ph.D. dissertation study,
investigating linkages between privacy and behavior of users like you, who had their
LinkedIn account scraped and made searchable through ICWATCH, a third-party
website. The anonymous survey is available at
https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CP5JWGS"
For 1st-degree connections, the invite was sent using the "Send a message" function.
For 2nd-degree connections, the invite was sent using the "Connect with note" function.
While the 300-character limit only applied to the 2nd-degree connection invites, the same
invite was used for both degrees of connection to maintain consistency.
Initially, it was observed that while 2nd-degree connections were accepting the
connection request, there was not a visible correlation with a subsequent survey response.
Therefore, it was assumed that invitees merely accepted the connection request and did
not see the invite. To mitigate this, each time a 2nd-degree connection accepted the
request to connect, a short one-time follow-up message was sent using the now available
"Send a message" feature (as they were now 1st-degree connections). The follow-up
message read, "Thank you for accepting my connection request. If you haven't already, I
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hope you will consider participating in my Ph.D. dissertation survey, which is
anonymous."
From the 1,310 invites sent via LinkedIn, there were 78 responses; 13 were not used,
as eight were incomplete and five indicated they were not sharing their profile publicly
(disqualification), resulting in 65 valid responses (4.96%). Participant demographics are
described in Table 5.
Table 5
Demographic Information of the Questionnaire Respondents
Demographic Variables
Sex

Age

Category

Frequency (%)

Female

8 (12.31%)

Male

57 (87.69%)

< 20

0 (0%)

20-29

1 (1.54%)

30-39

9 (13.85%)

40-49

16 (24.62%)

50+

39 (60.00%)

An ad-hoc post-invite analysis using the Social Security: Get Ready For Baby website
(https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/babynames/index.html) was used to derive approximate sex
demographics of the population, resulting in a 1067 male (81.45%) to 149 female (11.31)
distribution, with 94 indeterminate.
Phase 2 (P2): Qualitative Methodology
As part of the mixed method approach, the author invited select participants to
participate in a one-on-one interview (i.e., follow-up) to contextualize the quantitative
findings. Several reference studies also utilized interviews as part of a mixed methods
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approach, either to create an instrument (Cichy et al., 2014; Ku et al., 2013; Malhotra et
al., 2004; Smith et al., 1996; Treiblmaier & Chong, 2011) or to contextualize results (Ball
et al., 2012). This study employed a purposeful sampling approach, utilizing a simple
scoring model to identify and invite a minimum of three participants from pre-defined
variable outcome groups. What follows is a discussion of the qualitative portion of the
study, specifically, how the population was identified and invited for follow-up. Next, a
discussion regarding the demographics of the interview population and the participants is
described. Finally, an elaboration on the methodology used to derive the qualitative data
for analysis is discussed.

P2: Interview Development
As this research was explanatory in design, it employed semi-structured interviews,
which modeled the approach used by Ball et al. (2012). Also, to support an explanatory
design, the semi-structured approach employed topics aligned directly with the
questionnaire. This served to elaborate on the underlying concepts influencing the
participant's responses in the questionnaire. The topics also served a dual-purpose as the
categories for code alignment; categories were modeled after an approach used by Cichy
et al. (2014).
Since the research design assumed that this situation was a breach of privacy, the first
topic prompted a discussion on the participant's belief regarding this matter. It was
initiated by stating, "For the next few minutes, let's discuss if this is a breach of privacy."
The second topic prompted a discussion on the participant's disposition to value privacy
and was initiated by stating, "For the next few minutes, let's discuss your disposition to
value privacy."
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The third topic prompted a discussion regarding the participant's level of privacy
concern regarding the situation related to the ingestion of their LinkedIn information into
ICWATCH. It was initiated by stating, "For the next few minutes, let's discuss your level
of concern regarding LinkedIn scraping/posting your data." The fourth topic prompted a
discussion on the participant's intention to modify their LinkedIn profile's visibility and
was initiated by stating, "Finally, let's discuss your intention to modify your LinkedIn
profile's visibility." At the end of each interview, the participant was given the
opportunity to provide any additional thoughts by stating, "Are there any other additional
thoughts or comments you might have?"

P2: Sample and Data Collection
Only a subset of Phase 1 participants comprised the convenience population for this
phase of the study, expressly, those who (a) completed the questionnaire associated with
Phase 1 (quantitative), and (b) indicated a willingness to be interviewed (per
questionnaire response). A simple scoring model was selected to derive each variable's
least ambiguous representation for respondent assignment to an outcome group. The
scoring model calculated the numerical sum of results for each variable's questions, then
selected the top and bottom 25% of all scores within each variable to derive the least
ambiguous strong and weak representations of the variable, as shown in Table 6.
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Table 6
Internal Consistency and Discriminate Validity of Constructs
Constructs # of Questions
(7-pt Likert)

+ or -

Score Range

Top 25%

Bottom 25%

BITN

3

neg

0-21

<13

>17

DTVP

3

pos

0-21

>18

<15

SIPC

4

posx

0-28

>21

<16

Note. H = high score, L = low score

Respondents were assigned to one of the eight possible outcome groups based on
score calculations, as shown in Table 7. Of the 65 respondents, only 11 volunteers had
appropriate scores for assignment to five outcome groups (OG-A, OG-B, OG-E, OG-G,
and OG-H). However, any respondents groups not meeting a 5% population
representation were not invited for interviews, as they were considered outliers.
Table 7
Outcome-group Score Results and Distribution
OutcomeGroup

BITN

DTVP

SIPC

Qualified

Volunteer

OG-A

>17

<15

<16

7

5

OG-B

<13

<15

<16

1

1

OG-C

>17

<15

>21

0

0

OG-D

<13

<15

>21

0

0

OG-E

>17

>18

<16

1

1

OG-F

<13

>18

<16

0

0

OG-G

>17

>18

>21

1

1

OG-H

<13

>18

>21

4

3
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As mentioned earlier, the interview methodology modeled the approach utilized by
(Ball et al., 2012), employing semi-structured interviews around four topics; however, the
interviews were remote rather than face-to-face. An email was sent to the volunteers in
groups A and H to solicit a date/time for the follow-up interview, with a total of six
participants responding, a 50/50 split between groups as shown in Table 8. Once a
date/time was confirmed, a web conference invite was emailed to the participant, and
interviews were conducted via web conferencing (Zoom). During each, the author
confirmed the participant ID, provided a brief description of the interview purpose and
process, then provided each topic sequentially (as discussed earlier). A transcription of
each of the interviews is provided in Appendix E. Each participant was also provided an
opportunity to convey additional comments at the end of the interview, modeled as a fifth
topic.
Table 8
Individual Participant Score Results and Distribution
Participant

Outcome-Group

BITN

DTVP

SIPC

11269613365

OG-A

21

3

4

11223476508

OG-A

21

6

5

11188138618

OG-A

18

6

8

11251351842

OG-H

9

21

28

11224014306

OG-H

12

21

28

11205114603

OG-H

9

21

25

The six-person sample demographic was all male and all in the 50+ age category, as
depicted in Table 9.
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Table 9
Demographic Information of Interview Participants
Demographic Variables
Sex

Category

Frequency (%)

Female

0 (0%)

Male

6 (13.33%)

< 20

0 (0%)

20-29

0 (0%)

30-39

0 (0%)

40-49

0 (0%)

50+

6 (100%)

Age

A methodology provided by Creswell and Plano Clark (2018) was employed to
support generating and utilizing the qualitative data. In the first part of the methodology,
which is relevant to this section, the data must be prepared for analysis (i.e., transcribed
and formatted), explored (read and understood), then coded and analyzed (e.g., interrelate
categories). In the second part of the methodology, which is covered later, the data is
analyzed and represented (Appendices A and D), the results summarized and related
(Table 14), and the data and results validated.
Data Preparation. Interviews were recorded and then transcribed using a two-step
process. The audio recording was done using the Zoom cloud recording feature, which
resulted in a downloadable Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG-4) file of the
interview. Transcription was accomplished using a cloud-based tool called Otter, which
performed the speech-to-text translation. The first step was to upload the MPEG-4 file
into Otter, which resulted in a rough draft transcription of the recording. The second step
leveraged the cloud-based Otter.ai editing tools with synchronized playback (e.g., the
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service would highlight words synchronized to the audio). A second recording and
transcription methodology was in place for redundancy using the TapeACall application;
however, this was for backup only, and the additional files were not utilized.
Data Exploration. Each of the interviews was read multiple times to explore the data.
In this context, data exploration was limited to understanding the completeness and
context of a particular snippet and annotating each onto a separate card. This exploration
yielded 163 snippets, of which 149 were carried forward into step three. During
exploration, it became evident that the interview statements reflected the multidimensional aspects of privacy concern and other constructs well-represented in existing
privacy literature.
Coding and Analysis. Using a category/code approach, the snippets were separated
into codes and then grouped by category. After analyzing each of the 149 snippets, 12
codes were derived. As noted earlier, the codes were operationalized using constructs
adapted from existing literature, as described in Table A6. A code/snippet alignment
validation was also conducted, which is discussed in a later section, resulting in 139
usable code/snippet alignments, as shown in Appendix D.
Summary
This chapter provided a detailed discussion of the mixed method approach used in the
research. The first half elaborated on the quantitative portion. This portion employed a
survey methodology, using instrument scales operationalized from existing literature.
LinkedIn connections, numbering 1,310, were sent an invite, with a valid response rate of
4.96%, skewed heavily towards males over 50 years of age. Next, the qualitative portion
of the methodology was described. Participants were divided into variable-aligned
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outcome groups, based on the quantitative findings, using a simple scoring model. Only
two of the groups met the 5% representation threshold, of which only six participants
were interviewed. Finally, the multi-step methodology used to transform interview data
into category/code aligned data for analysis.
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Chapter 4
Results
In this chapter, the results of the data analysis are reported in various discussions and
tables for both the research's quantitative and qualitative phases. The quantitative portion
describes demographic statistics, findings from validity and reliability testing, and
hypothesis analysis. The qualitative phase of the research also includes demographic
statistics and validity and reliability support, integrated with the quantitative data for
contextual support. Finally, the chapter culminates in a summary of the results.
Phase 1 (P1): Quantitative Data Results
This section provides a discussion of the quantitative findings. The section elaborates
on the validity, reliability, and consistency of findings from the measurement model. This
is followed by a discussion of the data analysis methodology. Finally, the section
concludes with an elaboration of the results of the quantitative analysis.

P1: Measurement Model Findings
The validation methodology used SmartPLS analysis for convergent validity, the
degree to which the same construct measures are related or agree. Xu, Luo et al. (2011)
note, "In PLS, we conducted three tests to determine the convergent validity of measured,
reflective constructs in a single instrument: reliability of items, composite reliability of
constructs, and average variance extracted (AVE) by constructs" (p. 47). Reliability of
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items was assessed in several scales-aligned studies (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Kayhan &
Davis, 2016; Li et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017; Son & Kim, 2008; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011).
This study assessed each item’s factor loading to ensure it exceeded a minimum threshold
of 0.70 (Bollen, 1989). All exceeded the threshold, as shown in Table 10.
Table 10
Loading and Cross-Loadings of Measures
Constructs

BITN

DTVP

SIPC

BITN1

0.826

-0.351

-0.436

BITN2

0.880

-0.331

-0.462

BITN3

1.041

-0.417

-0.543

SPCN1

-0.346

0.859

0.651

SPCN2

-0.412

0.943

0.680

SPCN4

-0.418

0.769

0.568

SIPC1

-0.418

0.748

0.952

SIPC2

-0.480

0.653

0.905

SIPC3

-0.510

0.640

0.899

SIPC4

-0.476

0.592

0.818

BITN

DTVP

SIPC

Composite reliability of constructs was also assessed in two scales-aligned studies
(Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). This study also assessed that each
construct’s composite reliability exceeded the minimal criterion of 0.70 (Nunnally,
1978), which all of them achieved, as shown in Table 11.
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Table 11
Internal Consistency and Discriminate Validity of Constructs
Constructs

Composite
Reliability (CR)

Average Variance
Extracted (AVE)

Correlations

BITN

0.942

0.846

0.920

DTVP

0.894

0.739

-0.400

0.860

SIPC

0.941

0.800

-0.525

0.738

DTVP

SIPC

BITN

0.895

Note. Square root of AVE on the diagonals, correlations on off-diagonals

AVE was assessed in several scales-aligned studies (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Kayhan &
Davis, 2016; Li, 2014; Min & Kim, 2015; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). This study measured
the AVE to ensure it exceeded the minimum level of 0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981),
which all did, as shown in Table 11.
Discriminant validity is the degree to which different constructs are unrelated.
Throughout the reference studies, discriminant validity was assessed using the square
root of AVE and factor loadings/cross-loadings. The square root of the AVE was
assessed in several of the scales-aligned studies (Li et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017; Min &
Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Son & Kim, 2008; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). This study
found that it was greater than the correlation between that construct and any other
constructs (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), which it was, as shown in Table 11. Factor loadings
and cross-loadings were also assessed in several scales-aligned studies (Li, 2014; Li et
al., 2017; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). This study assessed that items
were loaded more strongly on their intended construct than others (Gefen & Straub,
2005), as shown in Table 10.
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Reliability refers to the internal consistency of items. Specifically, responses are
consistent across items and participants, assessed using CR and AVE. CR was assessed in
several scales-aligned studies (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Li et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017; Min &
Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Son & Kim, 2008). This study exceeded 0.70 (Bagozzi
& Yi, 1988; Fornell & Larcker, 1981) as shown in Table 11. AVE was assessed in
several scales-aligned studies (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2011; Li et al.,
2017; Ozdemir et al., 2017). This study exceeded 0.5 for all items (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988;
Fornell & Larcker, 1981), as shown in Table 11.

P1: Data Analysis, Partial Least Squares (PLS)
To measure the (a) influence of DTVP on situation-specific Internet privacy concerns
and (b) situation-specific Internet privacy concerns on a user's intention to engage in
privacy-protecting behaviors (modify their profile settings or keywords), the quantitative
analysis utilized Partial Least Squares (PLS). Of the three studies investigating the
influence of dispositional privacy concerns and site/situation-specific privacy concerns,
all three utilized PLS. Of the 19 studies investigating the influence of privacy concern on
intention 11 utilized PLS (Gu et al., 2017; Ku et al., 2013; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2011; Li et
al., 2017; Li & Unger, 2012; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Osatuyi, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017;
Xu, 2010; Xu & Gupta, 2009). Of the nine studies utilizing the same scales, six utilized
PLS (Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017; Ozdemir et al.,
2017; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). However, while only one study fell into all three of the
alignment areas for using PLS (Li, 2014), two fell into more than one alignment area (Li,
2014; Mao & Zhang, 2013). The usage of PLS in a quantitative approach, especially
survey methodology, is well represented in the literature. Thirty-one of the reference
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studies had at least one hypothesis related to privacy concern, of which 16 used PLS.
Thirteen of the 21 aligned reference studies utilized PLS.
Initially, it was assumed that a sample size of 65 would be adequate, since, as noted by
Li et al. (2011), "PLS requires a much smaller sample size than other structural equation
modeling (SEM) techniques" (p. 439). However, to validate this a software solution
called G*Power 3.1 was used to calculate the number of participants needed for PLS
analysis, which indicated a minimal sample size of 62 was needed, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2
G*Power Results
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Before the analysis, the data were normalized for ingestion into the software.
Specifically, fields were renamed to match the construct names and break out categorical
control variables (age and sex) into dummy variables to incorporate into the model and
were ingested with no errors. The analysis utilized the SmartPLS software application,
and analysis was conducted using both the Consistent PLS Algorithm (PLSc) and
Consistent PLS Bootstrapping as the model uses reflective factors. Specific settings for
each analysis are provided in Table 12.
Table 12
SmartPLS Configurations
SmartPLS Setting

Bootstrap

PLSc

Initial Calculations

Connect all LV’s for
Initial Calculation

Connect all LV’s for
Initial Calculation

Weighting Scheme

Path

Path

Maximum Iterations

1000

1000

Stop Criterion

7

7

Subsamples

5000

Amount of results

Complete Bootstrapping

Confidence Interval Method

Bias-corrected and
accelerated (BCa)
Bootstrap

Test Type

Two-Tailed

Significance Level

0.05

P1: Structural Model Findings
Path coefficients and path significance for the two hypotheses are shown in Figure 3
and summarized in Table 13.
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Figure 3
Research Model with Results and Significance

Note. As each of these control variables was categorical, each category was modeled as dummy
(binary) variables; age used five dummy variables, and sex used two. Four dummy variables (3039, 20-29, <20, and female) had insufficient analysis samples.

Table 13
Hypothesis Testing Results
Hypothesis

Path Coefficients t value

p-value

Supported?

H1

0.738

8.802

< 0.001

y

H2

-0.549

5.353

< 0.001

y

Age → BITN (50+)

0.302

1.492

0.136

Age → BITN (40-49)

0.300

1.631

0.103

Sex → BITN (Male)

0.151

1.389

0.165

Hypothesis One (H1) predicted that as a person's disposition to value privacy
increased, their situation-specific Internet privacy concerns would also increase. The
effect of DTVP on SIPC was shown to be both positive and significant (B=0.738,
p<0.001), therefore supporting H1. Hypothesis Two (H2) predicted that as a person's
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situation-specific Internet privacy concerns increased, their willingness to continue
sharing information publicly on LinkedIn would decrease. The effect of SIPC on BITN
was negative and significant (B=-0.549, p<0.001), therefore supporting H2.
Path coefficients and path significance for the control variables are also illustrated in
Figure 3. The control variables of age and sex were analyzed for their effect on BITN,
and neither affected BITN significantly. Only two age groups were modeled 50+
(B=0.302, p=0.136) and 40-49 (B=0.300, p=0.103); however, there were insufficient
samples in the other three age groups (30-39, 20-29, and 19 or less) to analyze. Being
male also had no significant effect on BITN (B=0.151, p=0.103); again, there was an
insufficient number of females to analyze.
Phase 2 (P2): Qualitative Data Results
This section provides a discussion of the qualitative findings. Creswell and Plano
Clark (2018) describe the purpose of the integration as connecting the quantitative and
qualitative phases. The first part of the section reviews the validity, reliability, and
consistency findings from the interview data, followed by a discussion of the sequential
integration methodology. Finally, the section concludes with an elaboration of the
qualitative analysis results, including the integrated results.

P2: Measurement Model Findings
Creswell and Plano Clark (2018) note, "In general, reliability plays a minor role in
qualitative research because the inquirer instead emphasizes the value of his or subjective
interpretations" (p. 217). Thus, validation focused on two primary goals, transcription
accuracy and coding alignment. A validator was recruited to independently utilize the
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Otter.ai tool to ensure that transcriptions were accurate. The validator reviewed each
transcription within the tool and agreed with transcriptions.
In addition, two rounds of code-snippet validation were also conducted. First, six
reviewers validated the code/snippet alignment by dividing it into three groups of two
each. Each pair was aligned with both a code definition and an example snippet that best
represented that code. The code-snippet pairs were distributed across the groups such that
each code would receive two reviews. A simple scoring model was implemented for the
review, asking each member to rate their concurrence with the author's alignment and
provided example, broken out as "Agree = 1". "Good as anything = .5", or "Something
else = 0". For "Something else," the reviewer was asked to suggest a different code. Of
the six participants, only four completed the peer reviews: one from both groups one and
three and two from group two; one of the reviewers from group two reviewed every item,
thus providing three total reviews. The minimum concurrence score was set for two, and
142/149 (95.90%) codes met or exceeded this score, as shown in Table D1. The seven
snippets that did not meet the minimum score were dropped.
Second, the author created a unique ID for each snippet/code pair and tagged the
appropriate text within each interview transcript, ensuring each snippet/code pair was
unique. This review identified seven snippets that required de-confliction due to overlap.
Post review, four of the seven codes were separated, and for the remaining three, one of
the conflicting codes for each was dropped. After all the validation was completed, 139
snippet/code pairs remained for analysis.
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P2: Data Analysis, Sequential Integration
A sequential integration process was used to integrate the findings from both phases of
the research. The integration's primary focus was to map shared category-code findings
from each outcome group to the hypotheses. A final consolidated mapping provided a
richer, more contextual understanding of the quantitative findings via a joint display, as
shown in Table 14. Creswell and Plano Clark (2018) note,
Researchers also need to represent the connection between the initial quantitative
results and the following-up qualitative results with a joint display or graph. The
purpose of such a results display is to make specific the link between the two
connected databases and to help visualize how the qualitative findings enhance
the understanding of the quantitative results (p 237).
For each of the five categories, standardized methodology generated the contextual
findings. First, code/snippet pairs were broken out by the two outcome groups. Next, the
total number of snippets for each code/group pair was quantified, and the number of
participants providing the associated snippets. Then, representative snippets were
selected based on score in that the highest score of three was selected when possible. If
multiple snippets were equal in score, best judgment was used based on the current
context. Subsequently, an analysis was conducted to validate if the snippets and
participants were normally distributed, then record the observations and outliers
associated with each.
The hypothesis support analysis utilized the same methodology, with some additional
steps in the beginning. First, category/code pairs were provided with their associated
hypothesis. Categories for DTVP and SIPC were associated with Hypothesis One (H1).
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Categories for SIPC and BITN were associated with Hypothesis Two (H2). Next, only
codes that were shared between the category pairs were selected for analysis. Finally,
representative snippets were selected for each code-group to provide context,
distributions analyzed, outliers identified, and observations were noted.
The analysis methodology was applied in three passes through the code/snippet
pairings. First, an analysis was conducted on all codes and categories (including
supplementary). Second, an analysis was conducted on code/snippet pairs for each
category individually (including supplementary). Finally, an analysis was conducted on
categories aligned with the hypotheses, and findings were integrated with the quantitative
results.

P2: Code Analysis Findings
All qualitative findings are presented in detail in Appendix D. Table D1 details all
code-snippet pairs' findings derived from the interviews. The analysis resulted in 139
snippets associated with 12 unique codes across two outcome groups (A and H) in a
43.17(A)/56.83%(H) breakout. Calculations using all 12 codes and all five categories
resulted in a distribution that did not differ significantly from the norm, as shown in
Table A7. The following describes the specific findings by both group-participants and
group-snippet.
Group-Participant: All Codes. There were six participants, all of whom were male
and 50 or older, divided equally into the two outcome groups. Calculations using all 12
codes and six participants resulted in a distribution that did not differ significantly from
the norm, as shown in Table A7; however, Group H contributed 31.67% more snippets.
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Only two codes were discussed by all six participants, while various combinations of
five participants discussed another four. All participants recognized the advantages of
having a LinkedIn profile (benefit) and knowledge of internet collection and analysis
activities (collection). However, only five indicated their intention (or lack thereof) to
make changes to their profile (behavior) or their inclination to value privacy (GPCN),
both of which were directly reflective of the underlying constructs. Five participants also
discussed their expectations of privacy on sites (PRBF) or how their data was being used
(usage).
Unlike their counterparts, Group A participants were more deliberate in their
contentions. They did not have any codes represented by only one participant; they had
five codes with zero snippets. However, only single participants from Group H indicated
contributions by their decision on what/when to share (control), accuracy or inaccuracy
of the posted data (errors), and/or personality traits. Group H was more deliberate in the
overall number of items all members acknowledged, with a total of six (behavior, benefit,
collection, GPCN, SPCN, and usage), as opposed to their group A counterparts at only
four (benefit, collection, control, PRBF). As expected, with group H the least ambiguous
representation of each variable, they were the only group to present all 12 codes;
however, with only one participant in three codes (control, errors, PNTR). Group H was
also the only group to indicate the influence of negative experiences (invasion),
personality quirks (PNTR), laws (regulations), and concerns with this situation (SPCN).
Participants in group A did not present any notions regarding the influence of
inaccuracies (errors), previous negative experiences (invasion), personality quirks
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(PNTR), laws, regulations, or policies, or the situation (SPCN). Only single participants
from group H indicated the influence of either errors or personality traits.
Group-Snippet: All Codes. There were 139 snippets separated into the two outcome
groups in a 43.17/56.83% breakout, respectively. Calculations using all 12 codes and
associated snippets resulted in a distribution that did not differ significantly from the
norm, as shown in Table A7; however, group H participants contributed 64.71% more
frequently.
There was a 50/50 split on the group presenting the most snippets for each of the four
codes having more than the average (11.58) number of snippets. Group A provided the
most snippets for the two codes having the most, 80.00% of the 25 snippets for PRBF and
90.01% of the 22 snippets for control. However, group H provided the most snippets for
the second two codes having the most snippets, 76.47% of the 17 snippets for usage and
66.671% of the 12 snippets for collection.
Group A did not make any contributions for five codes (errors, invasion, PNTR,
regulations, and SPCN), which would indicate that these were not a factor in the lesser
degree representations of the variables. Group H indicated that both control and PNTR
were underlying factors; however, two snippets only supported each.
Category 1: Breach of Privacy. The first interview topic sought to determine if the
situation was a breach of privacy by stating, "For the next few minutes, let's discuss if
this is a breach of privacy." The research design incorporated this topic to validate the
assumption of whether the participants considered this situation a breach of privacy.
Table A8 details the findings for this category derived from the interviews. Specifically,
10 codes were supported by 29 snippets provided by all six participants across the

67
outcome groups in a 37.93(A)/62.07%(H) breakout, with neither group presenting either
errors or PNTR. Separate calculations using all 12 codes, with all six participants and
associated snippets, resulted in disparate distributions; the code-participant distribution
did differ from normal, while the code-snippet distribution did not, as shown in Table A7.
Across both groups, 66.67% did not believe this situation was a breach of privacy,
with the remaining indicating they were unsure. Both groups indicated that their
inclinations to worry about privacy (GPCN) and potential for a loss of privacy (PRBF)
were underlying factors, with group A providing 88.89% of the nine for PRBF; which
presented at more than twice the number of snippets of the next most extensive code
(invasion) response at four. Group A was also the only group to indicate that their ability
to control their data was a factor. Group H had 133.33% more participant engagements at
14 and 63.64% more snippets at 18. Consistent with their higher degree representation of
the variables, group H also contributed 63.64% more snippets and seven unique codes
(behavior, benefit, collection, invasion, regulation, SPCN, and usage). As stated earlier,
invasion had the second most snippets, indicating that previous negative experiences
were a factor for group H.
While both groups indicated that their inclination toward privacy was a factor, it was
unsubstantial, with only a single participant from each group presenting a single snippet.
Participants in group H indicated that maintaining their profile (behavior) and potential
legalities and liabilities (regulation) were factors, again minimal as a single participant
only presented each with a single snippet. Unlike the others in group H, one of the
participants affirmed that this situation was not a privacy breach.
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Category 2: DTVP. The second interview topic sought to elicit the participant's
disposition to value privacy by stating, "For the next few minutes, let's discuss your
disposition to value privacy." Table A9 details the findings for the DTVP category
derived from the interviews. There were 11 codes supported by 34 snippets provided by
all six participants across the outcome groups in a 35.29(A)/64.71%(H) breakout;
however, the code for behavior was not presented by any participant. Separate
calculations using all 12 codes, with all six participants and associated snippets, resulted
in distributions that did not differ significantly from the norm, as shown in Table A7.
Both groups discussed elements of control (what to share, how much to share, and
when to engage in sharing), with group A providing 77.78% of the nine snippets for
control, which presented nearly twice the next most extensive code (GPCN and PRBF)
responses at four. Consistent with earlier trends, group H had 166.67% more participant
engagements at 16 and 83.34% more snippets at 22. All group H members affirmatively
expressed their inclination to value privacy (GPCN).
While both groups indicated that the advantages of having a LinkedIn profile were a
factor, it was negligible, with only a single participant from each group presenting a
single snippet. Group A did not make any contributions for six codes (collection, errors,
invasion, PNTR, regulation, and usage), which would indicate that these were not a factor
in the lesser degree representations of the variables. Participants in group H indicated that
while collection, errors, invasion, and usage (four codes) were factors, all were minimal
as a single participant only presented each with a single snippet.
Category 3: SIPC. The third interview topic sought to derive the participant's level of
privacy concern regarding the situation by stating, "For the next few minutes, let's discuss
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your level of concern regarding LinkedIn scraping/posting your data." Table A9 details
the findings for the SIPC category derived from the interviews. There were eight codes
supported by 28 snippets provided by all six participants, across the outcome groups in a
39.29(A)/60.71%(H) breakout, with neither group presenting four codes (benefit, GPCN,
invasion, and PNTR) in this category. Separate calculations using all 12 codes, with all
six participants and associated snippets, resulted in distributions that were not normally
distributed, as shown in Table A7.
During the interviews, members of both groups discussed internet collection and
analysis activities (collection) and the ambiguity on the ultimate purpose for the scraped
data (usage). However, group A provided 33.33% more snippets at three for collection,
and group H provided 500.00% more snippets at six for usage. Consistent with the trend,
group H had 66.67% more engagements at 10 and 54.55% more snippets at 17. All group
H members affirmatively expressed privacy concerns regarding this situation (SPCN) and
the potentially nefarious applications of their scraped data (usage).
Group A did not make any contributions for six codes (behavior, benefit, errors,
GPCN, PNTR, and regulations), which would indicate that these were negligible factors
in the lesser degree representations of the variables. Also, only a single participant from
group A presented the only four snippets for control in this category. Group H did not
make any contributions for five codes (benefit, control, GPCN, PNTR, and PRBF), which
would indicate that these were minor factors in the higher degree representations of the
variables.
Category 4: BITN. The fourth interview topic sought to derive the participant's
intention to modify their LinkedIn profile's visibility by stating, "Finally, let's discuss
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your intention to modify your LinkedIn profile's visibility." Table A9 details the findings
for the BITN category derived from the interviews. There were nine codes supported by
27 snippets presented from all six participants, across the outcome groups in a
59.25(A)/40.74%(H) breakout, with neither group presenting three codes (PNTR,
regulations, and SPCN) by any participant in this category. Separate calculations using all
12 codes, with all six participants and associated snippets, resulted in distributions that
were not normally distributed, as shown in Table A7.
The groups diverged in their intention to modify their profiles, although both agreed
there were advantages to having a LinkedIn profile (benefit). While benefit presented at
100%, only 83.33% of all participants discussed their intentions to modify their profile
(behavior, with only group H affirming this intent), resulting in the most associated
snippets in this category. Unlike the previous categories, group A had 11.11% more
engagements at 10 and 45.45% more snippets at 16.
Group A did not make any contributions for three codes (collection, errors, and
invasion), which would indicate that these were not a factor in the lesser degree
representations of the variables. Participants in group A also indicated three codes
(control, GPCN, and PRBF) were factors, again irrelevant as a single participant only
presented each with a single snippet. Group H did not make any contributions for four
codes (control, GPCN, PRBF, and usage), which would indicate that these were
unimportant in the higher degree representations of the variables. Participants in group H
also indicated three codes (collection, errors, and invasion) were factors, yet irrelevant as
a single participant only presented each with a single snippet.
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Category 5: Supplementary. The fifth interview topic sought to provide any additional
reflections from the interview subjects by stating, "Are there any other additional
thoughts or comments you might have?" Table A10 details the findings for the
supplementary category derived from the interviews. There were eight codes supported
by 21 snippets presented from only five participants across the outcome groups in a
47.62(A)/52.38%(H) breakout, with neither group presenting four codes (behavior,
GPCN, PNTR, and SPCN) by any participant in this category. Separate calculations
using all 12 codes, with only five participants and associated snippets, resulted in
distributions not normally distributed, as shown in Table A7.
Group A was the only group to indicate that their decisions on what/when to share
(control) and expectations of privacy on sites (PRBF) were factors by 66.67% of the
participants. Group H had 16.67% more participant engagements at 7 and 10.00% more
snippets at 11; however, one group A member did not contribute to this category. Group
H was the only group to indicate that laws (regulations) and how their data was being
used (usage) were factors, by 66.67% of the participants.
While both groups indicated that knowledge of internet collection and analysis
activities (collection) was a factor, it was unimportant. Only a single participant from
each group presented a single snippet. A single group A participant acknowledged that
the advantages of having a LinkedIn profile were a factor with a single snippet. Group A
did not make any contributions for four codes (errors, invasion, regulation, and usage),
indicating that these were not factors in the lesser degree representations of the variables.
As mentioned earlier, one participant in group A did not contribute any snippets. Group
H did not make any contributions for three codes (benefit, control, and PRBF), which
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would indicate that these were negligible factors in the higher degree representations of
the variables. Participants in group H also indicated three codes (collection, errors, and
invasion) were factors. However, again these were minimal, with a single participant only
presenting each with a single snippet.

P2: Sequential Integration Findings
Hypothesis One (H1). The quantitative analysis found significant support for H1,
showing that DTVP has a positive effect on SIPC. Table 14 details the findings for the
integration of results associated with H1. Overlap analysis of categories DTVP and SIPC
resulted in seven codes supported by 40 snippets from all six participants.
Table 14
Sequential Integration Results
Hypo/
Code
H1/CNTL

OG

Participants

Snippets

A

3

11

Representative Snippets
•

•

H1/PRBF

A

2

5

•

•

“So if if I don't want uh, if if I want to be
private, that I don't engage, that's that's the only
way to be completely private." (11188138618,
CNTL02, DTVP)
“Okay. So once again, I mean it's, it's up to me
to be careful of what I put out there in terms of
uh you know what content I make available."
(11269613365, CNTL12, SIPC)
“Um so uh I don't um believe that knowing my
name, and uh, and uh knowing my disposition,
but through conversation, either over the phone
or uh, or in person is anything more than just um
that person that I'm engaging with, using their
uh, their skills and their uh techniques of a, of a
um observation to to make a make a deduction."
(11188138618, PRBF20, DTVP)
“So maybe you have a question about it, you
know, we've been instructed to contact the
government, if you have, if you have any
concerns, so uh most of that stuff has been
vetted that that I would ever talk about, I have
very little out there." (11269613365, PRBF15,
SIPC)
(continued)
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Hypo/
Code
H1/COLL

OG

Participants

Snippets

H

1

3

Representative Snippets
•

•

H1/ERRS

H

1

2

•

•

H1/REGL

H

2

4

•

•

H1/SPCN

H

3

8

•

•

“I, I suspect the bigger the bigger issue and bigger
concern um would be to take uh the information
from the OPM or some of the other databases that
have been breached and and kind of uh meld them
together if you will." (11251351842, COLL09,
DTVP)
“So uh I think I need some questions answered,
um before I can move forward in having worked in
the IC community for a short period of time, just a
couple years, I know the capabilities of what they
can do and and uh things they can look at."
(11224014306, COLL05, SIPC)
“Professional reasons I had to and uh but every
now and then I go back in there and I make some
adjustments, make some updates, take some stuff
off that are no longer relevant." (11205114603,
ERRS01, DTVP)
“But uh, but for me, I have no need to be in that
um in that world anymore. Uh, so as time goes on
I, I remove a lot of those specific key
terminologies simply because um that's in the past
and it's no longer relevant." (11205114603,
ERRS03, SIPC)
“And actually was a little disappointed when the
Patriot Act was ah, I think if I'm not mistaken, I
know it's being re-looked, I think it may have been
approved, but I'm not sure we've made any
adjustments on that. For our, our, our new um for
this period, any updates, if you will, excuse me."
(11224014306, REGL05, DTVP)
“Um um but but looking at the some of the
previous models, um especially with uh Chelsea
Manning, and and uh and others. Um it it certainly
did harmful and uh severe damage to the US
government writ large." (11251351842, REGL01,
SIPC)
“I become quite concerned, also concerned with
little funny things that happen when ah I'm
standing around talking about a subject and it
shows up on my ah Amazon feed or something of
that nature." (11224014306, SPCN08, DTVP)
“Okay, yeah, that was a surprise to me. Um, I, at
first I was I was uh, I was quite unhappy about
that. But on the other end, I went back to my
original philosophy. Well, I put the stuff out
there." (11205114603, SPCN04, SIPC)

(continued)
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Hypo/
Code
H1/USGE

OG

Participants

Snippets

H

3

7

Representative Snippets
•

•

H2/CNTL

A

1

7

•

•

H2/PRBF

A

2

6

•

•

H2/USGE

A

2

3

•

•

H2/BEHV

H

3

6

•

•

“So ah somebody's grabbing my information, ah
somebody's using it for whether it's sales, or
whether to rob me or use my uh uh social security
number." (11224014306, USGE12, DTVP)
“Uh, for whatever purposes um, you know, could
be nefarious, it could simply be trying to find the
right people for the right position across the IC uh
or other other agencies, private and public."
(11205114603, USGE10, SIPC)
“Okay. So once again, I mean it's, it's up to me to
be careful of what I put out there in terms of uh
you know what content I make available."
(11269613365, CNTL12, SIPC)
“If I'm worried about it, it's gonna be a situation
where I'll push it to the guy. And it won't be
through the site, it'll be through an email or
something a little bit more secure." (11269613365,
CNTL11, BITN)
“So, you know, again uh, you know, I made the
conscious effort, uh the conscious decision that
that what they were going to be able to ascertain
from me was uh not going to directly uh um affect
me and uh in a negative way and and not to
negatively uh affect me in an indirect ways either.
Um I don't think that a uh bad actor could um
necessarily get enough information to do do me or
my um family harm." (11188138618, PRBF14,
SIPC)
“I also realize that people that know know people
that I know can see my some of my stuff because
they, they share it. So, once again, I uh it's my
assumption that anything that's on those sites is
going to be open source to anybody."
(11269613365, PRBF11, BITN)
“Uh I believe that IC I don't know where
ICWATCH is located or the people that are
involved in it, but they potentially make it easy for
enemies of the United States to assemble
information." (11223476508, USGE09, SIPC)
“And I believe that uh people generally generally
are doing the right thing and abiding by the terms
of service and uh and why they're using the
system. But I know that that is not always the
case." (11223476508, USGE06, BITN)
“And I think I went back there and uh did a
general scrub and use more general terminology,
because I'm not I'm no longer in that in that
profession." (11205114603, personal
communication, BEHV02, SIPC)
“So I I toned that thing down. An I uh think I uh I
uh may be doing the same with uh LinkedIn."
(11224014306, BEHV03, BITN)
(continued)
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Hypo/
Code
H2/COLL

OG

Participants

Snippets

H

1

3

Representative Snippets
•

“So uh I think I need some questions answered,
um before I can move forward in having worked in
the IC community for a short period of time, just a
couple years, I know the capabilities of what they
can do and and uh things they can look at."
(11224014306, COLL05, SIPC)
• “Um again, I don't know, they're we're looking at
if they've taken everything, um IP addresses, any
phone numbers that may or may not be in there.
Anything, anything I may have said."
(11224014306, COLL08, BITN)
H2/ERRS
H
1
2
• “But uh, but for me, I have no need to be in that
um in that world anymore. Uh, so as time goes on
I, I remove a lot of those specific key
terminologies simply because um that's in the past
and it's no longer relevant." (11205114603,
ERRS03, SIPC)
• “Um, as I mentioned before, I'm definitely uh
steering away from uh the IC community because
uh I haven't been involved in in quite a while
there's really no point it's actually misleading. For
those who see that language. Um, I don't want to
waste anybody's time. And uh really, um but it's
it's a constant care and feeding of my public
profile to present the most accurate up to date and
uh harmless um public presentation that I can um
you uh to uh you know benefit those in my
network and uh and myself to be honest."
(11205114603, ERRS02, BITN)
Note. Codes for behavior and SPCN, which directly reflect the underlying constructs and topics,
support/refute the associated hypotheses. Only one participant provided a single snippet for COLL or
ERRS in SIPC, accounting for the duplication. Snippet details provided after each in the following
format: Participant ID, Code ID, Category. Code ERRS03 intentionally used twice.

There were no codes shared between the two groups; six codes were overlapped
within the groups (collection control, errors, PRBF, regulations, and usage) and across
the categories, with 66.67% participant representation in four (control, PRBF,
regulations, and usage). Both groups also overlapped on the code SPCN, which reflects
statements directly related to one of the hypothesis constructs and discussion topics, with
a 66.67% representation. There was overlap on two codes for group A, indicating that
decisions on what/when to share (control) and expectations of privacy on sites (PRBF)
may antecede or moderate this hypothesis for the lesser degree representation group, with
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100% of participants for control and 66.67% for PRBF. There was overlap on five codes
for group H (collection, errors, regulation, SPCN, and usage) for the higher degree
representation group, with 100% of participants for both SPCN and usage, each having
the second-largest number of snippets, eight and seven, respectively. Support for
regulation was at the 66.67% participation level.
Group H indicated both knowledge of internet collection and analysis activities
(collection) and notions about inaccuracies (errors), but a single participant only
presented each with a single snippet. This would indicate that these were not relevant
factors in the higher degree representations of the variables.
Hypothesis Two (H2). The quantitative analysis found significant support for H2,
showing that SIPC has a negative effect on the intention (BITN) to continue sharing
information publicly on LinkedIn. Table 14 details the findings for the integration of
results associated with H2. Overlap analysis of categories SIPC and BITN resulted in six
codes supported by 27 snippets presented from all six participants.
Again, there were no codes shared between the two groups; five codes were
overlapped within the groups (collection, control, errors, PRBF, and usage) and across
categories, with 66.67% representation in two code, PRBF and usage. Both groups also
overlapped on the code behavior, reflecting statements directly related to one of the
hypothesis constructs and discussion topics, with an 83.34% representation. There was a
50/50 split of the six associated codes between the two groups. There was overlap on
three codes for group A (control, PRBF, and usage), which may antecede or moderate
this hypothesis for the lower degree representation group, with 66.67% of participants for
both PRBF and usage. There was also overlap on three codes for group H (behavior,
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collection, and errors) for the higher degree representation group, with 100% of
participants for behavior.
There was overlap on one code for group A, indicating that decisions on what/when to
share (control), but a single participant only presented each with a single snippet. This
would indicate that these were not substantial factors in the higher degree representations
of the variables. The same outliers for group H associated with Hypothesis One (H1) also
apply here, single contributions for both collection and errors.
Summary of Results
The mixed methodology approach produced two datasets, quantitative and qualitative,
which were then integrated. The following summarizes whether the hypotheses were
supported and significant, which other factors potentially underlie the study's
unidimensional constructs, and which other factors potentially influenced the hypotheses.

Constructs
Breach of privacy. 66.68% of the participants did not indicate they believed this to be
a breach of privacy. When discussed, both groups indicated that this might be more
relevant to privacy risk beliefs (66.67%) and general privacy concerns (33.33%).
However, the groups diverged on other influencing factors. Two-thirds of group A
implied that control might influence this. Two-thirds of group H implied that several
other factors might influence this, including benefit, collection, invasion, situational
privacy concern, and usage.
DTVP. When discussed, only 66.67% of the participants affirmed privacy concerns
(GPCN); however, both groups indicated the influence of benefit (33.33%), control

78
(66.667%), and PRBF (50.00%). However, group H at 66.67% representation indicated
that specific (SPCN) versus general privacy concerns may be meaningful in the lower
degree of the variables.
SIPC. When discussed, both groups indicated that this might be influenced by
collection (50.00%) and usage (66.667%). However, the groups diverged on other
influencing factors. Additionally, group A at 66.67% representation indicated that usage
may be important in the lower degree of the variables. All members of Group H made
reflective statements regarding SPCN bolstering support in the higher degree of the
variables.
BITN. When discussed, both groups at 100% of all participants indicated that the
advantages of having a profile (benefit) might be influential. However, only 83.33% of
all participants discussed their intentions to modify their profile (behavior, with only
group H affirming this intent). Additionally, group A at 66.67% representation indicated
that usage may be meaningful in the lower degree representations of the variables.
Supplementary. When allowed to provide additional reflections not explicitly related
to any topic, the groups diverged on other influencing factors. Group A indicated, with
66.67% representation, that control and PRBF may be meaningful in the lower degree
representations of the variables. However, group H indicated, with 66.67%
representation, that regulations may be meaningful in the higher degree representations of
the variables.

Hypotheses
Hypothesis One (H1). H1 had significant support and showed that DTVP influenced
SIPC as expected. However, the groups diverged on potential influencing factors. Group
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A had two shared codes bridging the hypothesis constructs, control (100%) and PRBF
(66.667%). Group H also had three shared codes, regulation (66.67%) and usage (100%),
as well as SPCN (100%), which was reflective of both a construct and topic.
Hypothesis Two (H2). H2 had significant support and showed that SIPC did influence
BITN as expected. Again, the groups diverged on potential influencing factors. Group A
had two shared codes bridging the hypothesis constructs, PRBF (66.67%) and usage
(66.67%). Group H only had one code behavior (100%), indicating their unanimity
towards modifying their profile.
Control variables. Neither of the control variables, age or sex, influenced BITN.
However, not all categories could be analyzed due to sampling limitations.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, Summary
The chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the mixed methods design and
subsequent findings, providing a discussion on accomplishing the objectives, alternative
explanations, strengths, weaknesses, and limitations. From there, an elaboration of the
findings' implications regarding their contributions and impacts on the field of study.
Then, it furnishes recommendations for future research and the application to
professional practice. Finally, the chapter culminates in a full summary of the research
study.
Conclusions
The mixed method approach was completed in two phases. The quantitative portion
utilized a survey instrument and PLS model analysis, while the qualitative portion used
interviews followed by sequential integration. Overall, the analysis showed clear support
for the underlying research questions, all of which were grounded in the context of
providing empirical justification for a relationship between privacy concern and behavior
intention in an actual privacy-centric situation. The second phase of the mixed method
approach provided context to the research questions, resulting in strong representation for
several antecedents or moderating factors, often spread unequally across the two groups
characterizing the low and high degree of variable representations. Across the entire
situation, participants in group A (lower degree of variables) presented the only factor
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(privacy risk belief) that bridged across both hypotheses. It was evident that more factors
influenced group H participants (higher degree of variables), presenting all 12 codes, five
more than group A. Group H appeared to be additionally influenced by factors such as
the inaccuracy of their information (errors), negative experiences on the Internet
(invasion), their personality quirks (personality traits), existing laws (regulations), and
concerns about ICWATCH or the situation (specific privacy concerns).
When allowed to provide additional reflections not explicitly related to any topic, both
groups were again divided on the underlying factors influencing the situation. Group A
again commented on the influence of choosing what to share (control, 66.67%) and the
expectation of privacy on LinkedIn (privacy risk belief, 66.67%). Group H also reiterated
that influences regarding applicable laws (regulation, 66.67%) were still present. Lastly,
for each of the hypotheses, the groups continued to diverge on the underlying factors.
The two groups personified the opposite degrees of the relationships between the
hypothesis variables. The only exact point of agreement between the two groups was the
advantages of having a LinkedIn profile. Group A members had the least concern for
privacy in general and none with the situation and had no plans nor intention to change
their profile. Their ability to select what, when, and where to share was the most
expressed, at 10 times the amount of comments of their counterparts. While they knew
their information was being collected on the internet, they did not expect privacy.
On the other hand, group H members valued the right to be left alone. They were
concerned when they saw this situation and expressed an intent to "tone it down" (profile)
or "take another look." They also revealed more latent factors influencing both their
privacy concerns and subsequent profile changes. These factors included that their profile
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may not reflect their current resume accurately. They had previously had an account
hacked, or money was stolen. They were introverted or uninteresting, or they were not
sure that protections provided by laws and regulations (e.g., Patriot and Privacy Acts)
were enough. They acknowledged that there was no expectation of privacy on the
internet, but at four times as much as their counterparts. While they also knew their data
was being collected and had no expectation of privacy, they expressed these sentiments at
twice their counterparts' rate.

Hypothesis One (H1)
The quantitative analysis showed strong support for the first hypothesis, that general
privacy concerns influence situation-specific privacy concerns in actual privacy-centric
situations. Again, different factors were exposed to be either antecedent or moderating
between the different degrees of each associated variable. Group A expressed support for
the influence of both control and privacy risk belief (66.67%). Participants in this group
expressed a conscious choice to both participate and what information to share on
LinkedIn (control), as expressed by Participant 11188138618, “…if I want to be private,
that I don't engage … that's the only way to be completely private." They also expressed
sentiments regarding the conscious decisions made when posting information to LinkedIn
and that the data was either already sanitized appropriately or not sensitive (privacy risk
belief); as voiced by Participant 11188138618, “…I made the conscious effort, uh the
conscious decision … I don't think that a uh bad actor could um necessarily get enough
information to … do me or my um family harm."
Group H conveyed support for the influence of regulation (66.67%), specific
privacy concerns (100%), and usage (100%). Participants in this group indicated the
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apparent lack of application of existing regulations (Constitutional amendments, Patriot
Act, and Privacy Act), as well as a lack of government action (regulation), as disclosed
by Participant 11251351842, "… the fact that ICWATCH has violated personal privacy
in the past … the US Government's [lack of] resolve to do anything about it."
They also expressed concern when they became aware of the situation (specific privacy
concerns), as revealed by Participant 11251351842, "… their [ICWATCH] behavior
certainly raises red flags." Finally, they indicated a lack of understanding as to what
ICWATCH was doing with their data, expressing that it may be inappropriate (usage), as
expressed by Participant 11224014306, "… if I'd summed up in one statement, what are
you [ICWATCH] doing with it?"

Hypothesis Two (H2)
The quantitative analysis also showed strong support for the second hypothesis, that
situation-specific privacy concerns influence behavior intention in actual privacy-centric
situations, again with diverging underlying factors. Group A indicated support for the
influence of both privacy risk belief (66.67%) and usage (66.67%). Participants in this
group indicated that a conscious choice was made to post information they knew could be
shared and seen by others, and the risk had been evaluated (privacy risk belief), as
disclosed by Participant 11269613365, "… it's my assumption that anything that's on
those sites is going to be open source to anybody." They also expressed notions
indicating they recognized their data was probably being used in ways they did not fully
understand (usage), as voiced by Participant 11223476508, "And I believe that uh people
… are doing the right thing and abiding by the terms of service …. but I know that that is
not always the case.” All Group H members were like-minded in that they already had or
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planned to revisit their profile on LinkedIn, as expressed by Participant 11205114603,
"…. I plan on I don't do it as frequently as I should. …. But yeah, before the weekend. I'll
probably go back in there [LinkedIn]."

Breach of Privacy
It was clear that while this was a privacy-centric situation that was of privacy concern,
it was not a breach of privacy. When discussed, both groups indicated an influence by
privacy risk beliefs (66.67%). Participants in both groups indicated that there was no
expectation of privacy, as people are essentially putting their information in the public
domain (privacy risk belief), as disclosed by Participant 11269613365, "But I think if you
go out to social media sites … you don't have any uh, any expectation of privacy at that
point." (11269613365, personal communication, March 28, 2020). However, the groups
differed on other elements. Group A conveyed support for the influence of control
(66.67%) in that participants could choose what to share, as voiced by Participant
11223476508, "… my resume is an assemblage of my life experience and I have not
divulged any classified information. In fact, that resume was scrubbed and approved for
release prior to it being posted anywhere or used for my job search."
However, Group H indicated support for the influence of collection (66.67%) and
usage (66.67%). Participants noted the potential naïveté of Internet users (collection) and
the sophistication of Internet aggregation, as indicated by Participant 11205114603,
"...I'm not sure many people realize that whatever they put out there is being scooped up
... to assist whatever agency creates those aggregators." They also conveyed that
providers and others are using data without permission and for undesirable and/or
unknown purposes, as revealed by Participant 11251351842, "… takes that information
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and uh puts it in, in the public under a false light … for some sort of uh, uh commercial
advantage."

Constructs
The qualitative findings also provided insight into each of the antecedents or
moderators of the individual constructs. For DTVP, both groups indicated the underlying
influence of both the decision of when/what to share (control, 66.67%) and the
expectation of losing privacy on LinkedIn (PRBF, 50.0%), with 66.67% making
statements reflective of their inclination to worry about privacy (GPCN). However, group
H indicated that associated laws (regulations, 66.67%) and concerns regarding the
ICWATCH situation (SPCN, 66.67%) also exert influence. For SIPC, both groups
indicated that this was influenced by their information being collected and analyzed
(collection, 50.0%) and what purposes their data was being used for (usage, 66.667%).
Consistent with the trend, the groups diverged on other influencing factors. Group A
described the influence of PRBF (66.67%), while 100% of group H made comments
directly reflective of situational privacy concerns (SPCN). For BITN, both groups
indicated the influence regarding the advantages of the data available in the profile
(benefit, 100%), with 83.33% discussing their choice to modify their profile (behavior).
However, group A also implied that ambiguity regarding how the data was employed
(usage, 66.67%) influenced their perspective.

Objectives
The results of the study met the three goals associated with the research. The first goal
was that the research would contribute to the literature by providing empirical
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justification for a relationship between privacy concerns and behavior intention in an
actual privacy-centric situation. As in the literature, the results demonstrated that the
resulting significance was similar, whether applied to an actual situation or contrived
scenarios. For Hypothesis One (H1) DTVPàSIPC, this study found a p<.001
significance. Kayhan & Davis (2016) and Li (2014) found similar levels of significance
for similar constructs, p<.01 and p<.05 levels, respectively. For Hypothesis Two (H2),
SIPCàBITN, this study found a p<.001, which was similar to that found by Li (2014) at
p<.01. The second and third goals were that the research would justify the
appropriateness of the constructs and scales regarding usage in actual situations. With
valid findings for the research model analysis and tests of measurement items, the
constructs and scales remain valid and applicable in an actual context. The qualitative
results provided further justification as each construct was equated with a category and
discussed with participants, with no noted issues. The author informed interview
participants at the outset that they could ask for clarification at any time and was
provided the opportunity to add additional reflections at the end, yet did not.

Alternative Explanations
Other factors may have contributed to findings of which privacy concerns were only
antecedent or moderating. The sentiments expressed regarding the advantages of sharing
information on LinkedIn (benefit) had 100% representation by all the interview
participants. The population for the study consisted of 1st- and 2nd-degree LinkedIn
connections to the author. A potential population skew existed as there was no way to
determine which profiles resulted from LinkedIn searches, considering both the multitude
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of factors associated with any individual's profile (e.g., sex, age, education, industry,
number of connections, etc.) and no insight into the search algorithm itself.
Limited participation may have also skewed the results in real privacy-centric
situations. The participation of only 65 out of 1,310 (4.96%) possible responders to
complete the survey and 44 volunteering for follow-up interviews (3.35%) may not be
surprising. Only the most concerned individuals may have volunteered (i.e., the most
robust representation of the variable), accounting for the lack of representation in other
outcome groups. Males overrepresented females by 612.50%, and the age category of
older than 50 years overrepresented all other age categories combined by 50%.
Chakraborty et al.’s (2013) work was indicative of this response. His work on Facebook
found partial support for older males and females, making different sharing decisions.
Similarly, Zhang et al. (2013) discovered a positive correlation between age and privacy
concerns (multidimensional; in an m-commerce context), as well as support for age
influencing behavior (specifically younger users' willingness to conduct mobile
commerce [m-commerce] activities). Either or both of these could account for the
significance of the findings.

Strengths, Weaknesses, Limitations
Strengths. While not a breach of privacy, both groups' revelations of their expectation
of losing privacy on LinkedIn (privacy risk belief) supports labeling this situation as
privacy-centric. The qualitative codes were operationalized using items adapted from
validated constructs in the existing literature. This alignment was appropriate as this
study sought to validate the unidimensional privacy concerns, which resulted in evidence
of the multidimensional aspects during descriptive analysis. Moreover, the increase of
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significance from contrived scenarios (p<.05 and p<.01) to actual (p<.001) bolstered the
validity of the findings.
Weaknesses. The study utilized a convenience population, limiting the generalizability
of results, which was exacerbated by a sample size of only 65 (a 4.96% participation rate)
and skewed heavily towards men over 50 years of age. The interview methodology frontloaded the breach of privacy topic at the onset of the interview. While necessary to
validate the research's underlying assumption, it may have framed the discussion, thereby
skewing the presented factors and the final qualitative results. While only two outcome
groups reached the 5% level, other non-represented outcome groups may have presented
different unique factors during the interviews, changing the factors underlying each
hypothesis. Four codes were represented weakly across all six interview participants,
errors (16.67%), invasion (33.34%), PNTR (16.67%), and regulations (33.34%), which
may have been more weighty with more participants. Lastly, while group H presented
homogenously for both SPCN (100%) and usage (100%), several snippets had qualifiers
indicating that it was not surprising upon reflection, as revealed by Participant
11205114603, “… the more I thought about it, the more I realized, well, that's to be
expected."
Limitations. Access to demographic diversity may continue to be problematic in real
situations. For this study, the Intelligence Community was the target of the privacycentric situation; however, of the 16 agencies comprising the Intelligence Community,
more than half (9) fell under the Department of Defense (DoD) (Office of the Director of
National Intelligence [ODNI], n.d.). Considering this, approximately 16% of the activeduty force (Air Force, Army, Marines, Navy) are female (Defense.gov, n.d.). Next,
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assessing actual behavior, not merely intention, may be problematic. Initially, the
deployed methodology only assessed if participants modified their profiles; actual
behavior regarding privacy concerns had little representation in the literature. However,
once LinkedIn changed its security settings, the author lacked a viable way to validate
that while the hypothesis was supported, people subsequently modified their profile.
Also, locating actual privacy-centric situations and their identifiable populations is
problematic as well. The study focused on a specific situation, which could infer the
findings were only relevant in this particular instance. Finally, no specific methodology
approximated the population demographics at the onset. Informally, the author assumed
that the age and sex of the population would be equally distributed. Such was not
supported in this study.
Implications
This research provides valuable contributions to the existing literature gaps regarding
general and specific privacy concerns and their influence on behavior intention in a real
situation. In contrast, the literature is primarily based on studies using contrived
approaches. This study used individuals in actual situations and evaluated their
behavioral intention on a specific action available to them.
The results provide empirical support for the influence of other factors in actual
privacy-centric situations. As there may be limited opportunities to investigate actual
privacy-centric situations, underlying factors expressed here lend support to prioritizing
them over others. For instance, benefit was the only factor presented by all six
participants.
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An assumption that researchers need to find a breach of privacy to best model a
privacy-centric situation may not be necessary. Qualitative findings indicated a breach
was not required. Support for the hypotheses and associated qualitative factors only
indicate that situations be privacy-centric. The findings also support utilizing
multidimensional constructs for privacy concerns in actual situations versus
unidimensional. This study modeled the literature trend of broad to specific and found
good support for a unidimensional application. However, the qualitative portion revealed
factors such as collection, invasion, errors, and usage, which typically align with
multidimensional privacy concerns, such as CFIP. There was a lack of overlap in the
shared codes across the two hypotheses and only full participant support for one code,
implying that various factors may influence the entire situation. Compounding this
possible scenario is that each group, representing different degrees of the variables,
presented different codes for each hypothesis, with only a single code (PRBF) bridging
for the low representation of the variables.
The results also have implications for the populations associated with research on
actual privacy situations regarding demographics and participation. The general
assumption that a relatively equal distribution of sex and age will be available is likely
not realistic in real situations. As these situations are unpredictable, researchers may need
to aggregate individual cases to accommodate diverse demographics fully. The necessary
rate of participation may also pose challenges. Although 78 individuals were willing to
engage at some level, which implies that these situations can yield viable populations, it
may be unpredictable. As Participant 11269613365 stated, "I don't friend everybody
asked to be friended …. I don't if I don't know the person."
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Research into actual privacy situations may need to modify participation assumptions to
accommodate lower participation rates. This study expected a participation rate of 19%
using LinkedIn, based on results from Claybaugh and Haseman (2015), yet only achieved
a 4.96% rate.
Recommendations

Based on this study's population demographics, future researchers may want to oversample a specific demographic intentionally to compensate for a lower participation rate,
as was the case in this study, with women participation at just 6.04%. While not an
entirely reliable method, something akin to the post-population analysis using popular
baby names, could help ensure a more equitable participation distribution. Xu, Dinev et
al. (2011) noted that using a more diverse sample increased generalizability to the general
population.
Actual privacy situations require further research. While the findings support the
hypotheses in this real privacy-centric situation, additional studies should address if the
results are unique to this particular situation. Applying a mixed method approach would
also address whether the same qualitative factors are present or changed in different
situations. Future studies using a mixed method approach should also consider using a
more open interview process. While a semi-structured approach was a reasonable tradeoff between structured and open for this initial study into an actual situation, an open
interview process may have revealed other latent factors.
While all group H members presented supportive codes for both behavior and SPCN
as expected, research into actual situations should consider prioritizing the latent factors
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of benefit and usage, which also had 100% representation. While the groups representing
different degrees of the variables diverged on provided codes, prioritizing the higher
degree group's factors should be considered. From a full model perspective, the
advantages (benefit) in having a LinkedIn profile may indicate a privacy paradox for
participants (Wakefield, 2013; Xu, Luo et al., 2011). While it did not factor directly into
the hypothesis support, this high degree of representation suggests its influence, as
expressed by Participant 11269613365, "So that to me is a social media site's all about us
out there trying to basically generate a network."
For OSN providers, the results indicate that while the participants did not express an
intention to discontinue using the platform, it was evident that external actors may
influence what information they choose to share/continue sharing based on external
visibility. As noted by Kayhan & Davis (2016), "Increased awareness of the factors that
contribute to situational privacy concerns will enable online service providers to be more
proactive in mitigating concerns" (p. 233).
Summary of Results
Both the government and large public organizations (i.e., Google, Facebook, and
Amazon) have recently encountered news-worthy privacy issues regarding the massive
amounts of data each collects, transmits, and stores. However, private entities, such as
ICWATCH, also use available information for profiling purposes. Multiple studies have
explored both the contextual and situational aspects of privacy, as well as its paradoxical
nature. However, there remains a gap in understanding if the influence of privacy
concerns on behavior intention can be extended to actual situations, especially since an
individual's behavior related to privacy concerns can be unpredictable.
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This study had three goals focused on extending the existing literature onto an actual
privacy-centric situation. Specifically, providing empirical justification for the
established relationship between privacy concern and behavior intention, appropriateness
of existing constructs, and suitability of existing scales. The study also sought to answer
three research questions grounded in an actual situation. First, what is the user's
disposition towards privacy? Second, to what extent does this influence users' privacy
concerns regarding the inclusion of their LinkedIn profile information within
ICWATCH? Third, to what extent do these concerns influence their stated intention to
modify their LinkedIn profile/settings to minimize/eliminate this inclusion?
The study was relevant as it progressed the field into an actual situation and modeled
the broad to specific approach in the existing literature. Researchers poorly understood
these underlying problems in the context of an actual situation. It was not clear what
other factors might influence findings from previous research. This study was unique. It
evaluated what participants declared they would do (well covered in the literature) but
what individuals might do in the context of an actual privacy-centric situation (little
coverage in literature). Opportunities to study real privacy-centric situations are
problematic as such situations are ad-hoc in nature, and affected populations may not be
identified easily.
A few issues were evident from the privacy literature. A variety of factors influence
privacy concerns and apprehension regarding the use of convenience populations. The
author assumed that users were unaware of this situation. As such, it was appropriate to
evaluate privacy concerns as a unidimensional construct and that the actual situation
qualified as privacy-centric. The researcher identified two limitations associated with the
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research. The reliance on external services (i.e., LinkedIn and ICWATCH) and
new/ongoing Internet security events might influence the study. This cautious approach
constrained the research scope by limiting it to a single behavior, two control variables
(age and sex), two degrees of connections via LinkedIn, and a 30-day window
disqualifier question.
The research included three constructs well represented in the literature, disposition to
value privacy, situation-specific Internet privacy concerns, and behavior intention. The
study included both privacy concern constructs as unidimensional in order to model the
broad-to-specific approach, even though multidimensional privacy concern constructs
were available (i.e., CIFP and IUIPC). The construct for behavior was specifically
narrowed to intention (i.e., future action), ignoring both current and past variations. This
study's strength rested with its underlying foundation of consistent results from the
utilized scales, constructs, and methodologies in the literature. The relevant gap was the
minimal investigation grounded in actual situational influences associated with privacy
concerns and behavior.
The research design employed an explanatory sequential mixed methods design with
interview follow-up, which involved collecting quantitative data first and then
contextualized the quantitative results with qualitative data. The first quantitative phase
of the study used survey methodology. The instrument variables were operationalized
using items adapted from validated scales, with items re-worded to fit the research
context. The researcher measured each of the three constructs with a seven-point scale,
the control variables by a single item each, with an additional binary scale question as a
participant disqualifier. Initial discovery methodology validated a viable population on
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LinkedIn before administering the survey to 1,310 individuals thru LinkedIn directly.
There were 65 valid responses, resulting in a 4.96% participation rate, heavily skewed
towards males (87.69%) over 50 years of age (60.00%).
The second qualitative phase of the study utilized follow-up semi-structured
interviews. The interview, structured around four topics aligned to assumptions or
constructs in the research, was supplemented with a fifth category to capture participants’
reflections. The valid survey respondents from the previous phase, who indicated a
willingness to participate, comprised the interview population. Survey participants were
assigned to one of eight possible outcome groups, characterizing each variable's least
ambiguous representation derived from a simple scoring model. The researcher invited
the most representative scoring participants for follow-up interviews from the only two
groups meeting the established 5% sample threshold per group. Six participants, all-male
and over 50, were interviewed from two groups representing different degrees of
variables (i.e., less/more concerned and not likely/likely to modify profile). The resulting
snippets were analyzed and aligned with 12 codes, operationalized with existing
constructs in the literature. After a code-snippet validation, the resulting data set was 139
code-snippet pairs.
The quantitative phase utilized SmartPLS to perform the partial least squares analysis
and derive both the measurement and structural model findings. A second software
solution called G*Power indicated that 65 samples were enough for PLS analysis,
calculating that 62 was the minimum threshold. The measurement model analysis
assessed both the convergent and discriminant validity and reliability, with all results
exceeding the required thresholds. The structural model analysis revealed that Hypothesis
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One (H1) had significant support that DTVP did influence SIPC as expected. Hypothesis
Two (H2) also had significant support showing that SIPC did influence BITN as
expected. However, there was no significance for any influence of either age or sex on
behavior intention, although neither could be modeled fully.
The qualitative phase utilized sequential integration to contextualize the findings from
the previous phase. First, the author mapped each of the code-snippet pairs to the topics
and constructs and noted observations and outliers. The majority of participants did not
indicate a breach of privacy with shared expressions on the influence of privacy risk
belief and general privacy concerns, and diverging opinions across seven other factors.
Both groups also indicated that DTVP might be influenced by benefit, control, and
privacy risk beliefs and diverged on the influence of specific privacy concerns. Both
groups indicated that SIPC might be influenced by collection and usage and diverged on
two other factors. Lastly, both groups indicated that BITN might be influenced by benefit
but diverged on the influence of usage.
Next, shared code-snippet pairs between each hypothesis were mapped, and
observations and outliers were noted; however, there were no shared codes between the
two groups on either hypothesis. For Hypothesis One (H1), the lesser degree group
expressed the influence of control and privacy risk beliefs, while the higher group
indicted regulation and usage. For Hypothesis Two (H2), the lesser degree group
indicated that privacy risk belief and usage might have influence. Only one shared code
(privacy risk beliefs) was shared across the lesser degree group's hypotheses.
Ultimately, the results of the study showed both support for the hypotheses and the
existing literature. Those participants who were neither inclined to privacy nor concerned
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with the situation did not intend to modify their LinkedIn profile; however, they indicated
that control and privacy risk belief might exert influence. Those participants who were
more inclined and more concerned about the situation did express an intent to modify
their profile and revealed influencing factors such as regulations and usage. The results
provided empirical justification for the established relationship between privacy concern
and behavior intention, appropriateness of existing constructs, and suitability of existing
scales in an actual situation. The methodology and results also revealed challenges with
achieving population demographic equitability when investigating actual privacy-centric
situations. Finally, the qualitative findings established a foundation for using
multidimensional scales and prioritizing other constructs, such as benefit, when
investigating actual privacy situations.
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Appendix A
Supporting Tables
Table A1
Research Contributions Based on Variable Outcomes
Outcome- BITN(-) DTVP(+) SIPC(+) Contribution
Group

OG-A

OG-B

OG-C

OG-D

H

L

H

L

L

L

L

L

L

Full hypothesis support. The participant indicated
they were more likely to continue sharing their
profile, as they were both less disposed to value
privacy and less concerned about the situation.
Interviews may expose influencing factors,
underrepresented in current research, which are
only apparent in an actual privacy-centric
situation.

L

Partial hypothesis support. The participant
indicated they were more likely to stop sharing
their profile even though they were both less
disposed to value privacy and less concerned about
the situation. Interviews may help explain the
contradictory findings for the established
relationship between SPC > BITN.

H

No hypothesis support. The participant indicated
they were more likely to continue sharing their
profile as they were less disposed to value privacy
and yet, more concerned about the situation.
Interviews may help explain the contradictory
findings between the established relationships for
both DTVP > SPC, as well as SPC > BITN.

H

Partial hypothesis support. The participant
indicated they were more likely to stop sharing
their profile, even though they were less disposed
to value privacy and yet more concerned about the
situation. Interviews may help explain the
contradictory findings between DTVP > SPC.
(continued)
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Outcome- BITN(-) DTVP(+) SIPC(+) Contribution
Group

OG-E

OG-F

OG-G

OG-H

H

L

H

L

H

H

H

H

Note. H = high score, L = low score

L

Partial hypothesis support. The participant
indicated they were more likely to continue
sharing their profile, even though they were more
disposed to value privacy and yet less concerned
about the situation. Interviews may help explain
the contradictory findings between DTVP > SPC.

L

No hypothesis support. The participant indicated
they were more likely to stop sharing their profile
as they were more disposed to value privacy and
yet less concerned about the situation. Interviews
may help explain the contradictory findings
between the established relationships for both
DTVP > SPC, as well as SPC > BITN.

H

Partial hypothesis support. The participant
indicated they were more likely to continue
sharing their profile even though they were both
more disposed to value privacy and more
concerned about the situation. Interviews may help
explain the contradictory findings between SPC >
BITN.

H

Full hypothesis support. The participant indicated
they were more likely to stop sharing their profile
as they were both more disposed to value privacy
and more concerned about the situation. Interviews
may expose influencing factors, underrepresented
in current research, which are only apparent in an
actual privacy-centric situation.
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Table A2
Theories in Privacy Research
Theory

Synopsis

Relation to Privacy
Concern Category

Reference Studies

Agency Theory

The relationship
between the principal
whom delegates
actions to an agent;
specifically, conflict
in desires and goals, Origin of privacy
and/or validation of
concerns
the agent’s actions
Text

Xu, 2010

Social Contract
Theory

The social norms
shared between two
parties and their
associated rights and
responsibilities

Li et al., 2010

Theory of Reasoned
Action (TRA) and
Theory of Planned
Behavior (TBP)

Beliefs and attitudes
determine behavior;
TBP adds behavioral
control as a factor

Behavioral
consequences

Bansal et al., 2016;
Dinev & Hart, 2006

Trade-offs

Bansal et al., 2010;
Bansal et al., 2016;
Cichy et al., 2014;
Dinev et al., 2008; Li
et al., 2011; Li, 2014;
Miltgen & PeyratGuilard, 2014; Min
& Kim, 2015

Privacy Calculus
(including Utility
maximization,
expectancy theory of
motivation,
Expectancy-value
theory)

Behavior is based on
a performed calculus
based on weighed
factors

Procedural Fairness
Theory

Fairness (aka justice)
intermediates in the
trust between
principals and
Institutional
agents, in that the
influential factors
actions taken on
behalf of the
principal should be
transparent

Xu, Dinev et al.,
2011

(continued)
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Theory

Synopsis

Protection
Motivation Theory

Fear appeals on
attitudes and
behaviors from
specific threats and
coping evaluations

Information
Boundary Theory

A calculus
generating rules for
disclosing
information from a
cost-benefit
perspective across
individual privacy
boundaries

personality theories

Personality traits
influence privacy
behaviors

Relation to Privacy
Concern Category

Reference Studies
Zhang et al., 2018

Choi & Land, 2016;
Xu, Dinev et al.,
Individual influential 2011
factors

Li, 2014; Osatuyi,
2015

Note. Adapted from Li, Y. (2012) Theories in online information research: A critical review
and an integrated framework, Decision Support Systems, 54(1), p. 474
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Table A3
DTVP Measurement Items
Reference

Question 1

Question 2

Question 3

Kayhan & Davis,
2016
(p. 236)

“Compared to others,
I am more sensitive
about the way my
personal information
is handled.”

“Compared to others,
“Compared to others,
I tend to be more
it is more important
concerned about
for me to keep my
threats to my
information private.”
information privacy.”

Li, 2104
(p. 353)

“Compared to others,
I am more sensitive
about the way other
people or
organizations handle
my personal
information.”

“Compared to others,
I see more
importance in
keeping personal
information private.”

“Compared to others,
I am less concerned
about potential
threats to my
personal privacy.
(reverse-worded)”

Li et al., 2011
(p. 443)

“Compared to others,
I am more sensitive
about the way online
companies handle
my personal
information.”

“To me, it is most
important to keep my
privacy intact from
online companies.”

“I am concerned
about threats to my
personal privacy
today.”

Li et al., 2017
(p. 1021)

“Compared to others,
I am more sensitive
about the way online
companies handle
my personal
information.”

“To me, it is most
important to keep my
privacy intact from
online companies.”

“I am concerned
about threats to my
personal privacy
today.”

Malhotra et al., 2004
(p. 352)

“Compared to others,
I am more sensitive
about the way online
companies handle
my personal
information.”

“To me, it is the most
important thing to
keep my privacy
intact from online
companies.”

“I am concerned
about threats to my
personal privacy
today.”

Xu, Dinev et al.,
2011
(p. 823)

“Compared to others,
I am more sensitive
about the way
companies handle
my personal
information.”

“Compared to others,
“To me, it is the most
I tend to be more
important thing to
concerned about
keep my information
threats to my
privacy.”
information privacy.”

Note. Seven-point scales anchored with “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree.”
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Table A4
Situation-Specific Internet Privacy Concern Measurement Items
Reference

Question 1

Question 2

Question 3

Question 4

Dinev & Hart,
2006
(p. 77)

“In general, I am
concerned that
the information I
submit on the
Internet could be
misused.”

“In general, I am
concerned that a
person can find
private
information
about me on the
Internet.”

“I am concerned
about submitting
information on
the Internet,
because of what
others might do
with it.”

“In general, I am
concerned about
submitting
information on the
Internet, because it
could be used in a
way I did not
foresee.”

Min & Kim,
2015
(p. 857)

“I am concerned
that the
information I
submit on
Facebook could
be misused.”

“I am concerned
that a person can
find private
information
about me on
Facebook.”

“I am concerned
about submitting
information on
Facebook,
because of what
others might do
with it.”

“I am concerned
about submitting
information on
Facebook, because
it could be used in
a way I did not
foresee.”

Ozdemir et al.,
2017
(p. 658)

“I am concerned
that the
information I
share through the
Internet with
people I know
could be misused
by them.”

“I am concerned
about sharing
information
through the
Internet with
people I know,
because of what
they might do
with it.”

“I am concerned
about sharing
information
through the
Internet with
people I know,
because they could
use it in a way I
did not foresee.”

“I am concerned
about providing
personal
information to
online
companies,
because of what
others might do
with it.”

“I am concerned
about providing
personal
information to
online companies,
because it could be
used in a way I did
not foresee.”

“I am concerned
that the
Son & Kim, 2008 information I
(p. 526)
submit to online
companies could
be misused.”

“In general, I am
concerned that a
person can find
private
information
about me on the
Internet.”

(continued)
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Reference

Xu et al., 2011
(p. 823)

Question 1

Question 2

Question 3

Question 4

“I am concerned
that the
information I
submit to this
website could be
misused.”

“I am concerned
that others can
find private
information
about me from
this website.”

“I am concerned
about providing
personal
information to
this website,
because of what
others might do
with it.”

“I am concerned
about providing
personal
information to this
website, because it
could be used in a
way I did not
foresee.”

Note. A mixture of five-point (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Ozdemir et al., 2017) and seven-point (Min
& Kim; Son & Kim; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011) scales anchored with “strongly disagree” and
“strongly agree.”

Table A5
Behavioral Intention Measurement Items
Reference

Question 1

Question 2

Question 3

“The extent to which I would reveal my health
information to this health website is” (Bansal et
al., 2010)

unlikely/
likely

not
probable/
probable

unwilling/
willing

“The extent to which I would reveal my
financial/ health/personal information to this
health/finance/ ecommerce website is” (Bansal
et al., 2016)

unlikely/
likely

not
probable/
probable

unwilling/
willing

“Please specify the extent to which you would
reveal your personal information to this vendor.”
(Li et al., 2011)

unlikely/
likely

not
probable/
probable

unwilling/
willing

“Given this hypothetical scenario, specify the
extent to which you would reveal (the
information) through the Internet.” (Malhotra et
al., 2004)

unlikely/
likely

not
probable/
probable

willing/
unwilling*

“Please specify the extent to which you would
reveal your personal information such as name,
affiliation, job, educational background on
Facebook” (Min & Kim, 2015)

unlikely/
likely

not
probable/
probable

unwilling/
willing

Note. A mixture of seven-point (Li et al., 2011; Malhotra et al., 2004; Min & Kim, 2015)
and eleven-point (Bansal et al., 2010, 2016) scales.
*One of the scales for Malhotra was reversed.
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Table A6
Derived Codes and Breakouts
Code

Behavior
(BEHV)

Benefit
(BNFT)

Collection
(COLL)

Definition

An individual’s
likelihood to perform an
action, prior
demonstrated action, or
prior stated action
(conduct)

An advantage or profit
gained, value to the user

Any collection and
processing of personal
data, for purposes of
influencing or managing
those whose data have
been garnered

References
Bansal et al., 2010; Dinev
& Hart, 2006; Dinev et al.,
2008; Ku et al., 2013; Li,
2014; Li et al., 2017; Li et
al., 2011; Li et al., 2015;
Mao & Zhang, 2013; Min
& Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et
al., 2017; Schwaig et al.,
2013; Son & Kim, 2008;
Xu, 2010; Zhang et al.,
2018

Outcome- Group

Participants

Snippets

OG-A

2

4

OG-H

3

7

OG-A

3

5

OG-H

3

6

OG-A

3

4

OG-H

3

8

Dinev et al., 2013; Xu,
Luo et al.,2011; Li et al.,
1024

Choi & Land, 2016

Representative Snippet
“But uh I’m not intending to change anything. An like I said, I accept
almost all requests for access and network.” (11223476508, BEHV01)

“So I I toned that thing down. An I uh think I uh I uh may be doing the
same with uh LinkedIn.” (11224014306, BEHV03)

“Uh, I uh I, I may be looking for another job soon. So, I am uh going to
um hazard to keep the the line of communicaiton open, uh no changes,
uh updating some of my uh um CV there and uh just you know um
reaching out to people that I deem worthy uh in my um search for a a
better job and or uh um to further further me in the job already have."
(11188138618, BNFT01)
“I scrubbed it uh even before this couple of weeks, two three weeks ago
uh with the intent of um ensuring um my network of IC and uh intel
professionals recognize um the new duties and positions that I was that
I'm currently in. And then more importantly, uh should I opt to uh
leverage those that skill set into other arenas other commands? Um I had
the requisite background that was uh verifiable um for potential
recruiters and what." (11251351842, BNFT02)
“Uh, you know, the things that Facebook and I, I mean, it's just it's out
there already and people have a a limited understanding of the totality of
the knowledge that's uh available to a company like Facebook or to
LinkedIn or to to others who have assembled these datasets and uh
conducted analysis on them." (11223476508, COLL07)
“So uh I think I need some questions answered, um before I can move
forward in having worked in the IC community for a short period of
time, just a couple years, I know the capabilities of what they can do and
and uh things they can look at." (11224014306, COLL05)

(continued)
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Code

Control
(CNTL)

Definition
An individual’s beliefs in
his or her ability to
manage the release and
dissemination of personal
information

References
Benson et al., 2015; Dinev
et al., 2013; Kayhan &
Davis, 2016; Schwaig et
al. 2013; Xu, 2010; Xu et
al., 2012; Xu, Dinev et al.,
2011; Chen et al., 2013;
Choi & Land, 2016; Li et
al., 2014; Li et al., 2017
Mao & Zhang, 2013;
Osatuyi, 2015; Smith et
al., 1996; Stewart &
Segars, 2002; Xu, 2010;
Xu & Gupta, 2009; Xu et
al., 2012; Zhang et al.,
2013; Zhou, 2011

Errors
(ERRS)

Deliberate or accidental
inaccuracies

General
Privacy
Concern
(GPCN)

A user's general worry
about personal
information regarding its
collection, storage, and
usage (i.e., general
privacy concern)

Kayhan & Davis, 2016;
Li, 2014; Li et al., 2017;
Li, Luo et al., 2011; Xu,
Dinev et al., 2011

Invasion
(INVN)

An individual indicates
current/past negative
experience or outcome

Bansal et al., 2014; Bansal
et al., 2016; Dinev et al.,
2008; Li et al., 2014; Li &
Unger, 2012; Xu, Luo et
al., 2011

Personality
Traits
(PNTR)

Characteristics that
distinguish an individual
(Big Five: extroversion,
agreeableness, emotional
instability,
conscientiousness,
intellect)

Bansal et al., 2010; Bansal
et al., 2016; Chen, 2013a;
Chen, 2013b; Chen &
Sharma, 2015; Osatuyi,
2015

Outcome- Group

Participants

Snippets

Representative Snippet
“Okay. So once again, I mean it's, it's up to me to be careful of what I put
out there in terms of uh you know what content I make available."
(11269613365, CNTL12)

OG-A

3

20

OG-H

1

2

“And for that reason I don’t have the only social media outlet I have is
LinkedIn." (11205114603, CNTL14)

OG-A

0

0

Not Represented

OG-H

1

4

“But uh, but for me, I have no need to be in that um in that world
anymore. Uh, so as time goes on I, I remove a lot of those specific key
terminologies simply because um that's in the past and it's no longer
relevant." (11205114603, ERRS03)

OG-A

2

4

“So, I, uh I value privacy." (11223476508, GPCN06)

OG-H

3

5

“Um, I do value privacy." (11205114603, GPCN01)

OG-A

0

0

OG-H

2

7

OG-A

0

0

Not Represented
“I've actually as an aside, I've had my identity stolen on Facebook, in one
of these romance scam things and I had four to 500 uh fake profiles out
there and people contacting me etc, which gave me great stress."
(11224014306, INVN05)
Not Represented

OG-H

1

2

“For me, I just don't find that myself that interesting to put so much
information out there uh" (11205114603, PNTR01)

(continued)
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Code

Definition

References
Bansal et al., 2010; Chen,
2013a; Chen, 2013b; Chen
& Sharma, 2015; Dinev &
Hart, 2006; Dinev et al.,
2013; Gerlach et al, 2015;
Li, 2014; Li et al., 2010;
Li et al., 2011; Li et al.,
2014; Luo et al., 2013;
Malhotra et al., 2004;
Miltgen & Smith, 2015;
Ozdemir et al., 2017;
Treiblmaier & Chong,
2011; Xu, Dinev et al.,
2011; Xu, Luo et al., 2011;
Zhou, 2011; Zhou, 2015

Privacy
Risk
Belief
(PRBF)

The expected loss
potential associated with
releasing personal
information to a specific
firm

Regulation
(REGL)

A binding custom or
practice of a community:
a rule of conduct or
action prescribed or
formally recognized as
binding or enforced by a
controlling authority

Miltgen & Smith, 2015;
Xu, 2010; Xu et al., 2012

Specific
Privacy
Concern
(SPCN)

Usage
(USGE)

Outcome- Group

Participants

Snippets

Representative Snippet
“But I think if you go out to social media sites, you gotta it's my position
that you don't have any uh any expectation of privacy at that point."
(11269613365, PRBF03)

OG-A

3

20

OG-H

2

5

“Uh, but, but for me, as soon as you put information out there, you, you
lose control of it. So just a matter of risk you're willing to accept, accept
that risk. Go for it." (11205114603, PRBF22)

OG-A

0

0

Not Represented

OG-H

2

9

“Um and certainly looking through the uh amendments, probably the
closest one that covers any sort uh of privacy information uh is both the
14th amendment uh or more importantly the Privacy Act of 1974 uh
which in theory should prevent the unauthorized disclosure uh held by
the government." (11251351842, REGL08)

OG-A

0

0

Not Represented

A user's worry about
personal information
regarding its collection,
storage, and usage by a
specific site or service

Bansal et al., 2010; Bansal
et al., 2016; Benson et al.,
2015; Li et al., 2011; Li,
2014; Luo et al., 2013;
Mao & Zhang, 2013;
Osatuyi, 2015; Wakefield,
2013; Xu et al., 2012;
Zhang et al., 2013

OG-H

3

10

“So I do feel that uh, a little concerned about that based on what I know
about Intel communities and sharing of information." (11224014306,
SPCN07)

Inappropriate/undisclosed
application (e.g.,
discrimination and
marketing) and sharing

Chen & Sharma, 2012;
Chen & Sharma, 2015; Li
& Unger, 2012; Mao &
Zhang, 2014; Schwaig et
al., 2013

OG-A

2

3

OG-H

3

14

Note. Snippet details provided after each in the following format: Participant ID, Code ID.

“And I believe that uh people generally generally are doing the right
thing and abiding by the terms of service and uh and why they're using
the system. But I know that that is not always the case." (11223476508,
USGE06)
“Um, so, the uh uh or uh in addition, takes that information and uh puts it
in in the public under a false light. Uh, and then lastly, uh uses my name
and or uh my personal information for some sort of uh uh commercial
advantage." (11251351842, USGE02)
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Table A7
Category/Code Distribution Analysis
All Codes
Cat 1: Breach of Privacy
Categories Grp-Part
Grp-Snip
Part
Snip
Categories
5
5
5
1
1
Codes
12*
24
24
24
24
Mean
9.200
1.875
5.792
24
1.208
Median
9.000
2.00
4.500
0.833
0.500
StdDev
1.304
1.191
5.618
0.500
1.865
Skewness
0.541
-0.582
1.414
0.963
2.391
Kurtosis
-1.488
-1.202
1.815
0.678
7.011
D-value
0.248
0.249
0.182
-0.879
0.254
p-value
0.850
0.084
0.359
0.312
0.075
Normal?
yes
yes
yes
0.014
yes
Note. The * indicates the twelve codes were not broken out between the two groups.

Cat 2: DTVP
Part
Snip
1
1
24
24
0.917
1.417
1.000
1.000
0.923
1.718
0.887
1.756
0.222
3.732
0.256
0.223
0.073
0.158
yes
yes

Cat 3: SIPC
Part
Snip
1
1
24
24
0.667
1.667
0.000
0.000
0.963
1.786
1.392
1.526
1.057
1.428
0.344
0.331
0.005
0.008
no
no

Cat 4: BITN
Part
Snip
1
1
24
24
0.792
1.125
0.000
0.000
1.062
1.541
1.165
1.172
0.144
0.215
0.318
0.314
0.016
0.134
no
no

Cat 5: Supplementary
Part
Snip
1
1
24
24
0.542
0.875
0.000
0.000
0.779
1.484
1.054
1.627
-0.430
1.113
0.386
0.352
0.001
0.004
no
no
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Table A8
Category One, Breach of Privacy Breakout
Code
Behavior
(BEHV)

Benefit
(BNFT)
Collection
(COLL)
Control
(CNTL)
Errors
(ERRS)
General
Privacy
Concern
(GPCN)

Outcome-Group
OG-A

Participants
0

Snippets
0

OG-H

1

1

OG-A

0

0

OG-H

2

2

OG-A

0

0

OG-H

2

3

OG-A

2

2

OG-H
OG-A
OG-H

0
0
0

0
0
0

OG-A

1

1

OG-H

1

1

Representative Snippet
Not presented.
“I'm torn on the subject. Um, after, after we, after we um engaged in our first um email
conversation and exchange of information, I went back and looked at my stuff. And I think I
made some adjustments and I'm still it's a constant, constant thing as, as uh life professional
and personal changes, you you make adjustments to those public profiles you make, to adjust
to those changes um for good or bad." (11205114603, BEHV06)
Not presented.
“I, I am on LinkedIn, which is an open site and I people use that to find resumes and things
like that. Um, so in that respect, I'm fine uh, because I'm looking for something that's
advantageous to me." (11224014306, BNFT06)
Not presented.
“But as time has gone by, and much more sophistication, on the ability to grab data from us
all kinds of information." (11224014306, COLL03)
“Uh, I my resume is an assemblage of my life experience and I have not divulged any
classified information. In fact, that resume was scrubbed and approved for release prior to it
being posted anywhere or used for my job search." (11223476508, CNTL17)
Not presented.
Not presented.
Not presented.
“So I post information on the internet with no expectation of privacy." (11223476508,
GPCN04)
“Um, obviously, I'm not any celebrity or public figure who could reasonably assume to be
recognized in the public and not be protected. But I would go on to say um that As a
nonpublic individual, I uh certainly have the right to be protected from any intrusion on my
solitude and my private affairs." (11251351842, GPCN08)

(continued)
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Code

Outcome-Group
OG-A

Participants
0

Snippets
0

OG-H

2

4

Personality
Traits
(PNTR)

OG-A

0

0

Representative Snippet
Not presented.
“I've been hacked and lost a lot of money about five or six years ago, and I thought I think it
was from the Chinese, ah based on some, some uh research I did." (11224014306, INVN06)
Not presented.

OG-H

0

0

Not presented.

Privacy Risk
Belief
(PRBF)

OG-A

3

8

OG-H

1

1

OG-A

0

0

OG-H

1

1

OG-A

0

0

OG-H

2

2

OG-A

0

0

Invasion
(INVN)

Regulation
(REGL)
Specific
Privacy
Concern
(SPCN)

“But I think if you go out to social media sites, you gotta it's my position that you don't have
any uh any expectation of privacy at that point." (11269613365, PRBF03)
“Uh, so while while it's not a privacy issue, because you're volunteering to put your stuff out
there, it's an argument could be made, it's in the public domain." (11205114603, PRBF06)
Not presented.
“So I've submitted this particular instance, they do not have have just cause and and rather um
the privacy that's being invaded, I would have, if you will, the essence uh or legal liability or
legal uh ability to bring a lawsuit if damages or for damages that were incurred."
(11251351842, REGL03)
Not presented.
“So I do feel that uh, a little concerned about that based on what I know about Intel
communities and sharing of information." (11224014306, SPCN07)

Not presented.
“Uh, and then anybody that takes those, that data and disclose them in it with the intent to
OG-H
2
3
embarrass me or somehow discredit me with that private information causes us concern."
(11251351842, USGE07)
Note. Snippet details provided after each in the following format: Participant ID, Code ID.
Usage
(USGE)
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Table A9
Categories Three thru Four Breakouts
Category 2: DTVP
Outcome-Group
Participants
Snippets
OG-A
0
0
OG-H
0
0
OG-A
1
1
Benefit (BNFT)
OG-H
1
1
OG-A
0
0
Collection
(COLL)
OG-H
1
1
OG-A
3
7
Control (CNTL)
OG-H
1
2
OG-A
0
0
Errors (ERRS)
OG-H
1
1
OG-A
1
2
General Privacy
Concern (GPCN)
OG-H
3
4
OG-A
0
0
Invasion (INVN)
OG-H
1
1
OG-A
0
0
Personality Traits
(PNTR)
OG-H
1
2
OG-A
1
2
Privacy Risk
Belief (PRBF)
OG-H
2
4
OG-A
0
0
Regulation
(REGL)
OG-H
2
2
OG-A
0
0
Specific Privacy
Concern (SPCN)
OG-H
2
3
OG-A
0
0
Usage (USGE)
OG-H
1
1
Note. Associated representative snippets were provided in Table 14.
Code
Behavior
(BEHV)

Category 3: SIPC
Participants
Snippets
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
2
3
1
2
1
4
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
3
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
5
1
1
3
6

Category 4: BITN
Participants
Snippets
2
4
3
5
3
3
3
3
0
0
1
1
1
3
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
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Table A10
Category Five, Supplementary Breakout
Code
Behavior
(BEHV)

Outcome-Group
OG-A
OG-H

Participants
0
0

Snippets
0
0

Benefit
(BNFT)

OG-A

1

1

OG-H

0

0

OG-A

1

1

OG-H

1

1

OG-A

2

4

OG-H
OG-A

0
0

0
0

OG-H

1

1

OG-A

0

0

Representative Snippet
Not presented.
Not presented.
“So I'm not there's not a lot of hiding unless I go, you know, off grid and I'm not willing to do
that, the benefit is worth the uh um uh the effort." (11188138618, BNFT07)
Not presented.
“Uh um there is a way that they could probably figure out my birthday. But you know, again,
there's so much public knowledge out there that for a few dollars at a time, you could put
together a fairly decent um uh biography of [NAME REMOVED]." (11188138618, COLL01)
“I think as we're moving forward and gaining more capabilities in our and an the ways that
we're able to collect and store data" (11224014306, COLL06)
“So people have to take a personal uh position on what they're doing, what they're posting out
there." (11269613365, CNTL04)
Not presented.
Not presented.
“So this is for me this is a good reminder to go back in there and double check on things to
make sure that uh the image that I'm trying to present is a s professional and uh accurate as
possible." (11205114603, ERRS04)
Not presented.

OG-H

0

0

Not presented.

OG-A

0

0

OG-H

1

1

Not presented.
“And I want to cut back on some of this other stuff. Uh, especially as I get older, I don't want
to be losing a nickel to anybody who uh may steal my stuff. I lost 25 thousand dollars a few
years ago, though, was FDIC a little bit of a ramble there." (11224014306, INVN04)

Collection
(COLL)
Control
(CNTL)
Errors
(ERRS)
General
Privacy
Concern
(GPCN)
Invasion
(INVN)

(continued)
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Code
Personality
Traits
(PNTR)
Privacy Risk
Belief
(PRBF)
Regulation
(REGL)
Specific
Privacy
Concern
(SPCN)

Outcome-Group
OG-A

Participants
0

Snippets
0

Not presented.

Representative Snippet

OG-H

0

0

Not presented.

OG-A

2

4

OG-H
OG-A

0
0

0
0

OG-H

2

4

OG-A

0

0

“So it's a social media site. So anyway, and I know there's a lot, a lot of millennials, I guess
there's an expectation of these things to be more than what they were intended to be, I think,
so. These expectations evolve. And I don't really know what the foundation for it is why they
believe that." (11269613365, PRBF09)
Not presented.
Not presented.
“But, um, I think we need to relook things and starting with many of the laws that are in place
and the ability to collect on on Americans, and then also the ability for private companies to
collect on us also." (11224014306, REGL04)
Not presented.

OG-H

0

0

Not presented.

OG-A

0

0

Not presented.
“The probably in in in stepping back it uh this is not the first time that uh an entity agency has
OG-H
2
4
looked to scrape and or um use this information for, you know, malicious type attacks."
(11251351842, USGE14)
Note. Snippet details provided after each in the following format: Participant ID, Code ID.
Usage
(USGE)
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Appendix B
Questionnaire
DTVP was measured using three items, SIPC was measured using four items, and
BITN was measured using three items. All constructs were measured with a seven-point
scale ranging from 1 to 7. A single item each measured both demographic factors (age
and sex). Finally, as the potential existed for participants to modify their LinkedIn profile
before contact, one additional binary scale question (suitability) was included as a
participant disqualifier.
Table B1
Questionnaire
Questionnaire
Participant Letter for Anonymous Surveys
NSU Consent to be in a Research Study Entitled
The Influence of an Individual’s Disposition to Value Privacy
in a Non-Contrived Study
Introduction
A website called ICWATCH (https://icwatch.wikileaks.org/) uses scraped LinkedIn
data to identify members of the Intelligence Community and collate them into a
searchable database. Your LinkedIn profile was scraped and stored in ICWATCH. As
a LinkedIn connection of yours, and as the focus of my Ph.D. dissertation, I would like
to understand better if you believe this to be a privacy concern and if so, will you take
action on LinkedIn to mitigate this. I hope that you will participate in a short
questionnaire (15 questions) and ideally, in a subsequent interview about the situation.
(continued)
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The specific participant consent details should be read here Research Participant
Consent Letter
Do you understand and do you want to be in the study?
If you have read the above information and voluntarily wish to participate in this
research study, please select the consent option below.
Consent (binary: I consent/I decline)
Do you understand and do you want to be in the study? If you have
read the above information and voluntarily wish to participate in this
research study, please select the consent option below.
Control variables (one ordinal: range, one binary: 0/1); age stratification modeled
from reference studies (Min & Kim, 2015; Zhang et al., 2018)
Age

< 20, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50+

Sex

Female, Male

Suitability (binary: yes/no)
Is any part of your LinkedIn profile publicly visible (e.g., any part of
your LinkedIn profile can be found using a search engine such as Google
or Bing)?
DTVP Seven-point scales anchored with “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”
DTVP1

Compared to others, I am more sensitive about the way online
companies handle my personal information.

DTVP2

To me, it is most important to keep my privacy intact from online
companies.

DTVP3

I am concerned about threats to my personal privacy today.

Situational Privacy Concerns Seven-point scales anchored with “strongly disagree”
and “strongly agree”
SIPC1

I am concerned that the information I submit on LinkedIn could be
misused.

SIPC2

I am concerned that a person can find private information about me from
LinkedIn.

SIPC3

I am concerned about submitting information on LinkedIn because of
what others might do with it.
(continued)
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SIPC4

I am concerned about submitting information on LinkedIn because it
could be used in a way I did not foresee.

Behavioral Intention Seven-point scales anchored with “strongly disagree” and
“strongly agree.” Question: Please specify the extent to which you would continue to
share your LinkedIn profile publicly, exposing profile data to ICWATCH.
BITN1

Unlikely/likely

BITN2

Not probably/probable

BITN3

Unwilling/willing

Interview (one binary: yes/no, one participant submission: email)
INTV1

Are you willing to be interviewed about this situation?

INTV2

My email address for scheduling a future interview is __________
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Appendix C
Raw Survey Results
Table C1
Raw Survey Results
ID
11859463589
11652267559
11630105120
11565649049
11448408267
11445999311
11431880759
11430743638
11424945022
11423552387
11420589586
11420277538
11420005672
11388874236
11336653975
11292890157
11292806106
11283971091

Consent

Qualifier

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Age

Sex

3
5
4
5
5
5
4
4
5
3
4
4
5
5
5
4
3
5

2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
2

Disposition to Value Privacy
DTVP1 DTVP2 DTVP3
7
5
6
6
4
6
1
1
3
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
5
6
5
5
7
6
6
6
6
7
5
6
6
7
6
6
7
4
4
4
4
4
4
6
7
6
7
7
6
6
4
5
6
6
6
7
7
7

Situation-Specific Privacy Concern
SIPC1 SIPC2 SIPC3 SIPC4
4
3
3
5
5
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
3
5
6
4
5
5
6
4
4
3
4
7
7
6
7
4
5
4
4
6
5
4
6
4
4
6
6
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
7
5
5
4
4
5
3
5
5
7
6
6
6
7
7
7
7

Behavioral Intention
BITN1 BITN2 BITN3
7
7
7
6
6
5
7
7
7
6
6
6
3
3
3
5
5
5
6
6
4
4
4
4
5
5
2
2
3
1
5
4
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
6
6
4
5
6
5
5
5
4
3
3
2
3
3
2

Interview
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
(continued)
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ID
11270499000
11269613365
11269116413
11269077529
11262237459
11258534181
11258094277
11254816449
11254766819
11253964035
11252427362
11251682995
11251597916
11251351842
11250719712
11250710475
11248992091
11248576429
11246837913
11242439726
11240433307
11240361396
11240246323
11240219945
11240201867
11239357735
11239279776
11239144520
11238329302
11238118996
11237599422
11227298696
11227117168
11226351367
11224014306
11223795290

Consent

Qualifier

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Age

Sex

5
5
5
5
4
5
5
3
3
4
5
2
5
5
4
5
5
5
5
3
3
5
3
5
5
4
4
4
5
4
5
5
4
5
5
5

2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2

Disposition to Value Privacy
DTVP1 DTVP2 DTVP3
6
6
5
1
1
1
6
7
7
6
6
7
6
5
4
7
6
6
6
6
2
4
6
7
6
6
6
7
7
7
6
6
6
3
6
5
6
6
7
7
7
7
6
6
7
6
7
6
4
5
5
5
6
6
7
6
6
6
5
6
7
7
7
5
5
7
5
5
5
5
6
7
4
6
7
6
5
5
3
3
2
3
5
5
7
7
7
6
5
1
3
3
3
4
4
5
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
4
4
4

Situation-Specific Privacy Concern
SIPC1 SIPC2 SIPC3 SIPC4
4
4
4
4
1
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
5
3
5
5
5
2
4
4
5
4
4
5
5
5
5
6
6
5
5
6
5
5
5
5
6
5
3
3
6
6
6
6
3
2
3
4
6
5
4
4
7
7
7
7
6
5
5
5
6
6
5
5
3
1
3
3
4
3
3
3
5
5
5
6
6
3
4
6
7
7
7
7
6
6
5
6
3
3
2
2
4
4
4
3
4
7
4
7
7
6
6
7
4
1
2
2
5
3
3
5
6
4
4
6
5
6
3
4
5
3
3
5
4
4
4
3
7
7
7
7
7
5
5
5
7
7
7
7
4
4
4
4

Behavioral Intention
BITN1 BITN2 BITN3
5
6
5
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
5
5
6
6
5
3
3
2
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
3
5
5
5
5
2
2
2
2
2
2
5
5
5
3
3
3
6
6
6
3
5
5
7
7
7
6
6
4
7
7
6
3
5
4
6
6
4
6
6
6
5
5
5
6
5
6
6
4
6
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
7
5
3
5
5
5
6
6
6
5
5
3
7
7
6
4
4
4
4
4
4

Interview
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
(continued)
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ID
11223476508
11218350809
11211977877
11208486428
11206905505
11206505729
11205114603
11205018115
11192764538
11188138618
11186388785

Consent

Qualifier

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Age

Sex

5
5
4
5
3
5
5
5
5
5
4

2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2

Disposition to Value Privacy
DTVP1 DTVP2 DTVP3
2
2
2
6
5
7
5
5
5
5
6
6
5
5
5
4
5
5
7
7
7
1
4
4
4
6
4
2
2
2
6
6
6

Situation-Specific Privacy Concern
SIPC1 SIPC2 SIPC3 SIPC4
2
1
1
1
5
5
4
4
1
1
1
1
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
6
7
6
6
6
5
4
4
5
5
5
4
5
2
2
2
2
6
5
5
5

Behavioral Intention
BITN1 BITN2 BITN3
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
3
3
3
7
7
7
4
4
4
6
6
6
6
6
6

Interview
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
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Appendix D
Snippet-Coding
Table D1
Total Snippets by Topic and Coding
Topic

Code

BEHV

OG
A
H
A

Topic One, "For the
next few minutes,
let's discuss if this is
a breach of privacy."

BNFT

H

Snippet
Not Represented
"I'm torn on the subject. Um, after, after we, after we um engaged in our first um email conversation and exchange
of information, I went back and looked at my stuff. And I think I made some adjustments and I'm still it's a constant,
constant thing as, as uh life professional and personal changes, you you make adjustments to those public profiles
you make, to adjust to those changes um for good or bad." (11205114603, BEHV06, 3)
Not Represented
"I, I am on LinkedIn, which is an open site and I people use that to find resumes and things like that. Um, so in that
respect, I'm fine uh, because I'm looking for something that's advantageous to me." (11224014306, BNFT06, 3)
"Uh, on the one hand, people people put all sorts of stuff on their profiles um, in the effort to either get seen, get
approached for work, establish a professional network or any number of things." (11205114603, BNFT10, 3)

(continued)
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Topic

Code

COLL

CNTL

Topic One, "For the
next few minutes,
let's discuss if this is
a breach of privacy."
(continued)

OG
A

H

A

H
A
GPCN

H
A

INVN

H

Snippet
Not Represented
"But as time has gone by, and much more sophistication, on the ability to grab data from us all kinds of
information." (11224014306, COLL03, 3)
"On the other hand, if you're not aware that your stuff is getting scooped up like that, maybe it's an issue for some
um frankly." (11205114603, COLL14, 3)
"On the other hand, uh, I'm not sure many people realize that whatever they put out there is being um scooped up by
whatever um artificial uh aggregators for lack of a better word, um to assist uh whatever agency creates those
aggregators." (11205114603, COLL15, S)
"I think I told you that my questionnaire I think that, you know, you could have as much as an individual, I could
have as much privacy as I want." (11269613365, CNTL13, 3)
"Uh, I my resume is an assemblage of my life experience and I have not divulged any classified information. In fact,
that resume was scrubbed and approved for release prior to it being posted anywhere or used for my job search."
(11223476508, CNTL17, 2)
Not Represented
"So I post information on the internet with no expectation of privacy" (11223476508, GPCN04, 2.5)
"Um, obviously, I'm not any celebrity or public figure who could reasonably assume to be recognized in the public
and not be protected. But I would go on to say um that As a nonpublic individual, I uh certainly have the right to be
protected from any intrusion on my solitude and my private affairs." (11251351842, GPCN08, 3)
Not Represented
"Yes um yes and no, I'm sorry, I've have to answer it that way." (11224014306, INVN01, 3)
"So, the um the breaches the breach of privacy is actually an intrusion into the personal life of another specifically
without just cause." (11251351842, INVN02, 3)
"So, so the breach of privacy is not fully satisfied, if you will, under under this particular uh situation. Under this
particular topic, ie a breach of privacy, that they scraped my personally available information um that anybody with
a reasonable uh basis could do you know, from uh Facebook, um and that is made to the general public, certainly.
Uh, but does that necessarily constitute a breach of my privacy? Uh, no, not at this point." (11251351842, INVN03,
3)
"I've been hacked and lost a lot of money about five or six years ago, and I thought I think it was from the Chinese,
ah based on some, some uh research I did." (11224014306, INVN06, 3)
(continued)
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Topic

Code

OG

A
PRBF

Topic One, "For the
next few minutes,
let's discuss if this is
a breach of privacy."
(continued)
H
A
REGL

H
A

SPCN

H

Snippet
"Although they try to do it. I mean, it's just, I mean, I don't know how hard it would be to for their platform to work
with uh personalized privacy settings. So I really don't expect, I have no expectation of privacy on that stuff."
(11269613365, PRBF02, 3)
"But I think if you go out to social media sites, you gotta it's my position that you don't have any uh any expectation
of privacy at that point" (11269613365, PRBF03, 3)
"There was never any expectation on my part that that information would be considered private or protected in any
way." (11223476508, PRBF04, 3)
"No, cuz uh and and the reason why I believe that is when you join LinkedIn, you give up inherent rights to privacy
by stepping into LinkedIn." (11188138618, PRBF07, 3)
"And so I was fully aware that both LinkedIn would use my information, as well as the availability of that
information to others uh uh or whoever scraped or used or viewed that information." (11223476508, PRBF08, 3)
"I just want to let you know, I can elaborate if you want more, but I just know that that's how I feel it just uh. You
know, just by the term social media. So LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, all those are uh social media sites, and I have
no expectation of privacy on any of those sites." (11269613365, PRBF10, 3)
"So, I mean, that's why they're called social media, right? So uh I guess that pretty much answers my the question."
(11269613365, PRBF18, 3)
"I fully am aware that the information that I post to any public page is available to any person." (11223476508,
PRBF21, 3)
"Uh, so while while it's not a privacy issue, because you're volunteering to put your stuff out there, it's an argument
could be made, it's in the public domain." (11205114603, PRBF06, 2)
Not Represented
"So I've submitted this particular instance, they do not have have just cause and and rather um the privacy that's
being invaded, I would have, if you will, the essence uh or legal liability or legal uh ability to bring a lawsuit if
damages or for damages that were incurred." (11251351842, REGL03, 2)
Not Represented
"Um, so, for me it's it's a double edged sword it could be construed as a privacy issue. While on the other hand, it
might not be depending on on um the the exact nature of one your understand you as an individual your
understanding of what those profiles are and are used for and two, the information you're putting out there."
(11205114603, SPCN02, 3)
"So I do feel that uh, a little concerned about that based on what I know about Intel communities and sharing of
information." (11224014306, SPCN07, 3)
(continued))
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Topic
Topic One, "For the
next few minutes,
let's discuss if this is
a breach of privacy."
(continued)

Code

USGE

BNFT

OG
A

H

A
H
A

COLL

Topic Two, "For the
next few minutes,
let's discuss your
disposition to value
privacy." (continued)

H

A
CNTL

H

Snippet
Not Represented
"Um, so, the uh uh or uh in addition, takes that information and uh puts it in in the public under a false light. Uh, and
then lastly, uh uses my name and or uh my personal information for some sort of uh uh commercial advantage."
(11251351842, USGE02, 2.5)
"Uh, and then anybody that takes those, that data and disclose them in it with the intent to embarrass me or somehow
discredit me with that private informatioin causes us concern." (11251351842, USGE07, 3)
"But I don't know what's going on on this site where my information is going." (11224014306, USGE13, 2.5)
"So it's, it's stuff that I wouldn't mind put it on there because I want a large number of people to be able to see it, i.e.,
my friends, so I'm not looking for any real privacy in those settings." (11269613365, BNFT09, 3)
"And I established that for a specific reason. Which has evolved over time." (11205114603, BNFT03, 3)
Not Represented
"I, I suspect the bigger the bigger issue and bigger concern um would be to take uh the information from the OPM or
some of the other databases that have been breached and and kind of uh meld them together if you will."
(11251351842, COLL09, 3)
"So if if I don't want uh, if if I want to be private, that I don't engage, that's that's the only way to be completely
private." (11188138618, CNTL02, 3)
"So I feel I'm in control that. So uh if I want something to be private, then I won't put it on a social media site. So I
mean, there's things that you look at my social media sites, I probably, I'm guessing you probably have. There's not
much out there. So it's, uh, it's pretty vanilla. And like, I try to stay away from politics or a lot of personal opinions.
Most of it has to do with pictures of the family and stuff like that" (11269613365, CNTL10, 3)
"I take steps to ensure that what I post or provide to others is information that I intend to provide that, that I've
thought about the implications of that information and the, the uh, you know, the receiver of that information and
and uh those sorts of contingencies or outcomes." (11223476508, CNTL15, 2)
"If I want privacy, then I don't engage that's the only way to secure absolute privacy." (11188138618, CNTL16, 3)
"I, I do not post a lot of social media information." (11223476508, CNTL18, 3)
"I have a Twitter account, but I don't tweet you know, I mean, I um so, I don't, I don't provide a lot of information,
because I consider much of that private." (11223476508, CNTL19, 3)
"If I'm looking for privacy, then I'll send you know, a personal email or letter, write someone a letter and send it."
(11269613365, CNTL22, 3)
"Um, I don't, I don't care to put much information out about myself. That's just my nature." (11205114603, CNTL01,
3)
"And for that reason I don’t have the only social media outlet I have is LinkedIn." (11205114603, CNTL14, 3)
(continued)
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Topic

Code
ERRS

OG
A
H
A
A

Topic Two, "For the
next few minutes,
let's discuss your
disposition to value
privacy." (continued)

GPCN
H
A
INVN

H
A

PNTR

H

Snippet
Not Represented
"Professional reasons I had to and uh but every now and then I go back in there and I make some adjustments, make
some updates, take some stuff off that are no longer relevant." (11205114603, ERRS01, 3)
"So that so I consider myself a very private person in that regard in that." (11223476508, GPCN05, 3)
"So, I, uh I value privacy." (11223476508, GPCN06, 2.5)
"Um, I do value privacy." (11205114603, GPCN01, 3)
"So, ah right now, at this point, I'm very concerned about my privacy." (11224014306, GPCN02, 3)
"I don't feel the need to share my life with strangers." (11205114603, GPCN07, 2.5)
"Uh, at the end of the day, I certainly value the right to be left alone." (11251351842, GPCN09, S)
Not Represented
"I was ah hacked through the OPM hack a couple of years ago, and God knows who has my Social Security numbers
and things like that." (11224014306, INVN07, S)
Not Represented
"For me, I just don't find that myself that interesting to put so much information out there uh." (11205114603,
PNTR01, 2.5)
"I'm not a very uh outgoing or extroverted person," (11205114603, PNTR02, S)

(continued)
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Topic

Code

OG

A

PRBF

H
Topic Two, "For the
next few minutes,
let's discuss your
disposition to value
privacy." (continued)

A

REGL

H

A

SPCN

H

Snippet
"Um so uh I don't um believe that knowing my name, and uh, and uh knowing my disposition, but through
conversation, either over the phone or uh, or in person is anything more than just um that person that I'm engaging
with, using their uh, their skills and their uh techniques of a, of a um observation to to make a make a deduction."
(11188138618, PRBF20, 3)
"And uh so um when I say that, you know, I'm gonna engage somebody um through a conversation, I'm willing, uh
at that point I made a decision that I'm gonna give up some of my property to go uh um further. " (11188138618,
PRBF25, S)
"Um, with that said, I do realize that uh let's let's put it this way, the, my philosophy is um, if you don't want people
to know something, don't put it on the internet." (11205114603, PRBF05, 3)
"Because once it's out there, you lose complete control over it. It's no longer yours. you're you're you're on someone
else's platform, therefore, it's at least partially theirs and they can do with it. What they want. If you're okay with
that, then the rules governing privacy are a little bit looser. Uh, if you're not okay with that, don't use a platform. "
(11205114603, PRBF16, 3)
"Uh my personally identifiable information is uh um thought to be at least protected from public scrutiny, especially
as a employee of the government, uh but I think uh recent breaches with, especially with the Office of Personnel
Management has almost made that null and void." (11251351842, PRBF17, 3)
"Uh, but, but for me, as soon as you put information out there, you, you lose control of it. So just a matter of risk
you're willing to accept, accept that risk. Go for it." (11205114603, PRBF22, 3)
Not Represented
"And actually was a little disappointed when the Patriot Act was ah, I think if I'm not mistaken, I know it's being relooked, I think it may have been approved, but I'm not sure we've made any adjustments on that. For our, our, our
new um for this period, any updates, if you will, excuse me." (11224014306, REGL05, 3)
"Um and certainly looking through the uh amendments, probably the closest one that covers any sort uh of privacy
information uh is both the 14th amendment uh or more importantly the Privacy Act of 1974 uh which in theory
should prevent the unauthorized disclosure uh held by the government." (11251351842, REGL08, 2.5)
Not Represented
"I never have been that way, whether before the internet or even even today, so it's not really uh, for me, it's not
really a privacy specific issue. It's more of a personality and I guess the nature of me issue." (11205114603,
SPCN05, 3)
"I become quite concerned, also concerned with little funny things that happen when ah I'm standing around talking
about a subject and it shows up on my ah Amazon feed or something of that nature." (11224014306, SPCN08, 3)
"So yes, I'm concerned." (11224014306, SPCN09, 3)
(continued)
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H

A

COLL

H

Snippet
Not Represented
"So ah somebody's grabbing my information, ah somebody's using it for whether it's sales, or whether to rob me or
use my uh uh social security number." (11224014306, USGE12, 3)
Not Represented
"And I think I went back there and uh did a general scrub and use more general terminology, because I'm not I'm no
longer in that in that profession." (11205114603, BEHV02, 3)
"Uh, you know, the things that Facebook and I, I mean, it's just it's out there already and people have a a limited
understanding of the totality of the knowledge that's uh available to a company like Facebook or to LinkedIn or to to
others who have assembled these datasets and uh conducted analysis on them." (11223476508, COLL07, 2.5)
"But it does uh provide a central repository for somebody who's interested and desires to have introspection into the
US intelligence community. Um, your thesis statement talks about, um you know, code words and different
information and the assembly of aggregate information and, and I, I believe that that is an issue in uh general that
the, you know, a lot can be learned from uh, from assembling different data sources and analyzing those. And um so,
at some point, you know, we are as a, as a human race going to really have to come to grips with the understanding
of what privacy is because because of the potential for these different data sets to be assembled." (11223476508,
COLL12, 3)
"So I thought, I thought that was it I just wasn't real sure ICWATCH almost sounds like a government function so
but I'm sure the government does the same thing with my with me too also so same thing ICWATCH. I'm guessing
the government's also doing the same thing." (11269613365, COLL13, 3)
"So uh I think I need some questions answered, um before I can move forward in having worked in the IC
community for a short period of time, just a couple years, I know the capabilities of what they can do and and uh
things they can look at." (11224014306, COLL05, 3)
"Uh, it does bother me because I don't know what they're doing with I know what the NSA programs are with
phones and things like that of gathering data uh and and uh holding on to it, but only looking specifically when they
need something. Um, I don't feel comfortable with somebody holding on to uh critical information about me, what
are they using it for? What are they scraping it for? And what are they doing with it?" (11224014306, COLL11, 2.5)

(continued)
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next few minutes,
let's discuss your
level of concern
regarding LinkedIn
scraping/posting your
data." (continued)

PRBF

H

A

H
A

REGL

H

Snippet
"So once again, I thought, you know if your personal responsibility to montior that, so I wouldn't expect uh uh a site,
a social media site to be able to uh protect, I shouldn't be discussing that." (11269613365, CNTL07, 3)
"I mean, I have a resume that's been there forever, and it's pretty vanilla. And the government's seen it. So it's uh,
you know, once again, I'm kind of careful about that. I don't go any further than that." (11269613365, CNTL09, 3)
"Okay. So once again, I mean it's, it's up to me to be careful of what I put out there in terms of uh you know what
content I make available." (11269613365, CNTL12, 3)
"So we want to talk about additional data that I make sure that we talk in a space somewhere where I know that it's,
it's uh been SCIF'd for the discussion that we're about to have." (11269613365, CNTL20, 3)
Not Represented
Not Represented
"But uh, but for me, I have no need to be in that um in that world anymore. Uh, so as time goes on I, I remove a lot
of those specific key terminologies simply because um that's in the past and it's no longer relevant." (11205114603,
ERRS03, 2)
"So, you know, again uh, you know, I made the conscious effort, uh the conscious decision that that what they were
going to be able to ascertain from me was uh not going to directly uh um affect me and uh in a negative way and and
not to negatively uh affect me in an indirect ways either. Um I don't think that a uh bad actor could um necessarily
get enough information to do do me or my um family harm." (11188138618, PRBF14, 3)
"So maybe you have a question about it, you know, we've been instructed to contact the government, if you have, if
you have any concerns, so uh most of that stuff has been vetted that that I would ever talk about, I have very little
out there." (11269613365, PRBF15, 3)
"Uh, again, you know I uh my concern is a, is really kind of moot um as I engage in those already um when uh when
I decided to go onto LinkedIn, you know, I I knew um that uh there was going to be a um uh the disability because I
I knew of this ability to scrape information and and uh um you to fit into algorithms that would be able to uh
ascertain my likes, dislikes, and and basically pull the strings, my personality." (11188138618, PRBF19, 2)
Not Represented
Not Represented
"Um um but but looking at the some of the previous models, um especially with uh Chelsea Manning, and and uh
and others. Um it it certainly did harmful and uh severe damage to the US government writ large." (11251351842,
REGL01, 3)
"Um, so um you know, the the fact that ICWATCH has violated personal privacy in the past it has and and and,
more importantly, the US government's resolve to do anything about it. Um um you know, has has me equally
concerned and I say that because uh uh Julian Assange uh has been uh under um has not been brought to trial in 10
years despite being uh currently at trial as we speak." (11251351842, REGL07, 3)
(continued)

128

Topic

Code

SPCN

Topic Three, "For the
next few minutes,
let's discuss your
level of concern
regarding LinkedIn
scraping/posting your
data." (continued)

OG
A

H

A

USGE
H

Snippet
Not Represented
"Um, on the other hand, it was it was the more I thought about it, the more I realized, well, that's to be expected."
(11205114603, SPCN01, 3)
"It does bother me, when I first saw it, I was concerned." (11224014306, SPCN03, 2)
"Okay, yeah, that was a surprise to me. Um, I, at first I was I was uh, I was quite unhappy about that. But on the
other end, I went back to my original philosophy. Well, I put the stuff out there." (11205114603, SPCN04, 3)
"And it makes me concerned. I just don't, uh I just don't gave enough information about it." (11224014306, SPCN06,
3)
"Um, surely, uh ICWATCH um their behavior certainly raises red flags." (11251351842, SPCN10, S)
"Uh I believe that IC I don't know where ICWATCH is located or the people that are involved in it, but they
potentially make it easy for enemies of the United States to assemble information. " (11223476508, USGE09, 2)
"Um but uh you know, his his model of behavior, not only with ICWATCH, but similar programs were designed to
do that bring discredit on um the folks in that community. So it does raise a red flag. They could certainly be used
um with a nefarious attack." (11251351842, USGE01, 3)
"Well uh, what are they doing with it?" (11224014306, USGE05, 3)
"So I guess my question, you know, if I'd summed up in one statement, what are you doing with it?" (11224014306,
USGE08, 3)
"Uh, for whatever purposes um, you know, could be nefarious, it could simply be trying to find the right people for
the right position across the IC uh or other other agencies, private and public." (11205114603, USGE10, 3)
"Um, using the WikiLeaks model as a conduit to the general public, um um it was in my mind anyways that that uh
that breach that scraping of information that technique that model is uh designed more clear or clearly more
designed, if you will, to harm the IC community and and writ large the US government." (11251351842, USGE11,
3)
"Um and at the end of the day, the question comes into uh what the intent is, um you know, is the intent malicious
Um, that's questionable." (11251351842, USGE16, S)

(continued)
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A
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H

Snippet
"But uh I'm not intending to change anything. An like I said, I accept almost all requests for access and network."
(11223476508, BEHV01, 3)
"So, you know, I'm not I'm not um anticipating any change." (11188138618, BEHV04, 2.5)
"I don't I don't have plans right now." (11188138618, BEHV08, 3)
"Uh, I do not intend to change anything. I update my resume periodically. I don't intend to change any settings."
(11223476508, BEHV11, S)
"So I I toned that thing down. An I uh think I uh I uh may be doing the same with uh LinkedIn." (11224014306,
BEHV03, 3)
"Yeah, that's funny you bring that up. Uh, aside from this, I was, someone had mentioned something like this just the
other day I forget the specific, but um I, I, I thought I was in a private mode, I'm going to have to take another look,
not just with my LinkedIn, but also with Facebook and a few other things." (11224014306, BEHV05, 3)
"Um, so quite honestly, I like it the way it is." (11251351842, BEHV07, 3)
"Okay, yeah um. I plan on I don't do it as frequently as I should. But uh not, uh not because of you specifically, or
the subject matter. But yeah, before the weekend. I'll probably go back in there and um take another look and see
what, what not image but." (11205114603, BEHV09, 3)
"I'm not going to be job hunting a lot more late in the next few years, but I, I think I'm going to take another look at
it and see what is accessible. " (11224014306, BEHV10, 3)
"Uh, I uh I, I may be looking for another job soon. So, I am uh going to um hazard to keep the the line of
communicaiton open, uh no changes, uh updating some of my uh um CV there and uh just you know um reaching
out to people that I deem worthy uh in my um search for a a better job and or uh um to further further me in the job
already have." (11188138618, BNFT01, 3)
"I acccept nearly all requests to uh know whenever it's not a friend request that leaded at LinkedIn but but I think
there's value in networking." (11223476508, BNFT05, 3)
"So that to me is a social media site's all about us out there trying to basically generate a network." (11269613365,
BNFT08, 2)
"I scrubbed it uh even before this couple of weeks, two three weeks ago uh with the intent of um ensuring um my
network of IC and uh intel professionals recognize um the new duties and positions that I was that I'm currently in.
And then more importantly, uh should I opt to uh leverage those that skill set into other arenas other commands? Um
I had the requisite background that was uh verifiable um for potential recruiters." (11251351842, BNFT02, 2.5)
"What public profile of me I want out there to strengthen or expand my network. Take it in the direction I want it to
go." (11205114603, BNFT04, 3)
"I don't have a lot of information on there except of who I am, uh jobs I've held, which is advantageous to me."
(11224014306, BNFT11, S)
(continued)
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Not Represented
"Um again, I don't know, they're we're looking at if they've taken everything, um IP addresses, any phone numbers
that may or may not be in there. Anything, anything I may have said." (11224014306, COLL08, 2)
"So I don't I don't perceive any, any uh expectation of privacy when dealing with those sites but if I want to be
private, then I'll write an email, I won't, it won't be on some kind of uh, I guess it's, you know, there's a push-pull
arrangement, right? It won't be on a site where people can pull data." (11269613365, CNTL06, 2)
"If I'm worried about it, it's gonna be a situation where I'll push it to the guy. And it won't be through the site, it'll be
through an email or something a little bit more secure." (11269613365, CNTL11, 2.5)
"I know everybody that's on my site." (11269613365, CNTL21, 3)
Not Represented
Not Represented
"Um, as I mentioned before, I'm definitely uh steering away from uh the IC community because uh I haven't been
involved in in quite a while there's really no point it's actually misleading. For those who see that language. Um, I
don't want to waste anybody's time. And uh really, um but it's it's a constant care and feeding of my public profile to
present the most accurate up to date and uh harmless um public presentation that I can um you uh to uh you know
benefit those in my network and uh and myself to be honest." (11205114603, ERRS02, 3)
"I don't friend everybody asked to be friended I think you asked and I did for you. But uh just because of the topic
you were working on, buty yeah, I mean, I don't if I don't know the person" (11269613365, GPCN03, 3)
Not Represented
Not Represented
"I've actually as an aside, I've had my identity stolen on Facebook, in one of these romance scam things and I had
four to 500 uh fake profiles out there and people contacting me etc, which gave me great stress." (11224014306,
INVN05, 2)

(continued)
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"I also realize that people that know know people that I know can see my some of my stuff because they, they share
it. So, once again, I uh it's my assumption that anything that's on those sites is going to be open source to anybody. "
(11269613365, PRBF11, 2)
"No, once again, I just it's my opinion that if I put something on a link on a link like LinkedIn so I would say
something like clearancejobs.com all of them. Yeah, I mean it would I follow the rules the government has given me
and that and then I would expect it to be open source anybody that looks at those sites that once again, I don't let
every I don't." (11269613365, PRBF13, 2.5)
"Even when you send an email, you know, to a friend, you're not necessarily secure all the time, but that's a whole
different problem where people have hacked into people's email accounts." (11269613365, PRBF23, 3)
Not Represented
"I don't know what they're doing with the data, then I'm pretty I close it down pretty, pretty uh tightlly."
(11269613365, USGE03, 3)
"And I believe that uh people generally generally are doing the right thing and abiding by the terms of service and uh
and why they're using the system. But I know that that is not always the case." (11223476508, USGE06, 3)
Not Represented
"So I'm not there's not a lot of hiding unless I go, you know, off grid and I'm not willing to do that, the benefit is
worth the uh um uh the effort." (11188138618, BNFT07, 3)
Not Represented
"Uh um there is a way that they could probably figure out my birthday. But you know, again, there's so much public
knowledge out there that for a few dollars at a time, you could put together a fairly decent um uh biography of
[NAME REMOVED]." (11188138618, COLL01, 3)
"I think as we're moving forward and gaining more capabilities in our and an the ways that we're able to collect and
store data." (11224014306, COLL06, 3)
"They uh you know, do I give them my social security number? No, do I give them my uh um birthday?"
(11188138618, CNTL03, 3)
"So people have to take a personal uh position on what they're doing, what they're posting out there." (11269613365,
CNTL04, 2)
"So you gotta, you kind of gotta filter what you're saying and doing and uh uh its kinda, I don't think ther's any
expectation." (11269613365, CNTL05, 2.5)
"I don't give out explicit personal information but um you know, people know my phone number because uh they
know my phone number or they know my address because it's public record." (11188138618, CNTL08, 3)
Not Represented
(continued)
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Not Represented
"So this is for me this is a good reminder to go back in there and double check on things to make sure that uh the
image that I'm trying to present is a s professional and uh accurate as possible." (11205114603, ERRS04, S)
Not Represented
"And I want to cut back on some of this other stuff. Uh, especially as I get older, I don't want to be losing a nickel to
anybody who uh may steal my stuff. I lost 25 thousand dollars a few years ago, though, was FDIC a little bit of a
ramble there." (11224014306, INVN04, 3)
"I'm uh basically I'm hiding in the, in the in the vast, you know, expanse I mean than vice trying to make it active uh
[undecipherable distortion]." (11188138618, PRBF01, 2.5)
"So it's a social media site. So anyway, and I know there's a lot, a lot of millennials, I guess there's an expectation of
these things to be more than what they were intended to be, I think, so. These expectations evolve. And I don't really
know what the foundation for it is why they believe that." (11269613365, PRBF09, 3)
"Um nuh nothing but to, you know to say in my viewpoint and I think this is pretty clear from the interview, I I deem
any anytime that I enter into the internet, whether it's through LinkedIn or Facebook or uh an email, or whatever, um
I do not consider unless I go to extreme means to encrypt and uh hide emails uh through VPN or encryption
software. And I don't I don't consider uh um myself to be as secure. So whatever I'm saying or doing, uh um I I fully
intend to be looked at." (11188138618, PRBF12, 3)
"I don't have any expectation of privacy on any of those sites." (11269613365, PRBF24, S)
Not Represented

(continued)
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Topic

Snippet
Not Represented
"And and um I guess it's frustrating from a jurisprudence perspective on the exactly what mechanisms are in place to
um prosecute, uh certainly into the, you know, the digital cyber realm, um which, which is tough to, and then the
content could potentially be classified, which adds another uh layer to another dimension to prosecution. Uh and
again, I think uh, using Julian Assange um and the Wikileaks program as as a whole, using that model, uh and then
seeing that uh its taken 10 years to to bring him to trial, uh I think speaks poorly of, of our um our government's
ability to uh provide ramifications for such activities." (11251351842, REGL02, 2.5)
REGL
"But, um, I think we need to relook things and starting with many of the laws that are in place and the ability to
H
collect on on Americans, and then also the ability for private companies to collect on us also." (11224014306,
Topic Five, "Are
REGL04, 3)
there any other
"I know we sign an I agree thing, but nobody reads any of that stuff. Uh, I think that is us that's very concerning to
additional thoughts
me." (11224014306, REGL06, 3)
or comments you
"Uh, American and American lawmakers need to take a look at uh what we're allowing companies to do and selling
might have?"
data." (11224014306, REGL09, S)
(continued)
Not Represented
A
"I do think there needs to be a very hard look at what they can do with our stuff without permission." (11224014306,
USGE04, 2.5)
"The probably in in in stepping back it uh this is not the first time that uh an entity agency has looked to scrape and
or um use this information for, you know, malicious type attacks." (11251351842, USGE14, 3)
USGE
H
"Uh, you know, we just another point, I have friends who do this DNA testing, which I will never do because I don't
know who's going to get ahold or protect my DNA somewhere. Might be some guy in China walking around with
my DNA, so I don't do that." (11224014306, USGE15, 2.5)
"Uh, and I know they do that at Facebook for promotional concerns and stuff like that." (11224014306, USGE17, S)
Note. Snippet details provided after each in the following format: Participant ID, Code ID, Validation Score. S= validation sample snippet
Code

OG
A
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Appendix E
Interview Transcripts
The following are transcripts of the six Phase 2 interviews. Each interview was
recorded via Zoom. The audio files were uploaded to a transcription service call Otter.ai.
Using the real-time editing tools, transcripts were reviewed through multiple rounds to
ensure accuracy. A subsequent validation review was conducted by an independent
auditor to ensure transcription accuracy. A separate validation review was conducted to
ensure that individual snippets were uniquely associated with only a single code, and
highlighted.
Interview 11188138618
Sat, 4/18 8:33AM
SPEAKERS
John Marsh, 11188138618
John Marsh 15:17
Hello.
11188138618 15:17
Hello, Hey, how you doing Mr. Marsh?
John Marsh 15:23
Very well, thank you. Are you participant 11188138618?
11188138618 15:32
Yes.
John Marsh 15:34
Perfect, and do you consent to be interviewed?
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11188138618 15:38
Yes, I do.
John Marsh 15:40
And do you consent to this interview being recorded?
11188138618 15:43
Yes.
John Marsh 15:45
Perfect, so please allow me to explain this study for a few minutes briefly. Its purpose is
to investigate the linkages between privacy and behavior in an actual privacy specific
scenario. If you will recall you previously took a survey regarding your LinkedIn profile
data being scraped and posted to a third party's website called ICWATCH. Per their
website, ICWATCH is a project to collect and analyze resumes of people working in the
intelligence community. People working for intelligence contractors, the military and
intelligence agencies frequently mention secret code words and surveillance programs in
public resumes. These resumes are useful for uncovering new surveillance programs,
learning more about known code words, identifying which companies help with which
surveillance programs, examining trends in the intelligence community and more. This
study is designed to examine the level of an individual's disposition to value privacy, how
this influences their situational privacy concerns regarding their information being
scraped, and posted by ICWATCH, and ultimately, its influence on the users intentions
modify their LinkedIn account settings. So now I will capture your feedback on several
topics for a few minutes each. You are welcome to ask me to rephrase or explain
anything. Are you ready to proceed?
11188138618 17:06
Yes, sir.
John Marsh 17:08
Perfect. Uh, so topic one, for the next few minutes let's discuss if this situation is a breach
of privacy. What are your thoughts?
11188138618 17:20
The situation that we're in now?
John Marsh 17:22
Uh the your information being scraped from LinkedIn and being posted on ICWATCH.
11188138618 17:29
•[PRBF07]
No, cuz uh and and the reason why I believe that is when you join LinkedIn, you
give up inherent uh um rights to privacy by stepping into LinkedIn.
John Marsh 17:44
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All right, give me one moment. All right, uh topic two. For the next few minutes, let's
discuss your disposition to value privacy. What are your thoughts?
11188138618 18:02
•[CNTL16]
Um, if I want privacy, then I don't engage that's the only way to secure absolute
privacy. •[PRBF20]Um so uh I don't um believe that knowing my name, and uh, and uh
knowing my disposition, but through conversation, either over the phone or uh, or in
person is anything more than just um that person that I'm engaging with, using their uh,
their skills and their uh techniques of a, of a um observation to to make a make a
deduction. •[CNTL02]So if if I don't want uh, if if I want to be private, that I don't engage,
that's, that's the only way to be completely private. •[PRBF25]And uh so um when I say that,
you know, I'm gonna engage somebody um through a conversation, I'm willing, uh at that
point I made a decision that I'm gonna give up some of my property to go uh um further.
So um I'm, I I engage clients all day long with uh conversations regarding, uh you know,
products and services, uh and [undecipherable distortion] then sometimes make
connections and I'm always looking at them to uh get [undecipherable distortion] um uh
fissures into their, um uh I guess, into their uh, their their [undecipherable distortion], to
make a um determination on uh you know, most effective to get uh my across and to get
them to uh um uh be sympathetic, if not absolutely um uh convinced that I have the best
product for them.
John Marsh 20:17
Alright, perfect. Uh, for the next few minutes, let's discuss your level of concern
regarding ICWATCH scraping and posting your data.
11188138618 20:26
•[PRBF19]
Uh, again, you know I uh my concern is a, is really kind of moot um as I engage
in those already um when uh when I decided to go onto LinkedIn, you know, I I knew um
that uh there was going to be a um uh the disability because I I knew of this ability to
scrape information and and uh um you to fit into algorithms that would be able to uh
ascertain my likes, dislikes, and and basically pull the strings, my personality. •[PRBF14]So,
you know, again uh, you know, I made the conscious effort, uh the conscious decision
that that what they were going to be able to ascertain from me was uh not going to
directly uh um affect me and uh in a negative way and and not to negatively uh affect me
in an indirect ways either. Um I don't think that a uh bad actor could um necessarily get
enough information to do do me or my um family harm. Um, but you know, I'm I am
semi prepared uh if if that case ever comes to fruition.
John Marsh 22:04
Alright, give me ne moment. Just taking some notes.
11188138618 22:13
Sure.
John Marsh 22:15
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Alright then topic four. Finally, let's discuss your intention to modify your LinkedIn
profiles visibility.
11188138618 22:25
•[BEHV08]
I don't I don't have plans right now. •[BNFT01]Uh, I uh I, I may be looking for
another job soon. So, I am uh going to um hazard to keep the the line of communication
open, uh no changes, uh updating some of my uh um CV there and uh just you know um
reaching out to people that I deem worthy uh in my um search for a a better job and or uh
um to further further me in the job already have. •[BEHV04]So, you know, I'm not I'm not
um anticipating any changes.
John Marsh 23:12
Alright. And uh do you have any final thoughts or additional comments on anything we
discussed?
11188138618 23:21
•[PRBF12]
Um nuh nothing but to, you know to say in my viewpoint and I think this is pretty
clear from the interview, I I deem any anytime that I enter into the internet, whether it's
through LinkedIn or Facebook or uh an email, or whatever, um I do not consider unless I
go to extreme means to encrypt and uh hide emails uh through VPN or encryption
software. And I don't I don't consider uh um myself to be as secure. So whatever I'm
saying or doing, uh um I I fully intend to be looked at and •[PRBF01]I'm uh basically I'm
hiding in the, in the in the vast, you know, expanse I mean than vice trying to make it
active uh [undecipherable distortion]. •[CNTL08]And I don't give. I don't give out explicit
personal information but um you know, people know my phone number because uh they
know my phone number or they know my address because it's public record.
•[CNTL03]
They uh you know, do I give them my social security number? No, do I give
them my uh um birthday? •[COLL01]Uh um there is a way that they could probably figure
out my birthday. But you know, again, there's so much public knowledge out there that
for a few dollars at a time, you could put together a fairly decent um uh biography of
[NAME REMOVED]. •[BNFT07]So I'm not there's not a lot of hiding unless I go, you
know, off grid and I'm not willing to do that, the benefit is worth the uh um uh the effort.
John Marsh 25:23
All right. Uh well, thank you again for your participation. This concludes my data
collection.
11188138618 25:29
I appreciate
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Interview 11205114603
Sat, 3/28 2:49PM
SPEAKERS
John Marsh, 11205114603
John Marsh 07:21
Hello,
11205114603 07:23
Hello, can you hear me?
John Marsh 07:26
I can. Can you hear me?
11205114603 07:27
I sure can took me a minute to figure out this contraption but I got it.
John Marsh 07:32
Oh no worries whatsoever. So I just want to confirm that you are participant
11205114603
11205114603 07:43
That is correct.
John Marsh 07:46
And do you consent to be interviewed?
11205114603 07:51
Yes, yes I do.
John Marsh 07:53
Okay, and do you consent to this interview being recorded?
11205114603 07:57
Yes.
John Marsh 07:59
Perfect. Uh, so please allow me to explain this study for a few minutes briefly. Its
purpose is to investigate the linkages between privacy and behavior in an actual privacy
specific scenario. If you will recall, you previously took a survey regarding your
LinkedIn profile data being scraped and posted to a third party website called
ICWATCH. Per their website ICWATCH is a project to collect and analyze resumes of
people working in the intelligence community, people working for the intelligence
contractors, the military and intelligence agencies frequently mention secret code words
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and surveillance programs in public resumes. These resumes are useful for uncovering
new surveillance programs, learning more about known code words identifying which
companies help with which surveillance programs examining trends in the intelligence
community and more. This study is designed to examine the level of an individual's
disposition to value privacy. How this is influences their situational privacy concerns
regarding their information being scraped, and posted by ICWATCH, and ultimately, its
influence on the user's intention to modify their LinkedIn account settings. So now I will
capture your feedback on several topics for a few minutes each. You are welcome to ask
me to rephrase or explain any of the questions or topics. Are you ready to proceed?
11205114603 09:26
Yes.
John Marsh 09:28
All right, perfect. So for the next few minutes, let's discuss if this situation is a breach of
privacy. What, what are your thoughts on that?
11205114603 09:42
Oh, this situation you described?
John Marsh 09:45
Correct.
11205114603 09:46
Um, yes and no. Um, and I'll explain that real quick. •[BNFT10]Uh, on the one hand, people
people put all sorts of stuff on their profiles um, in the effort to either get seen, get
approached for work, establish a professional network or any number of things.
•[COLL15]
On the other hand, uh, I'm not sure many people realize that whatever they put
out there is being um scooped up by whatever um artificial uh aggregators for lack of a
better word, um to assist uh whatever agency creates those aggregators. •[PRBF06]Uh, so
while while it's not a privacy issue, because you're volunteering to put your stuff out
there, it's an argument could be made, it's in the public domain. •[COLL14]On the other
hand, if you're not aware that your stuff is getting scooped up like that, maybe it's an
issue for some Um, frankly, •[BEHV06]I'm torn on the subject. Um, after, after we, after we
um engaged in our first um email conversation and exchange of information, I went back
and looked at my stuff. And I think I made some adjustments and I'm still it's a constant,
constant thing as, as uh life professional and personal changes, you you make
adjustments to those public profiles you make, to adjust to those changes um for good or
bad or however •[SPCN02]Um, so, for me it's it's a double edged sword it could be construed
as a privacy issue. While on the other hand, it might not be depending on on um the the
exact nature of one your understand you as an individual your understanding of what
those profiles are and are used for and two, the information you're putting out there.
John Marsh 12:05
Okay, um so for the next few minutes, let's discuss your disposition to value privacy.
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11205114603 12:16
Okay. Is it a question?
John Marsh 12:21
What are your, this is mostly topics. So really what I want to know is, you know, how do
you value privacy and uh what is your approach to or your feelings about privacy online,
personally?
11205114603 12:39
•[GPCN01]
Um, I do value privacy. •[CNTL14]And for that reason I don't have the only social
media outlet I have is LinkedIn. •[BNFT03]And I established that for a specific reason.
Which has evolved over time. •[CNTL01]Um, I don't, I don't care to put much information
out about myself. That's just my nature. •[SPCN05]I never have been that way, whether
before the internet or even even today, so it's not really uh, for me, it's not really a privacy
specific issue. It's more of a personality and I guess the nature of me issue. •[PNTR02]I'm
not a very uh outgoing or extroverted person, •[GPCN07]I don't feel the need to share my life
with strangers. •[PRBF05]Um, with that said, I do realize that uh let's let's put it this way,
the, my philosophy is um, if you don't want people to know something, don't put it on the
internet. •[PRBF16]Because once it's out there, you lose complete control over it. It's no
longer yours. you're you're you're on someone else's platform, therefore, it's at least
partially theirs and they can do with it. What they want. If you're okay with that, then the
rules governing privacy are a little bit looser. Uh, if you're not okay with that, don't use a
platform. •[PRBF22]Uh, but, but for me, as soon as you put information out there, you, you
lose control of it. So just a matter of risk you're willing to accept, accept that risk. Go for
it. I or, •[PNTR01]for me, I just don't find that myself that interesting to put so much
information out there uh for •[ERRS01]professional reasons I had to and uh but every now
and then I go back in there and I make some adjustments, make some updates, take some
stuff off that are no longer relevant. Um, but that's, that's my uh, that's my take on on it,
especially with regard to the internet and LinkedIn.
John Marsh 14:54
All right, perfect. Um, so for the next few minutes, let's discuss your level of concern
regarding ICWATCH scraping and posting your data.
11205114603 15:04
•[SPCN04]
Okay, yeah, that was a surprise to me. Um, I, at first I was I was uh, I was quite
unhappy about that. But on the other end, I went back to my original philosophy. Well, I
put the stuff out there. Um, and I immediately went back in there and looked to see what
terms and words I used to attract potential recruiters. •[BEHV02]And I think I went back
there and uh did a general scrub and use more general terminology, because I'm not I'm
no longer in that in that profession. So there's, there's really no need to attract that
attention. •[SPCN01]Um, on the other hand, it was it was the more I thought about it, the
more I realized, well, that's to be expected. •[USGE10]Uh, for whatever purposes um, you
know, could be nefarious, it could simply be trying to find the right people for the right
position across the IC uh or other other agencies, private and public. •[ERRS03]But uh, but
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for me, I have no need to be in that um in that world anymore. Uh, so as time goes on I, I
remove a lot of those specific key terminologies simply because um that's in the past and
it's no longer relevant.
John Marsh 16:34
Perfect. Uh, and then finally, let's discuss your intention to modify your LinkedIn profiles
visibility.
11205114603 16:42
•[BEHV09]
Okay, yeah um. I plan on I don't do it as frequently as I should. But uh not, uh not
because of you specifically, or the subject matter. But yeah, before the weekend. I'll
probably go back in there and um take another look and see what, what not image but
•[BNFT04]
what public profile of me I want out there to strengthen or expand my network.
Take it in the direction I want it to go. •[ERRS02]Um, as I mentioned before, I'm definitely
uh steering away from uh the IC community because uh I haven't been involved in in
quite a while there's really no point it's actually misleading. For those who see that
language. Um, I don't want to waste anybody's time. And uh really, um but it's it's a
constant care and feeding of my public profile to present the most accurate up to date and
uh harmless um public presentation that I can um you uh to uh you know benefit those in
my network and uh and myself to be honest. So yes, before probably before the weekend
is out, I will have gone back in there and taken another look.
John Marsh 18:19
All right. Um, so is there any uh other thoughts or additional comments you'd like to add
based on uh some of the topics you've discussed?
11205114603 18:28
Um, I think if anything is pretty cut and dry to me, I think I've explained my position and
the thinking behind it. And the uh in my approach going forward. Um, It's good to have
these reminders that there are constantly organizations and people out there looking
looking at the at the things you put online. Um, It's a constant uh reminder that care
should be taken not only for um the profession, but also, uh you know, in your personal
life. Um, you don't want to um you don't want to drag your baggage out in the real world
because it will it will come back to haunt you um especially as you're seeking um
professional uh expertise and, and uh work and things like that. •[ERRS04]So this is for me
this is a good reminder to go back in there and double check on things to make sure that
uh the image that I'm trying to present is as professional and uh accurate as possible.
John Marsh 19:53
Perfect. uh so uh, thank you again for your participation. Uh this concludes my data
collection.
11205114603 20:01
All right, thank you very much
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Interview 11223476508
Sat, 3/28 2:56PM
SPEAKERS
John Marsh, 11223476508
John Marsh 11:04
Hello.
11223476508 11:06
Hi there. How are you?
John Marsh 11:08
Oh, very well. Uh, good evening are you participant 11223476508?
11223476508 11:17
I, I'm assuming so that was in the email.
John Marsh 11:21
Okay. Fair enough. And do you consent to be interviewed?
11223476508 11:26
Yes, I do.
John Marsh 11:28
And do you consent to this interview being recorded?
11223476508 11:31
Uh, yes, I do.
John Marsh 11:34
Perfect. Uh, so please allow me to explain this study for a few minutes briefly. Um its
purpose is to investigate the linkages between privacy and behavior in an actual privacy
specific scenario. If you will recall, you previously took a survey regarding your
LinkedIn profile data being scraped and posted to a third party website called
ICWATCH. Per their website, ICWATCH as a project to collect and analyze resumes of
people working in the intelligence community. People working for intelligence
contractors, the military and intelligence agencies frequently mention secret code words
and surveillance programs in public resumes. These resumes are useful for uncovering
new surveillance programs, learning more about known code words, identifying which
companies help with which surveillance programs, examining trends in the intelligence
community and more. This study is designed to examine the level of an individual's
disposition to value privacy, how this influences their situational privacy concerns
regarding their information being scraped, and posted by ICWATCH. And ultimately, its
influence on the user's intention to modify their LinkedIn account settings. So now I'll
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capture your feedback on several topics for a few minutes each. You're welcome to ask
me to rephrase or explain anything? Are you ready to proceed?
11223476508 13:05
I am. Yes.
John Marsh 13:07
Perfect. So for topic one, uh for the next few minutes, uh let's discuss if the situation is a
breach of privacy, what are your thoughts?
11223476508 13:18
•[GPCN04]
So I post information on the internet with no expectation of privacy. •[PRBF21]I
fully am aware that the information that I post to any public page is available to any
person. •[CNTL17]Uh, I my resume is an assemblage of my life experience and I have not
divulged any classified information. In fact, that resume was scrubbed and approved for
release prior to it being posted anywhere or used for my job search. •[PRBF08]And so I was
fully aware that both LinkedIn would use my information, as well as the availability of
that information to others uh uh or whoever scraped or used or viewed that information,
•[PRBF04]
there was never an expectation on my part that that information would be
considered private or protected in any way.
John Marsh 14:33
All right. Um, so for topic number two, for the next few minutes, let's discuss your
disposition to value privacy.
11223476508 14:45
•[GPCN06]
So, I, uh I value my privacy, and •[CNTL15]I take steps to ensure that what I post or
provide to others is information that I intend to provide that, that I've thought about the
implications of that information and the, the uh, you know, the receiver of that
information and and uh those sorts of contingencies or outcomes, and so um and
•[GPCN05]
so that so I consider myself a very private person in that regard in that. •[CNTL18]I,
I do not post a lot of social media information. •[CNTL19]I have a Twitter account, but I
don't tweet you know, I mean, I um so, I don't, I don't provide a lot of information,
because I consider much of that private.
John Marsh 15:57
Perfect. Uh, for topic number three For the next few minutes, let's discuss your level of
concern regarding ICWATCH scraping, posting your data.
11223476508 16:10
So, so in regard to the topic that we're discussing, I have no concern at all about my
information being posted. •[USGE09]Uh I believe that IC I don't know where ICWATCH is
located or the people that are involved in it, but they potentially make it easy for enemies
of the United States to assemble information. Now, that information is obviously, you
know, available out there. •[COLL12]But it does uh provide a central repository for
somebody who's interested and desires to have introspection into the US intelligence
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community. Um, your thesis statement talks about, um you know, code words and
different information and the assembly of aggregate information and, and I, I believe that
that is an issue in uh general that the, you know, a lot can be learned from uh, from
assembling different data sources and analyzing those. And um so, at some point, you
know, we are as a, as a human race going to really have to come to grips with the
understanding of what privacy is because because of the potential for these different data
sets to be assembled and for people to resolve and to make different judgments and
understand different aspects of life, how people live, what they do, how they think um,
and it happens now in the ad tech world. •[COLL07]Uh, you know, the things that Facebook
and I, I mean, it's just it's out there already and people have a a limited understanding of
the totality of the knowledge that's uh available to a company like Facebook or to
LinkedIn or to to others who have assembled these datasets and uh conducted analysis on
them.
John Marsh 18:34
All right. And then uh finally, let's discuss your intention to modify your LinkedIn
profiles visibility.
11223476508 18:41
•[BEHV11]
Uh, I do not intend to change anything. I update my resume periodically. I don't
intend to change any settings. •[BNFT05]I accept nearly all requests to uh know whenever
it's not a friend request that leaked at LinkedIn but but I I think there's value in
networking. •[USGE06]And I believe that uh people generally generally are doing the right
thing and abiding by the terms of service and uh and why they're using the system. But I
know that that is not always the case. •[BEHV01]But uh I'm not intending to change
anything. And like I said, I accept almost all requests for access and network.
John Marsh 19:44
Alright, I'm just taking some notes real quick.
11223476508 19:46
Certainly.
John Marsh 19:50
Um, so with that uh, any, any uh additional comments or thoughts based on the topics
you discussed?
11223476508 20:01
No I think we've pretty much covered everything.
John Marsh 20:05
All right. Um, so thank you again for your participation. This concludes my data
collection.
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Interview 11224014306
Thu, 3/12 8:34PM
SPEAKERS
John Marsh, 11224014306
11224014306 00:00
Sure am great.
John Marsh 00:03
All right, perfect. Well uh, let me start by saying Good evening, and um I'll capture your
participant ID but I'm assuming since you're in your car, you probably don't have it
handy.
11224014306 00:14
Uh no, I don't, well, let me see
John Marsh 00:19
It's not terribly important. I was just trying not to capture names if I didn't have to, but I
cannot.
11224014306 00:25
Okay. It's uh, I have it. It's 11224014306.
John Marsh 00:37
Perfect. Thank you. And do you consent to be interviewed?
11224014306 00:42
Yes, and I sent you the forms last night.
John Marsh 00:46
And I did receive them. And I just wanted to also capture do you consent to this interview
being recorded?
11224014306 00:53
Yes, Yes, I do.
John Marsh 00:55
Alright, perfect. Uh, so just allow me to briefly explain uh this study real quick.
11224014306 01:01
Okay.
John Marsh 01:02
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So its purpose is to investigate linkages between privacy and behavior in an actual
privacy specific scenario. If you will recall, you took a survey regarding your LinkedIn
profile data being scraped and posted to a third-party website called ICWATCH.
11224014306 01:19
Yes
John Marsh 01:20
Per, per their website ICWATCH is a project to collect and analyze resumes of people
working in the intelligence community. People working for intelligence contractors and
military and
11224014306 01:35
Okay,
John Marsh 01:35
These resumes, these resumes, go ahead
11224014306 01:40
I used to, I don't work for the IC anymore. Is that okay?
John Marsh 01:44
Oh, oh, absolutely. That's fine um these resumes, per ICWATCH the resumes are useful
for identifying people in the intelligence community.
11224014306 01:57
Okay,
John Marsh 01:58
So, specifically, my study is designed to examine the level of an individual's disposition
to value privacy.
11224014306 02:06
Okay
John Marsh 02:07
How this influences their situational privacy concerns related to having their information
scraped and posted by ICWATCH, and ultimately, its influence on the user's behavioral
intention to modify their LinkedIn account settings.
11224014306 02:22
Okay.
John Marsh 02:24
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All right. Um so um I will capture your feedback on the following topics for a few
minutes each. And you're welcome to ask me to rephrase or explain anything. Are you
ready to go?
11224014306 02:37
Uh ready to go.
John Marsh 02:40
Perfect. Um so for the next few minutes, uh let's discuss if you, if this situation is a
breach of privacy,
11224014306 02:49
Okay
John Marsh 02:51
What do you think? Did you believe this is a breach of your privacy?
11224014306 02:55
What the scraping of the uh, of my site, of LinkedIn?
John Marsh 03:02
Correct the scraping of your site and then having that information posted to ICWATCH.
11224014306 03:09
•[INVN01]
Yes um yes and no, I'm sorry, I've have to answer it that way. •[BNFT06]I, I am on
LinkedIn, which is an open site and I people use that to find resumes and things like that.
Um, so in that respect, I'm fine uh, because I'm looking for something that's advantageous
to me. •[USGE13]But I don't know what's going on on this site where my information is
going. •[SPCN07]So I do feel that uh, a little concerned about that based on what I know
about Intel communities and sharing of information.
John Marsh 03:47
Okay, great. Uh, so for the next few minutes uh let's discuss your disposition to value
privacy.
11224014306 03:57
Okay, um I value my privacy, uh especially in this day and age. Um, let me just go back a
few years after 911 when I was a younger guy, and even before that, I really didn't have a
lot of concerns about privacy necessarily. Ah because things weren't in place, uh I what's
the word I'm looking for intelligence, ability to grab information, uh the the social
networks and all those sorts of things were not in place. So I really felt very comfortable
uh in in giving information out in presenting it. Ah, those were the days when you could
actually keep your social security number on ah on your check and pass it around freely.
Ah, then 911 hit and ah I was ah I was in agreement that we should have much more of a
robust intelligence ability to go after terrorists and those people who are ah possibly
criminals in the United States and those who are outside. •[COLL03]But as time has gone by,
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and much more sophistication, on the ability to grab data from us all kinds of
information, and •[INVN06]I've been hacked and lost a lot of money about five or six years
ago, and I thought I think it was from the Chinese, ah based on some, some uh research I
did, •[SPCN08]I become quite concerned, also concerned with little funny things that happen
when ah I'm standing around talking about a subject and it shows up on my ah Amazon
feed or something of that nature. •[USGE12]So ah somebody's grabbing my information, ah
somebody's using it for whether it's sales, or whether to rob me or use my uh uh social
security number. •[INVN07]I was ah hacked through the OPM hack a couple of years ago,
and God knows who has my Social Security numbers and things like that. •[GPCN02]So, ah
right now, at this point, I'm very concerned about my privacy and •[REGL05]actually was a
little disappointed when the Patriot Act was ah, I think if I'm not mistaken, I know it's
being re-looked, I think it may have been approved, but I'm not sure we've made any
adjustments on that. For our, our, our new um for this period, any updates, if you will,
excuse me. Um, •[SPCN09]so yes, I'm concerned, did that make any sense?
John Marsh 06:34
It made perfect sense.
11224014306 06:36
Okay.
John Marsh 06:39
Alright. So moving on to the next topic. Let's discuss your level of concern regarding
ICWATCH, scraping and posting your data.
11224014306 06:50
•[USGE05]
Well uh, what are they doing with it? •[SPCN03]Uh, it does bother me. Um, when I
first saw it, I was concerned. •[COLL11]Uh, it does bother me because I don't know what
they're doing with I know what the NSA programs are with phones and things like that of
gathering data uh and and uh holding on to it, but only looking specifically when they
need something. Um, I don't feel comfortable with somebody holding on uh to critical
information about me, what are they using it for? What are they scraping it for? And what
are they doing with it? •[COLL05]So uh I think I need some questions answered, um before I
can move forward in having worked in the IC community for a short period of time, just a
couple years, I know the capabilities of what they can do and and uh things they can look
at. •[SPCN06]And it makes me concerned. I just don't, uh I just don't have enough
information about it. •[USGE08]So I guess my question, you know, if I'd summed up in one
statement, what are you doing with it?
John Marsh 08:00
Sure, Okay, then moving on to the final topic, uh let's discuss your intention to modify,
your LinkedIn profile's visibility.
11224014306 08:11
•[BEHV05]
Yeah, that's funny you bring that up. Uh, aside from this, I was, someone had
mentioned something like this just the other day I forget the specific, but um I, I, I
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thought I was in a private mode, I'm going to have to take another look, not just with my
LinkedIn, but also with Facebook and a few other things. •[INVN05]I've actually as an aside,
I've had my identity stolen on Facebook, in one of these romance scam things and I had
four to 500 uh fake profiles out there and people contacting me etc, which gave me great
stress. •[BEHV03]So I i toned that thing down. And I uh think I uh may be doing the same
with uh LinkedIn. •[BNFT11]I don't have a lot of information on there except of who I am,
uh jobs i've held, which is advantageous to me. Uh, well was previously I'm 61 years old.
•[BEHV10]
I'm not going to be job hunting a lot more late in the next few years, but I, I think
I'm going to take another look at it and see what is accessible. •[COLL08]Um again, I don't
know, they're we're looking at if they've taken everything, um IP addresses, any phone
numbers that may or may not be in there. Anything, anything I may have said. Uh, gives
me pause. Okay.
John Marsh 09:34
Sure, give me one second.
11224014306 09:42
All right.
John Marsh 09:46
All right um. So is there any other additional thoughts or comments you might have?
11224014306 09:54
•[COLL06]
I think as we're moving forward and gaining more capabilities in our and and the
ways that we're able to collect and store data. •[REGL09]Uh, American and American
lawmakers need to take a look at uh what we're allowing companies to do and selling
data. •[USGE17]Uh, and I know they do that at Facebook for promotional concerns and stuff
like that. •[USGE04]I do think there needs to be a very hard look at what they can do with
our stuff without permission. •[REGL06]I know we sign an I agree thing, but nobody reads
any of that stuff. Uh, I think that is uh that's very concerning to me. •[USGE15]Uh, you
know, we just another point, I have friends who do this DNA testing, which I will never
do because I don't know who's going to get ahold or protect my DNA somewhere. Might
be some guy in China walking around with my DNA, so I don't do that. •[INVN04]And I
want to cut back on some of this other stuff. Uh, especially as I get older, I don't want to
be losing a nickel to anybody who uh may steal my stuff. I lost 25 thousand dollars a few
years ago, though, was FDIC a little bit of a ramble there. •[REGL04]But, um, I think we
need to relook things and starting with many of the laws that are in place and the ability
to collect on on Americans, and then also the ability for private companies to collect on
us also.
John Marsh 11:21
All right, uh perfect. Um, so, I'd like to say thank you again for your participation. This
concludes my data collection.
11224014306 11:32
Okay,
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Interview 11251351842
Sun, 4/5 8:04AM
SPEAKERS
John Marsh, 11251351842
John Marsh 06:47
Hello
11251351842 06:50
Hey how are you?
John Marsh 06:52
Very well thank you. Are you participant? Oh, okay [participant enables video], I
suppose we could do that. That's, actually I don't have a camera on this computer.
11251351842 07:04
[Lauging] All right.
John Marsh 07:07
But uh, are you uh participant 11251351842?
11251351842 07:16
I am.
John Marsh 07:18
Perfect. And do you consent to be interviewed?
11251351842 07:18
I do. I do.
John Marsh 07:22
And do you consent to this interview being recorded? Perfect. Uh so please allow me to
explain the study for a few brief minutes. Its purpose is to investigate the linkages
between privacy and behavior in an actual privacy specific scenario. If you will recall,
you previously took a survey regarding your LinkedIn profile data being scraped and
posted to a third party website called ICWATCH. Per their website, ICWATCH is a
project to collect and analyze resumes of people working in the intelligence community,
people working for the intelligence contractors, the military, and intelligence agencies
frequently mentioned secret code words and surveillance programs in public resumes.
These resumes are useful for uncovering new surveillance programs learning more about
known code words, identifying which companies help with which surveillance programs,
examining trends in the intelligence community and more. This study is designed to
examine the level of an individual's disposition to value privacy, how this influences their
situational privacy concerns regarding their information being scraped, and posted by
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ICWATCH, and ultimately, its influence on the user's intention to modify their LinkedIn
account settings. Now, I will capture your feedback on several topics for a few minutes
each. You're welcome to ask me to rephrase or explain anything. Are you ready to
proceed?
11251351842 08:42
I'm ready to go.
John Marsh 08:50
Perfect. So topic one., for the next few minutes let's discuss if this situation is a breach,
breach of privacy. What are your thoughts?
11251351842 08:59
•[INVN02]
So, the um the breaches the breach of privacy is actually an intrusion into the
personal life of another specifically without just cause. •[REGL03]So I've submitted this
particular instance, they do not have have just cause and and rather um the privacy that's
being invaded, I would have, if you will, the essence uh or legal liability or legal uh
ability to bring a lawsuit if damages or for damages that were incurred. •[GPCN08]Um,
obviously, I'm not any celebrity or public figure who could reasonably assume to be
recognized in the public and not be protected. But I would go on to say um that As a
nonpublic individual, I uh certainly have the right to be protected from any intrusion on
my solitude and my private affairs. •[USGE07]Uh, and then anybody that takes those, that
data and disclose them in it with the intent to embarrass me or somehow discredit me
with that private information causes us concern. •[USGE02]Um, so, the uh uh or uh in
addition, takes that information and uh puts it in in the public under a false light. Uh, and
then lastly, uh uses my name and or uh my personal information for some sort of uh uh
commercial advantage. •[INVN03]So, so the breach of privacy is not fully satisfied, if you
will, under under this particular uh situation. Under this particular topic, ie a breach of
privacy, that they scraped my personally available information um that anybody with a
reasonable uh basis could do you know, from uh Facebook, um and that is made to the
general public, certainly. Uh, but does that necessarily constitute a breach of my privacy?
Uh, no, not at this point.
John Marsh 09:50
Okay. Uh, take some notes for a minute.
11251351842 11:32
Okay.
John Marsh 11:34
Okay. All right. So moving on to topic two, for the next few minutes, let's discuss your
disposition to value privacy.
11251351842 11:44
Okay. •[GPCN09]Uh, at the end of the day, I certainly value the right to be left alone.
•[PRBF17]
Uh my personally identifiable information is uh um thought to be at least
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protected from public scrutiny, especially as a employee of the government, uh but I
think uh recent breaches with, especially with the Office of Personnel Management has
almost made that null and void. •[REGL08]Um and certainly looking through the uh
amendments, probably the closest one that covers any sort uh of privacy information uh
is both the 14th amendment uh or more importantly the Privacy Act of 1974 uh which in
theory should prevent the unauthorized disclosure uh held by the government. Um, so, so,
uh so in some value it protections are in place. Uh, are they being followed is the spillage
occurred? Certainly. Uh does that uh help or hurt uh ICWATCH. Um, you know,
•[COLL09]
I, I suspect the bigger the bigger issue and bigger concern um would be to take uh
the information from the OPM or some of the other databases that have been breached
and and kind of uh meld them together if you will.
John Marsh 13:21
Okay. I'm sorry. So moving on to topic three for the next few minutes, let's discuss your
level of concern regarding ICWATCH scraping and posting your data.
11251351842 13:38
Okay. •[SPCN10]Um, surely, uh ICWATCH um their behavior certainly raises red flags.
•[USGE16]
Um and at the end of the day, the question comes into uh what the intent is, um
you know, is the intent malicious Um, that's questionable. Uh is I would say that posts in
any of my information is less than desire desirable, certainly. Um, to be sure, I know the
information I had on my profile is sanitized to the fullest extent possible. •[USGE11]Um,
using the WikiLeaks model as a conduit to the general public, um um it was in my mind
anyways that that uh that breach that scraping of information that technique that model is
uh designed more clear or clearly more designed, if you will, to harm the IC community
and and writ large the US government. •[REGL07]Um, so um you know, the the fact that
ICWATCH has violated personal privacy in the past it has and and and, more
importantly, the US government's resolve to do anything about it. Um um you know, has
has me equally concerned and I say that because uh uh Julian Assange uh has been uh
under um has not been brought to trial in 10 years despite being uh currently at trial as we
speak. •[USGE01]Um but uh you know, his his model of behavior, not only with
ICWATCH, but similar programs were designed to do that bring discredit on um the
folks in that community. So it does raise a red flag. They could certainly be used um with
a nefarious attack. •[REGL01]Um um but but looking at the some of the previous models,
um especially with uh Chelsea Manning, and and uh and others. Um it it certainly did
harmful and uh severe damage to the US government writ large. Uh, but at the end of the
day, uh I think uh the uh WikiLeaks enterprise and especially Julian Assange, have
perhaps a more personal uh price to pay.
John Marsh 16:33
All right. Uh then finally, let's discuss your intention to modify your LinkedIn profiles
visibility.
11251351842 16:42
•[BEHV07]
Um, so quite honestly, I like it the way it is, •[BNFT02]I scrubbed it uh even before
this couple of weeks, two three weeks ago uh with the intent of um ensuring um my
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network of IC and uh intel professionals recognize um the new duties and positions that I
was that I'm currently in. And then more importantly, uh should I opt to uh leverage those
that skill set into other arenas other commands? Um I had the requisite background that
was uh verifiable um for potential recruiters and what.
John Marsh 17:36
All right. Um, so any uh additional thoughts or comments you might have based on the
topics that we discussed?
11251351842 17:51
•[USGE14]
The probably in in in stepping back it uh this is not the first time that uh an entity
agency has looked to scrape and or um use this information for, you know, malicious
type attacks. •[REGL02]And and um I guess it's frustrating from a jurisprudence perspective
on the exactly what mechanisms are in place to um prosecute, uh certainly into the, you
know, the digital cyber realm, um which, which is tough to, and then the content could
potentially be classified, which adds another uh layer to another dimension to
prosecution. Uh and again, I think uh, using Julian Assange um and the Wikileaks
program as as a whole, using that model, uh and then seeing that uh its taken 10 years to
to bring him to trial, uh I think speaks poorly of, of our um our government's ability to uh
provide ramifications for such activities.
John Marsh 19:21
All right. So um thank you again for your participation in the interview. This concludes
my data collection.
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Interview 11269613365
Sat, 3/28 2:54PM
SPEAKERS
John Marsh, 11269613365
John Marsh 07:23
Hello
11269613365 07:24
Hey John, [participant name removed].
John Marsh 07:27
Oh, hey, how you doing?
11269613365 07:28
Good.
John Marsh 07:30
All right. Let me start this out by saying good evening. Are you participant
11269613365?
11269613365 07:41
I am.
John Marsh 07:43
And do you consent to being interviewed?
11269613365 07:46
I do.
John Marsh 07:47
And do you consent to this interview being recorded?
11269613365 07:50
I do.
John Marsh 07:52
Perfect. So please allow me to explain the study for a few minutes briefly. Its purpose is
to investigate
11269613365 08:00
Okay
John Marsh 08:01
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Its purpose is to investigate the linkages between privacy and behavior in an actual
privacy specific scenario. If you will recall, you previously took a survey regarding your
LinkedIn profile data being scraped and posted to a third party website called
ICWATCH. Per their website, ICWATCH is a project to collect and analyze resumes of
people working in the intelligence community. People working for the intelligence
contractors, the military and intelligence agencies frequently mention secret code words
and surveillance programs in public resumes. These resumes are useful for uncovering
new surveillance programs, learning more about known code words, identifying which
companies help with which surveillance programs, examining trends in the intelligence
community and more. This study is designed to examine the level of an individual's
disposition to value privacy, how this influences their situational privacy. privacy
concerns regarding their information being scraped and posted by ICWATCH, and
ultimately, its influence on the user's intention to modify their LinkedIn account settings.
So now, I will capture your feedback on several topics for a few minutes each, and you
are welcome to ask me to rephrase or explain anything that isn't clear. Are you ready to
proceed?
11269613365 09:24
I am.
John Marsh 09:26
Perfect. So the first topic for the next few minutes, let's discuss if this situation is a breach
of privacy.
11269613365 09:36
Okay
John Marsh 09:37
What are your thoughts on that?
11269613365 09:39
I really don't think it is. So.
John Marsh 09:41
Okay.
11269613365 09:42
•[CNTL13]
I think I told you that my questionnaire I think that, you know, you could have as
much as an individual, I could have as much privacy as I want. •[PRBF03]But I think if you
go out to social media sites, you gotta it's my position that you don't have any uh any
expectation of privacy at that point. •[PRBF18]So, I mean, that's why they're called social
media, right? So uh I guess that pretty much answers my the question. Yeah. Do you
want me to elaborate any further on that?
John Marsh 10:18

156
Um, oh, no. If you have something you'd like to add, that's great. If not, uh however, you
answer is perfectly fine.
11269613365 10:26
•[PRBF10]
I just want to let you know, I can elaborate if you want more, but I just know that
that's how I feel it just uh. You know, just by the term social media. So LinkedIn,
Facebook, Twitter, all those are uh social media sites, and I have no expectation of
privacy on any of those sites. •[PRBF02]Although they try to do it. I mean, it's just, I mean, I
don't know how hard it would be to for their platform to work with uh personalized
privacy settings. So I really don't expect, I have no expectation of privacy on that stuff.
John Marsh 11:08
Okay, um so moving on to the next topic then for the next few minutes, let's discuss your
disposition to value privacy. How do you personally feel about privacy or your privacy?
11269613365 11:23
•[CNTL10]
So I feel I'm in control that. So uh if I want something to be private, then I won't
put it on a social media site. So I mean, there's things that you look at my social media
sites, I probably, I'm guessing you probably have. There's not much out there. So it's, uh,
it's pretty vanilla. And like, I try to stay away from politics or a lot of personal opinions.
Most of it has to do with pictures of the family and stuff like that. •[BNFT09]So it's, it's stuff
that I wouldn't mind put it on there because I want a large number of people to be able to
see it, i.e., my friends, so I'm not looking for any real privacy in those settings. •[CNTL22]If
I'm looking for privacy, then I'll send you know, a personal email or a letter, write
someone a letter and send it.
John Marsh 12:17
All right. Just taking some notes here. Um, all right, so the next topic, for the next few
minutes, let's discuss your level of concern regarding ICWATCH scraping and posting
your data.
11269613365 12:32
So I saw that I'm not real sure if ICWATCH is a government thing or a commercial thing.
John Marsh 12:39
I can answer that, that they are a private entity. And right now they are being hosted by
WikiLeaks.
11269613365 12:48
•[CNTL12]
Okay. So once again, I mean it's, it's up to me to be careful of what I put out there
in terms of uh you know what content I make available. •[PRBF15]So maybe you have a
question about it, you know, we've been instructed to contact the government, if you
have, if you have any concerns, so uh most of that stuff has been vetted that that I would
ever talk about, I have very little out there. •[CNTL09]I mean, I have a resume that's been
there forever, and it's pretty vanilla. And the government's seen it. So it's uh, you know,
once again, I'm kind of careful about that. I don't go any further than that. •[CNTL20]So we
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want to talk about additional data that I make sure that we talk in a space somewhere
where I know that it's, it's uh been SCIF'd for the discussion that we're about to have.
•[CNTL07]
So once again, I thought, you know if your personal responsibility to monitor
that, so I wouldn't expect uh uh a site, a social media site to be able to uh protect, I
shouldn't be discussing that. •[COLL13]So I thought, I thought that was it I just wasn't real
sure ICWATCH almost sounds like a government function so but I'm sure the
government does the same thing with my with me too also so same thing ICWATCH. I'm
guessing the government's also doing the same thing.
John Marsh 14:27
Alright, so topic four last topic. So finally let's discuss your intention to modify your
LinkedIn profiles visibility.
11269613365 14:38
Okay, so uh I don't think I have anything was that
John Marsh 14:50
I was just gonna elaborate has this situation uh influenced your desire to modify the
visibility of your LinkedIn profile?
11269613365 14:59
•[PRBF13]
No, once again, I just it's my opinion that if I put something on a link on a link
like LinkedIn so I would say something like clearancejobs.com all of them. Yeah, I mean
it would I follow the rules the government has given me and that and then I would expect
it to be open source anybody that looks at those sites that once again, I don't let every I
don't. •[GPCN03]I don't friend everybody asked to be friended I think you asked and I did
for you. But uh just because of the topic you were working on, but yeah, I mean, I don't if
I don't know the person, •[USGE03]I don't know what they're doing with the data, then I'm
pretty I close it down pretty, pretty uh tightly. •[CNTL21]I know everybody that's on my site.
•[PRBF11]
I also realize that people that know know people that I know can see my some of
my stuff because they, they share it. So, once again, I uh it's my assumption that anything
that's on those sites is going to be open source to anybody. •[CNTL06]So I don't I don't
perceive any, any uh expectation of privacy when dealing with those sites but if I want to
be private, then I'll write an email, I won't, it won't be on some kind of uh, I guess it's,
you know, there's a push-pull arrangement, right? It won't be on a site where people can
pull data. •[CNTL11]If I'm worried about it, it's gonna be a situation where I'll push it to the
guy. And it won't be through the site, it'll be through an email or something a little bit
more secure. •[PRBF23]Even when you send an email, you know, to a friend, you're not
necessarily secure all the time, but that's a whole different problem where people have
hacked into people's email accounts. •[BNFT08]So that to me is a social media site's all
about us out there trying to basically generate a network. So that's how I use it. So
probably not a very fun interview, screw you up?
John Marsh 17:15
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Oh, no, no, it's perfectly fine. I'm just basically capturing your thoughts on it. So no, that's
fine. Um, so I'll give you here an opportunity for any uh additional comments based on
what you've discussed over those topics.
11269613365 17:29
I'm not, I want to participate because I just, I hear my uh my niece is a big uh software
person. She worked at gosh can't remember the name of the company. I'm old and I'm
getting senile, but she worked for [company name removed] now. And uh she gets all
upset about like, Facebook and all these things. And I'm just like, are you kidding me?
•[PRBF09]
So it's a social media site. So anyway, and I know there's a lot, a lot of
millennials, I guess there's an expectation of these things to be more than what they were
intended to be, I think, so. These expectations evolve. And I don't really know what the
foundation for it is why they believe that. But uh that's why I wanted to participate with
this with you just because I wanted to uh. There's some personal [indecipherable word].
•[CNTL04]
So people have to take a personal uh position on what they're doing, what they're
posting out there. •[CNTL05]So you gotta, you kind of gotta filter what you're saying and
doing and uh uh its kinda, I don't think there's any expectation. •[PRBF24]I don't have an
expectation of privacy on any of those sites.
John Marsh 18:50
All right. Um, so, thank you again for your participation.
11269613365 18:55
All right
John Marsh 18:56
This concludes my data collection.
11269613365 18:58
Okay,
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